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Abstract 
When Economic Value Added (EVA
™
) was first promoted by the patent-holders, Stern 
Stewart and Company, it was hailed as an innovation in management accounting.  The 
suggestion was that this measure could be used as the basis for the management control 
system within the firm, covering planning, control, investment decision making and 
remuneration determination.  Many firms introduced the EVA system.  New Zealand, in 
particular, was exposed to the EVA methodology through the publication in 1996 of a 
Value-Based Reporting Protocol that was recommended for state-owned enterprises.    
 
This study adopts a longitudinal perspective to examine the experience of three large 
companies in New Zealand, who implemented EVA in the late 1990s.  These companies 
are ex-nationalised firms; two are state-owned enterprises and one is listed.  The firms 
implemented EVA in the late 1990s and continued to use it as the management control 
system for a period of 10-15 years.  The evidence is gathered from a questionnaire 
conducted in 1999, interviews conducted in 2001 and 2011, and supporting 
documentary evidence.  It covers the entire ‘life cycle’ of EVA, from initial 
implementation, through its evolution to the eventual decline.   
 
Three different theoretical frameworks are developed from three academic disciplines 
and applied in an original context to analyse this EVA evidence.  The first is the 
discovery theory framework, drawing from the economics literature base.  This 
framework is used to consider whether EVA can be regarded as a discovery process 
within the organisation, to discover the source of value that is known to exist in these 
ex-nationalised firms.  The second, from the management literature, is used to 
investigate whether EVA can be viewed as a management model in the firm.  Finally, 
contingency theory as applied in management accounting is extended to a longitudinal 
perspective to analyse the variables that were important at each stage of the EVA life 
cycle. A central theme of each framework was the information provided and the 
incentives created by the measure. 
 
The thesis provides original contributions to the evidence on EVA, including why EVA 
needed to evolve and why it eventually failed.  Further contributions are the suggestions 
for development and extension of each framework and the synthesising of the 
frameworks.  Finally, implications for practitioners and policy makers are considered. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the scene for the thesis, providing an introduction to the concept of 
Economic Value Added (EVA
™
) and a discussion of the literature on EVA, including 
academic literature and literature from the EVA promoters, Stern Stewart and Company 
(Stern Stewart).
1
  The experience of previous researchers provides valuable knowledge 
in designing this study.  A discussion of their results serves to identify a gap in the 
literature which provides the justification for the research method and questions 
addressed in this thesis.  The three theoretical frameworks adopted to interpret the 
evidence are described and explained, together with the anticipated benefits of 
employing three different frameworks.  Finally, the choice of the three case study 
companies is justified.  Overall, the introduction establishes the motivations for the 
study and a case for its significance. 
 
1.2 The EVA Phenomenon 
 
Economic Value Added became very popular as a financial management system in the 
1990s.
 
 EVA is defined as net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) less a charge on total 
capital (debt plus equity capital multiplied by the cost of capital).  In other words, EVA 
is the income earned by a business after deducting a charge on the capital required in 
order to generate that income.  The measure of EVA has its roots in the residual income 
concept but with EVA it is claimed that the accounting numbers, on being re-formatted, 
make the construct more economically meaningful, moving accounting towards the 
ideal of economic income (Stern et al., 2001, p17).
 2
  It has been argued that EVA 
provides an annual measure that is based on ‘hard data’ rather than projections (Stern et 
al., 2001, p19).  The concepts behind EVA have been around for almost one hundred 
years, with implementation of an EVA-type system in General Motors in the 1920s, in 
Matsushita in Japan in the 1930s and General Electric in the 1950s (Young and 
O’Byrne, 2001, p104).   
 
                                                 
1
 EVA is a registered trademark of the Stern Stewart and Company Consulting firm.  For ease of reading, 
the trademark symbol is omitted from the remainder of the thesis, although the patent is acknowledged. 
2
 Residual income is defined as net income less a capital charge that reflects the return to equity holders 
(Solomons, 1965).   
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Stern Stewart would argue that EVA is much more than simply a measure of ex post 
performance based on accounting numbers and the cost of capital.  The scope of their 
model and its application to incentives is claimed by them to offer more than residual 
income.  Furthermore, EVA is not measured solely at the overall firm level; it can be 
drilled down into the organisation and measured at the divisional, process or product 
level.  It is argued by Stern Stewart that EVA can be used as a complete measure within 
the firm, for planning, investment decision making, control and remuneration 
determination.  In his seminal book, Stewart (1991) argued that EVA is “the bedrock 
upon which a new and completely integrated financial management system can be 
created” (Stewart, 1991, p4).  Integration is achieved along several dimensions.  Firstly, 
the mapping of EVA to divisional and/or business unit levels achieves vertical linkages 
within decentralised organisations.  Secondly, ex ante EVA can be used for investment 
decision making, whilst ex post EVA can be used for performance evaluation and 
reward structures.  This potentially solves conflicts of interest that are created through 
the use of different measures for these key activities.  Thirdly, perhaps the key 
motivation for EVA
 
is that its maximisation throughout the organisation is consistent 
with the objective of shareholder value maximisation.  It therefore directly addresses the 
moral hazard issue of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  By linking rewards 
to EVA
 
there is an integration of managerial self interest with shareholder objectives.  
Managers are on the same footing as shareholders as they are rewarded for actions that 
increase shareholder returns (Stern and Shiely, 2001, p24).  This meant that where EVA 
was fully implemented, it had the potential to become central to the management control 
system (MCS) for the firm (Otley, 1980, p422).  This application led EVA to be 
described as an ‘innovation’ in management accounting (for example, Sulaiman and 
Mitchell, 2005; Worthing and West, 2001).   
 
Following much publicity, EVA was implemented by many companies across the 
world.
3
  Organisations featured in EVA publications include Coca-Cola, Quaker Oats,  
Briggs and Stratton and the US Postal Service in the  United States of America; 
Cadbury Schweppes, Lloyds Bank and Tate and Lyle in the United Kingdom; Siemens 
in Germany and Telecom New Zealand and Airways Corporation of New Zealand in 
New Zealand (Ehrbar, 1998; Stern and Sheily, 2001).   
 
                                                 
3
 In their book published in 2001, Stern et al. state that more than 300 companies worldwide have adopted 
EVA (Stern et al. 2001, p16). 
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1.3 Literature from the EVA Promoters 
 
There is a large body of literature published by Stern Stewart, centred on the premise 
that EVA can create value.  The first major publication is Stewart’s seminal book which 
provides extensive discussion on the merits of EVA, including the statement that EVA 
is the only performance measure that links directly to a share’s intrinsic value.  In the 
book there is step by step information on how to construct EVA from accounting data 
(Stewart, 1991).  Further publications include more general information and 
applications (for example Ehrbar, 1998 and Stern et al., 2001).  Again, these books 
highlight the advantages of EVA, such as the link to value creation, the alignment of 
incentives (so that managers can be turned into owners) and objectives (with EVA 
“taken to the shop floor”) (Stern et al., 2001, ch6).   
 
Academic evidence has also been published by the promoters, in the Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance.  Again, this literature is inevitably biased towards the various 
perceived merits of EVA but arguably it does widen the base of opinion on which the 
information is drawn.  As well as containing articles by Stern, Stewart and other EVA 
promoters (for example, O’Byrne, 1996; Stewart, 1994), academics contribute to the 
discussions (for example The EVA Roundtable, 1994) and provide articles in their own 
right (for example Kleiman, 1999; Zimmerman, 1997).   
 
These publications do tend to concentrate on the benefits of EVA, although there is not 
always universal agreement about the details of the methodology.  For example, on the 
subject of accounting adjustments, one publication states that there are more than 160 
possible adjustments (Ehrbar, 1998, p164), another states that 150 possible adjustments 
have been identified by EVA consultants, with no more than around 15 necessary 
within a specific company (Young and O’Byrne, 2001, p267), while a third publication 
cites 120 possible adjustments with no more than one dozen necessary to make NOPAT 
realistic (Stern et al., 2001, p20).   
 
Although concentrating on the benefits, there is brief recognition in some publications 
that EVA may fail (for example Stern et al., 2001; Young and O’Byrne, 2001).  Reasons 
for failure are provided (such as transfer pricing issues) as well as “recipes for success” 
(including full installation of EVA for measurement, management and incentives, 
4 
 
support from the top (Chief Financial Officer and/or Chief Executive Officer) and full 
training programmes (Stern et al., 2001, ch10 and ch13). 
 
1.4 Academic Literature 
 
Academic studies on EVA are likely to be more neutral. However, many of the 
empirical studies using EVA numbers rely on publicly available data, often purchased 
from Stern Stewart.  This data would include calculations for firms that may not be 
EVA users.  Furthermore, the data represented external investigations at the firm level, 
much of it involving statistical analysis.  The objective of this analysis was to test for 
value creation by examining whether the EVA number was more highly correlated with 
share price than other measures of performance such as earnings, where an increase in 
share price was deemed to indicate value creation.  The results from these investigations 
provide mixed conclusions.  A greater correlation between EVA and share price was 
found by some researchers, for example, Chen and Dodd (1997); Kleiman (1999); 
O’Byrne (1996); Stark and Thomas, (1998); Worthing and West (2001).    On the 
contrary, Biddle et al. (1997) and Lougee et al. (2006) found that the association 
between returns and earnings was higher (more positive) than it was between returns 
and EVA.   
 
Researchers have also compared the abnormal returns of EVA adopters to a control 
group of non-adopters.  Griffith (2004) found that his sample of EVA adopters (which 
comprised underperforming firms) continued to underperform both their peers and the 
market.  He suggested that EVA was not a good indicator of performance and there was 
no correlation between firms adopting EVA and subsequent shareholder returns. On the 
contrary, Kleiman (1999) in his study of 71 firms found that EVA firms outperformed 
the control group.  Lougee et al. (2006) found that their sample of 74 Stern Stewart 
EVA firms earned positive abnormal returns of around 7% for the first two years after 
EVA implementation but for the next three years the abnormal return was -6.5%, 
effectively eradicating the initial positive returns. 
 
Other studies have focussed upon the impact of EVA upon a different measure of value, 
namely accounting operating performance, and whether it is correlated with managerial 
action choice.  These studies looked in particular at the impact upon the use of capital 
within a company.  The reason for this focus is that one of the arguments cited by Stern 
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Stewart is that the introduction of EVA can lead to a shedding of obsolete capital within 
the firm (Stewart, 1991).  Managers would have an incentive to get rid of such capital, 
since holding it incurs a capital charge for no benefit.  Again, the conclusions from 
these studies are mixed.  There is evidence of greater asset utilisation, smaller net 
working capital correlated with better operating performance, Wallace (1997); evidence 
that EVA adopters outperform non-adopters for up to five years, Ehrbar (1999); while 
other studies claimed that improvements in the use of capital or the generation of 
income may not be attributable to EVA, for example Hogan and Lewis (1999); or that 
there was no relation between EVA adoption and security analysts’ forecasts, Cordeiro 
and Kent (2001).  Lougee et al. (2006) hypothesised that initial large improvements 
from EVA implementation were a result of companies “picking the low hanging fruit” 
by selling non-performing assets (Lougee et al., 2006, p357).  They found that 
dispositions increased by over 50% in the two years after EVA implementation, but 
then decreased in the following two year period.  They related this result to their finding 
that EVA initially increased by around 40% in the year following implementation and 
then the increase in EVA fell to around 9% in subsequent years. 
 
Some earlier studies examined the characteristics of firms adopting EVA, compared to 
non-adopters.  For example, Lovata and Costigan (2002) looked at business strategy, 
partitioning firms into defender (pursuing a strategy of cost leadership) and prospector 
(pursuing a differentiation strategy).   They concluded that EVA is more suited to 
defender firms, whilst prospector firms tend to rely on non-financial measures as they 
adapt to their changing environments.  Kleiman (1999) found that capital intensity is 
positively associated with adoption, as did Riceman et al. (2002), who concluded that 
EVA may be less effective in service areas.     
 
These weak and inconclusive results on the impact of EVA are perhaps not surprising 
because some difficult design issues have to be overcome by researchers.  The most 
fundamental difficulty is the partitioning of firms into EVA users and non-users.  There 
are two key problems with this.  Firstly, evidence suggests that the term ‘EVA user’ is 
not well-defined.  For example, an EVA user may fully implement EVA as a 
completely integrated or holistic system, as recommended by Stern Stewart.  
Alternatively, selected parts of the EVA ‘package’ may be adopted, for example EVA 
for remuneration but not for planning and control.  At the other extreme, an EVA user 
may calculate the EVA results only at the overall corporate level, with these results 
6 
 
having no behavioural impact within the decentralised organisation.  In other words 
there is a continuum from full implementation throughout the company through to 
almost nothing (Griffith, 2004; Malmi and Ikaheimo, 2003; McLaren, 2004).  Secondly, 
whether a firm is an EVA user is not always publicly known.  Again studies may rely 
on Stern Stewart publications or perhaps on discursive information contained in the 
annual report and accounts.  Since there is no requirement to publish EVA results or 
even to disclose that a firm is an EVA user, many firms employing the EVA 
methodology may go undetected.  Some studies have not used firms identified as EVA 
users in their samples because of this identification issue.  For example, Wallace (1997) 
used proxy companies identified by profit sharing arrangements that ‘looked’ like EVA.  
If some of the companies are not actually EVA companies, then there is a confounding 
of EVA and non-EVA companies.  Similarly, Stark and Thomas (1998) use a lagged 
balance sheet variable, book value of equity, in a regression and claimed that this is an 
EVA construct.  This is clearly not a test of the value consequences of an EVA user as 
there is not even a cost of capital adjustment in the regression; it is just a regression with 
an additional lagged variable.   
 
Since firms do not tend to disclose their EVA results, any attempt to construct them in 
order to compare EVA users and non-users is flawed.  It is argued that each company 
needs a tailor-made definition of EVA that balances the trade-off between simplicity 
and precision (Ehrbar, 1998, p165).  ‘Basic’ EVA, containing no adjustments to the 
GAAP figures, is not appropriate.  Not only are the accounting adjustments advocated 
by Stern Stewart that move accounting measures to economic measures missing from 
both NOPAT and capital but also there is often no estimate of the weighted average cost 
of capital that can be sensibly defended.
4
  ‘Disclosed’ EVA, where around a dozen 
standard adjustments are made to accounting data (such as in the EVA results published 
by Stern Stewart), is also flawed because the adjustments may not be applicable to 
certain companies. 
 
Further issues over research design depend upon the methodology employed.  For 
example, if the short-run impact on corporate value of the introduction of EVA is 
analysed with an event study methodology, there are further selection criteria to be 
                                                 
4
 There are research design issues that have not been discussed because they are not central to the study.  
These would include sample selection bias (from the incentives of Stern-Stewart) and errors in variables 
from not using EVA numbers. 
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established, the event window to define and identify, and a benchmark normal return to 
be defined.  The selection criteria will naturally impose restrictions given by data 
availability such as a stock market listing.  For example SOEs would be excluded, since 
they are not listed companies.  It is usual to define a one day, or two day or three day 
event window but crucially to examine the impact of EVA introduction, the exact 
announcement date must be known.  Since firms do not tend to publicly announce the 
exact date of introduction, sample size would be reduced (compared to the size if the 
announcement dates were all available), raising the prospect of sample selection bias.  
The benchmark normal return is a standard issue for all event studies and is the subject 
of considerable controversy because of the disagreement over the appropriate asset 
pricing model (for example, Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2011).   
 
For long-term impact studies of EVA there is the problem of controlling for all the other 
variables that influence the dependent variable.   Studies involving a ‘benchmark’ 
control group of non-EVA companies not only have to deal with the lack of definition 
in EVA companies but also have to cope with the additional problem of defining 
exactly what it means to be a non-EVA company.  Specifically, companies that can be 
identified as not using the EVA performance measure may still be using other forms of 
value based management or may be using management accounting tools that look like 
EVA.  For example, the cost of capital may be factored into pricing and investment 
decision making and managerial rewards may be based on excess profits where this is 
measured in an equivalent way to EVA.  This diversity of practice within the samples of 
EVA and non-EVA companies implies not only that the sampling distributions of each 
sample will have high variability – covering both negative and positive outcomes but 
that they will substantially overlap making the task of finding systematic differences 
between the two samples very difficult.   
 
While there are research design issues limiting the quality of the EVA outcomes, the 
objective of most studies has been to go beyond correlation and attempt to establish a 
cause and effect relationship.  However, there has been criticism of this objective.  For 
example, Kleiman, states that: 
 
“When companies consider making EVA their primary performance criterion, 
they are searching for more than just a better financial metric.  They are seeking 
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a better way to motivate value-adding behaviour throughout the organisation.”  
(Kleiman, 1999, p80). 
 
In other words, if the results of the studies are to be of use to managers, the evidence 
should provide information on how value can be created and the objectives should not 
be confined to just establishing the causal link.  But this may be difficult in practice.  
For example, Jazayeri and Scapens (2008) stated that: 
 
“Unfortunately, it is very difficult to isolate the direct effect of using the BVS 
(Business Values Scorecard) on the performance of BAE Systems and to 
separate out the impact of the culture change project from the many other factors 
which have affected the company’s performance over the years.”  (Jazayeri and 
Scapens, 2008, p67). 
 
In other words, Jazayeri and Scapens (2008) are arguing that the modelling required will 
inevitably be too complex to produce meaningful results and that it is not possible to 
isolate a clear cause and effect relationship because so many variables are involved.  
The implication of this statement for EVA is that (at this time) it cannot be introduced 
into a company and its effects (say through value drivers) predicted ex ante.   
 
1.5 Comments on the Literature 
 
The studies cited above have several limitations which serve to weaken the EVA 
evidence they have generated: 
 In the correlation studies, causation links between EVA and share price are not 
investigated.   
 Even if correlation of a measure (such as EVA or accounting profit) with share 
prices was found to be low, this does not mean that the construct under investigation 
is irrelevant for the firm.  What it may mean is that an alternative method of analysis 
is required.   
 The EVA numbers used in these studies contain relatively few adjustments, 
meaning that the numbers do not reflect economic profits and are therefore more a 
test of residual income.   
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 Some authors have not even attempted to identify EVA firms, relying instead on a 
construct of EVA.  It is unclear whether these estimated figures are even appropriate 
(Ittner and Larcker, 2001).   
 There are possible problems in the identification of EVA users.  For example, 
identification through remuneration plans does not necessarily indicate that the firm 
embraces the EVA philosophy.   
 Firm-level studies take no account of the fact that there is a whole spectrum of EVA 
use.   
 In these studies there is no consideration of the evolution of EVA use over time.  
Attention must be paid to the dynamics of the process by which EVA is used and 
this has been neglected by researchers (Otley, 2003).   
 
1.6 Implications for Research 
 
1.6.1 Research Method 
 
The issues described above suggest that there are various levels at which studies on 
EVA can be conducted.  In order to obtain comprehensive evidence on the use of EVA 
and the experience of working with EVA, it may be appropriate to conduct research at 
the level of the individual firm.  Therefore, the case study method may be the most 
suitable, rather than the ‘veranda’ model adopted by many studies, where the researcher 
examines from a distance.
5
  The case study method may be particularly apposite if the 
case study is exploratory or explanatory and the researcher is adopting a management 
accounting perspective.  In their book on research methods and methodology in finance 
and accounting, Ryan et al. stated: 
 
 “Case studies offer us the possibility of understanding the nature of accounting 
in practice; both in terms of the techniques, procedures, systems, etc. which are 
used and the way in which they are used.” (Ryan et al., 2002, p143). 
 
In addition, Otley (1999) suggested the use of the case study to investigate new 
management accounting practices, including EVA.  Through the case study, a detailed 
                                                 
5
 The veranda model is described by Burgess (1984). 
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picture of EVA use can be established which will enable the development of 
explanations.   
 
1.6.2 The Longitudinal Perspective 
 
It is important to recognise that the implementation and use of EVA can develop and 
evolve within firms.  A more complete picture of how and why it is designed and used 
will be obtained if the research adopts a long-term perspective, rather than if the 
evidence is taken from a snapshot in time.  Explanations of how management 
accounting systems change “require longitudinal studies that look at the relationship 
over long periods of time” (Ryan et al, 2002, p84).  When considering a man-made 
phenomenon such as EVA, it is important to recognise that it is assumed that such 
constructs are developed over time through human experience, grounded in the 
experiences of managers.  They undergo evolution as a result of human interaction.  
This can be detected through the longitudinal study, if the theoretical frameworks 
employed to interpret the evidence allow for this evolution.   
 
1.6.3 Interpreting the Evidence 
 
With the aim of building explanations, an interpretive methodology is appropriate.  
Theories can be used to explain the dynamic process of EVA use and how it changes 
over time.  Such research does not have the explicit aim of testing the theories, rather it 
uses theoretical frameworks to provide a way of thinking about the observations and 
helping to explain and understand them.    However, as well as the theoretical 
frameworks providing inputs to the building of explanations, they are also the outputs.  
This is because the interpretation of the evidence using the frameworks provides 
conclusions for the frameworks themselves.  In this way, the frameworks may be 
developed and extended over time.  The choice of the theoretical frameworks employed 
is important and will depend upon the specific research questions to be addressed. 
 
1.6.4 Criticisms of the Management Accounting Perspective 
 
Zimmerman (2001) criticised the progress made in empirical managerial accounting 
research.  A central criticism is the fact that much published research in management  
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accounting concentrates on describing practice and the frameworks adopted may be 
driven by consultants (a view which was motivated in response to Ittner and Larcker’s 
value-based management perspective view of managerial accounting research (Ittner 
and Larcker, 2001).)  Zimmerman argued that management accounting researchers 
should develop and test economics-based theoretical hypotheses.  He argued that a 
failure to do so retards empirical managerial accounting research.  Furthermore, 
managerial accounting data is heterogeneous and complex and not reliable and 
consistent, leading to the use of weak theory, or no theory and badly designed research 
methods.  Therefore, studies (such as field and case studies) may lack validity.   
 
Zimmerman’s article led to a response from accounting researchers.  For example, 
Hopwood (2002) agreed with some of Zimmerman’s criticisms (particularly regarding 
Ittner and Larcker’s framework) but he did not agree that economic theories were the 
answer to the lack of an underlying theoretical framework in managerial accounting.  
Similarly, Luft and Shields (2002) argued that empirical management accounting 
research goes beyond describing practice, since many social science theories are 
adopted by researchers.  They also refuted Zimmerman’s assertion that economics-
based theories should be employed, commenting on the fact that many neo-classical 
economics assumptions (such as rationality and equilibrium) do not hold in practice and 
therefore can impede observation and understanding, particularly when investigating 
management accounting change.   They concluded that improvements in empirical 
management accounting research will arise from the use of a variety of theories. 
 
1.6.5 Using a Variety of Theories 
 
Despite Zimmerman’s criticisms, it appears that the complex and heterogeneous nature 
of EVA use within organisations suggests that the case study is an appropriate research 
method to employ.  Without going into the organisations, it would be impossible to 
build up a picture of the reasons why EVA is introduced (origins and influences), and 
how it is used in the firm (design and evolution).  However, through a careful choice of 
theoretical frameworks to interpret the evidence, heed may be paid Zimmerman’s 
suggestion to employ economics-based theories (Zimmerman, 2001) and Luft and 
Shield’s response that a variety of theories should be used (Luft and Shields, 2002). 
 
  
12 
 
1.7 The Research Questions and the Theoretical Frameworks Employed 
 
In respect of case study information on the experience of EVA users, there appears to be 
a gap in the literature, since there is not much research evidence available.  Exceptions 
are Malmi and Ikaheimo (2003) who considered the experiences of users in Finland and 
McLaren (2004) who considered EVA users in New Zealand (in a preliminary study to 
this PhD thesis).  However, neither of these studies provided a holistic picture of EVA 
use over a sustained period of time.   
 
1.7.1 Research Questions  
 
The aim of the PhD is to investigate whether EVA can create value, with a specific 
focus on three organisations in New Zealand.  The overall focus is to appraise the 
usefulness of EVA with the central theme being the information provided and the 
incentives created by the EVA system, over the whole life cycle of EVA use.  
Specifically, three major research questions are addressed: 
 
1. Can the implementation and use of EVA lead to the discovery of value within 
the organisation? 
2. Can EVA be viewed as a management model to ensure corporate objectives are 
met? 
3. What were the key factors driving implementation, use and decline of EVA? 
 
The first question addresses the major reasons for the origins of EVA and how it is 
designed and used within the case study firms.  The second question focuses, in 
particular, on how EVA is used within the firms. The final question concentrates on the 
whole EVA life cycle, with the aim of identifying factors that drove each phase of the 
cycle. 
 
1.7.2 Gathering the Evidence 
 
Longitudinal evidence will be analysed, covering the entire period or life cycle of EVA 
use in the companies, from implementation, through evolution, to its eventual decline, 
in order to fully capture the dynamic process.  The chain of evidence for each company 
is collected from questionnaires distributed in 1999 (a blank questionnaire is provided 
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in Appendix A) and 21 semi-structured interviews conducted with key staff members in 
each company in 2001 and 2011.  The interview evidence was triangulated by 
documents that were referred to and discussed in the interviews, including internal 
corporate documents and documents from advisors to the companies.  Such a chain of 
evidence serves to enhance calibration and construct validity (Brownell, 1995, p65).   
  
Prior to the first set of interviews in 2001, the researcher specified to interviewees the 
broad areas to be covered. This was an attempt to achieve a well-defined research focus 
and consistency across the case studies.  Interviews in 2001 covered the spectrum of 
EVA use, from initial introduction through to its measurement and use for planning, 
investment decision making, control and remuneration determination.  These areas 
mirror the framework suggested by Otley (1999) with the additional consideration of 
the evolution with EVA since its initial implementation.  Otley stated that his objective 
was to “develop a framework which can provide a structure for examining extant 
practice in a more holistic way than has previously been the case” (Otley, 1999, p377).  
The 2011 interviews covered the time period since the 2001 visit and so examined the 
factors driving both the evolution and the decline in the measure.   
 
Respondents held a range of positions within the companies, from Board and Director 
level to Business Unit managers, team members and staff from central functions.  All 
had direct experience of implementing and/or working with EVA.  This meant that the 
perspective obtained on EVA was wider that simply the experience of management 
accountants.  In 2001, the EVA ‘owner’ was one of the respondents interviewed in each 
company.  Within two companies the same respondent was interviewed in 2001 and 
2011, thus helping to ensure continuity over time.   
 
1.7.3 The Theoretical Frameworks  
 
In addressing the research questions three different theoretical frameworks are 
employed to interpret the evidence.  The theoretical frameworks are developed and used 
to organise the analysis and explain and understand the empirics.  Each of the 
frameworks explicitly allows for evolution in EVA over time.  The frameworks are not 
employed to bias the research questions in a particular direction or directions.   
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The theoretical frameworks are as follows: 
 
1. Discovery Process – developed from Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
2. Management Model – developed from Berkinshaw and Goddard’s management 
model framework (Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009). 
3. Dynamic Contingency Theory – using a dynamic perspective developed from 
the contingency theory literature in management accounting (including 
Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1995). 
 
This study presents a new application of each of the frameworks.  The first two 
frameworks are from different disciplines (economics and management, respectively) 
and their use to analyse an accounting based construct (the EVA MCS) is something 
new.  The final framework, whilst developed from contingency theory in management 
accounting, extends the model to a dynamic, longitudinal perspective.  Further details 
on each of the frameworks are now provided. 
 
Discovery Process 
 
The discovery process framework is developed to interpret the evidence in order to 
address the first research question; Can the implementation and use of EVA can be used 
to discover value within the organisations?  The framework is based on evolutionary 
theory in economics, which states that organisations are dynamic and they evolve over 
time.  The evolution represents a change in the routines of a firm.  It is a process that is 
path-dependent, arising as a result of a shift in product demand or supply conditions or 
from innovation by firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p3).  Whilst innovation may most 
commonly be regarded as technical innovation, Nelson and Winter state that 
evolutionary theory can treat organizational innovation just as it treats technical 
innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p38).   Evolution occurs through the dynamic 
search and selection process (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p19).  In this context, for the 
firms, there are two major evolutions.  First of all and common across the firms will be 
the change in routines brought about by the introduction of EVA.  Secondly, further 
evolution takes place as EVA is modified and developed through the dynamic learning 
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(search and selection) process.  This evolution will be path-dependent for the firms, 
occurring as a result of individual reactions to the EVA systems.   
 
Whilst evolutionary theory explicitly allows for the consideration of responses of 
individuals to information provided by the innovation during the dynamic learning 
process, the impact of incentives is absent from the Nelson and Winter model.  It has 
been argued that an understanding of the impact, persistence and change of non-
technological features requires the consideration of incentives (Grief, 2006, p7).  Since 
incentives are an important feature of the EVA system as they are the mechanism for an 
alignment with shareholder objectives (and Stern Stewart were originally remuneration 
consultants), it is preferable they are considered.  The notion of extrinsic versus intrinsic 
incentives is employed, as discussed by Layard (2003).  In his lecture, Layard was 
specifically referring to performance related pay in the public sector which is relevant to 
all three firms in this study, since they were originally nationalised organisations.  
 
In order to assess whether EVA can help with the discovery of value, the question is, 
how would one know?  An examination of outcomes before and after EVA 
introduction, such as share prices or profit levels, does not help when the counterfactual 
is unknown.  An alternative methodology is not to focus on corporate performance but 
to focus upon the key influences (activities and processes) that would be expected to 
arise in a specific setting for EVA to be value adding.  Of course, such an approach does 
not guarantee that EVA will be successful.  However, what can be concluded is that if 
these factors are not in place then it is very unlikely that EVA will be successful as a 
tool for creating value.  These key influences are derived from Stern Stewart’s 
recommendations for the EVA system.  They include the proper measurement of EVA 
(with adjustments to accounting numbers and the measure pushed down through the 
decentralised organisation to business units) in order to provide the right information 
and the alignment of incentives, to ensure goal congruence (Stewart, 1991).  As well as 
the key influences, it is also important to consider the factors that may inhibit EVA as a 
discovery process. These include transactions costs (which may mean that the whole 
system is not worthwhile) and inertia (the reluctance of managers to change their 
existing routines). 
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Management Model 
 
The management model framework is developed and used to investigate the second 
research question focusing on the use of EVA; Can EVA be viewed as a management 
model within the firms, to ensure that the corporate objective can be met?  The notion of 
management models has been recognised as a key recent innovation by leading 
management academics (for example Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw and Goddard, 
2009; Hamel, 2007; Mintzberg, 2009).  It is argued that the management model is 
essential to help the manager evaluate how to do business, running alongside the 
business model and leadership.  The management model is defined by Birkinshaw and 
Goddard (2009) as: 
 
“The choices made by a company’s top executives regarding how they define 
objectives, motivate effort, coordinate activities and allocate resources; in other 
words, how they define the work of management” (Birkinshaw and Goddard, 
2009, p82).   
 
The Birkinshaw and Goddard model is chosen over two alternative models, Mintzberg, 
(2009) and Hamel, (2007), as it is a model derived from factor analysis drawn from 
many theoretical models.  Thus there is a theoretical underpinning for the model.  
Birkinshaw and Goddard state that through their analysis of the management literature, 
they have provided a “framework for dimensionalizing management”, based on a: 
 
“150 year analysis of the evolution of management models, studies of recent 
cases of management models, studies of recent cases of management innovation 
and a theoretical investigation of the underlying principles of management” 
(Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009, p83).   
 
In the model, management activity is grouped into four core sets or dimensions: 
managing objectives, motivating individuals, coordinating activities and making 
decisions.  The research aims to see investigate whether EVA in the three firms can be 
interpreted as a management model, by considering its role within the four theoretical 
dimensions.      
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Dynamic Contingency Theory 
 
The final theoretical framework, dynamic contingency theory, is employed to address 
the third research question; What are the key factors driving EVA implementation, use 
and decline?  This framework draws on the entire evidence gathered, spanning the three 
broad stages in the life cycle sequence of the EVA MCS, i.e. implementation, evolution 
in the measure and eventual decline.  The basic premise of contingency theory in 
management accounting is that there is no ‘best’ way to structure the MCS and 
consequently it is not possible to identify a universally appropriate management 
accounting system that will apply in all circumstances (Otley, 1980).  Many studies 
have been conducted that attempt to identify the impact of one or more contingency 
variables on the MCS or on an outcome, such as profit (for a review of such studies, see 
Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1995).   These studies tend to be cross-sectional statistical 
studies which use data from one point in time.  A weakness with these studies is that 
relevant variables may be omitted and causations unexplored.  This suggests a 
longitudinal approach would complement existing studies and enhance internal validity 
(Brownell, 1995, p64; Fisher, 1995, p45; Otley, 1980, p424).  Such an approach is 
adopted in this study; where the overall objective is to investigate the contextual 
variables that were important influences on EVA practice at each phase of the EVA life 
cycle.  The investigation of the decline of EVA within the firms is particularly 
interesting, as there is very little empirical information on the decline in management 
accounting techniques (Chanegrih, 2008; Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005). 
 
Overall, the three frameworks are summarised in table 1.1, where broad distinctions are 
drawn between them.  They are complementary as the discovery framework is used to 
interpret the evidence on implementation and use of EVA, the management model 
framework is used to interpret findings on the use of EVA and the contingency 
framework provides evidence on the introduction, use and demise of EVA.  It is 
anticipated that the employment of the three frameworks will help to provide a richer 
picture of the EVA experience within the firms.  For example, whilst the contingency 
theory framework can be used to identify the factors that are relevant at each stage of 
the EVA life cycle, the discovery theory and management model provide the theoretical 
underpinnings for the implementation and evolution in the measure.  Overall, the central 
theme within each framework is the information provided and the incentives created by 
EVA. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of the three theoretical frameworks 
 
 Discovery 
Theory 
Management 
Model 
Contingency 
Theory 
Literature base Economics, 
particularly 
Nelson and 
Winter (1982) 
Management, 
particularly 
Birkinshaw and 
Goddard (2009) 
Accounting, 
particularly 
Chenhall (2003) 
and Fisher (1995) 
Aspect considered Implementation 
and evolution 
Use of EVA, 
including the 
evolution 
Implementation, 
evolution and 
decline 
Research question Can EVA be used 
as a discovery 
process? 
Can EVA be 
interpreted as a 
management 
model? 
What are the key 
factors that led to 
EVA 
implementation, use 
and decline? 
Key themes Information and 
incentives 
Information and 
incentives 
Information and 
incentives 
Evidence used Published EVA 
information, 
questionnaires 
(1999), interviews 
(2001), 
supporting 
documentation 
Questionnaires 
(1999), interviews 
(2001), supporting 
documentation 
Questionnaires 
(1999), interviews 
(2001 and 2011), 
supporting 
documentation 
 
 
Overall, the study provides longitudinal evidence on EVA use within the three firms, 
from three different theoretical perspectives, as depicted in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of the theoretical frameworks used to 
interpret the EVA evidence 
 
  
All companies: 
Abandonment of full EVA 
system after 13-15 years 
All companies: Introduction 
of EVA: Stern Stewart & 
Co as advisors 
Company Y: Firm-specific 
measure of EVA 
Company X: Firm-specific 
measure of EVA  
Company Z: Firm-specific 
measure of EVA 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to information 
provided 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to information 
provided 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to information 
provided 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to incentives 
created 
 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to incentives 
created 
 
Evolution: In measure of 
EVA due to incentives 
created 
 
DISCOVERY PROCESS 
CONTINGENCY THEORY 
All companies: Extensive 
implementation throughout 
organisation for planning, 
decision making and 
rewards 
MANAGEMENT MODEL 
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The objective in using the frameworks is to provide different perspectives on EVA 
rather than to provide a test of whether one framework is ‘better’ than another.  Thus the 
frameworks are not conflicting in any way.  Overall, the study is exploratory, with the 
aim of building explanations through use of the theoretical frameworks.  In addition, the 
application of the frameworks leads to conclusions for the frameworks themselves.  In 
this respect, the research methodology is interpretive, as the theoretical frameworks are 
both inputs and outputs.  A summary of these outputs can be found in the concluding 
chapter.   
 
1.8 Introduction to the Case Study Companies 
 
The three firms chosen for investigation are; 
 
 Airways Corporation of New Zealand (Airways) – State-owned enterprise 
(SOE) responsible for air traffic management 
 New Zealand Post (Post) – SOE responsible for the postal system (also operates 
a large bank) 
 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (Telecom) – Publicly listed firm in the 
telecommunications sector 
 
Each firm implemented EVA in the 1990s at the time when the methodology first 
became very popular.  Stern Stewart consultants were employed to ensure a 
comprehensive introduction that was phased from the company level and mapped down 
to business units.  As such EVA was ‘properly’ implemented in that it was not simply a 
performance measure but was used fully throughout each organisation as a central 
component of the MCS.  The full EVA ‘package’ was implemented, so there was an 
expectation that this American system would be culturally appropriate in the New 
Zealand environment.   
 
EVA was employed in each of the firms for a period of thirteen-fifteen years.  During 
this time period, Telecom was well-known as an EVA company and cited by Stern 
Stewart in their publications (for example Ehrbar, 1998, p150; Stern et al. 2001, p206).  
The SOEs provide an interesting opportunity as they both (voluntarily) publish EVA 
information.  Over the time period under consideration in this study (1998-2010), 
Airways published (and continues to publish) audited EVA results in the annual report 
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and accounts, including detailed information on calculations.  This was extremely 
unusual and almost unique for EVA companies and it reflected commitment within the 
organisation to the EVA methodology.
6
  Similarly, although not in as much detail, Post 
published its annual EVA results against a five-year trend in the annual report and 
accounts, together with a commentary on the EVA philosophy adopted.  This means 
that it is possible to analyse the actual results that have been released by the companies, 
based on their own definition of EVA (which will reflect the adjustments that are 
deemed to be relevant).  There is no need to construct a ‘basic’ EVA (with no 
adjustments) or to rely on a ‘disclosed’ EVA (with standard adjustments).   The ability 
to analyse actual results is a strength of this research.  In addition, the EVA results 
provide an opportunity to consider hypotheses postulated in the literature concerning 
business strategy, performance and managerial action choice, thus addressing 
Zimmerman’s criticism that management accounting research merely describes practice 
(Zimmerman, 2001).  The EVA information and the testing of the hypotheses are 
discussed in the following chapter.   
  
1.8.1 Size of the Companies 
 
The companies are all network firms that were former nationalised entities.
7
  They 
comprise a significant proportion of the New Zealand economy in terms of their 
operating revenue to total New Zealand retails sales.  For many years, Telecom was the 
largest listed company in New Zealand.  Table 1.2 shows the operating revenue for the 
companies from 1998 to 2010 together with total retail sales and sales growth, GDP and 
GDP growth in New Zealand over the same period.  Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the 
proportion of individual company operating revenue to total retail sales, and the 
proportion of individual company operating revenue to GDP, respectively.  
 
  
                                                 
6
 The author is only aware of one other company, Transpower New Zealand, that has published audited 
EVA results, including detailed EVA calculations.  However, the company ceased publishing this 
information in 2004. 
7
 Further contextual information is provided in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. 
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Table 1.2 Operating revenue for the companies (NZ$ million) and New Zealand 
retail sales (NZ$ million), sales growth, GDP (NZ$ million) and GDP growth  
for the period 1998-2010 
 
Year Airways Post Telecom 
 
Retail 
 
  
  
Op Rev Op Rev Op Rev Retail Sales 
Sales 
Growth 
GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
1998 94 707 3398 38456   103004   
1999 99 790 3434 38820 0.95% 104890 1.83% 
2000 100 915 4335 41098 5.87% 111202 6.02% 
2001 103 982 5648 43145 4.98% 117540 5.70% 
2002 110 959 5537 46110 6.87% 126355 7.50% 
2003 115 977 5191 49352 7.03% 132848 5.14% 
2004 124 1051 5360 52269 5.91% 142046 6.92% 
2005 132 1209 5605 56066 7.26% 152079 7.06% 
2006 131 1114 5555 59511 6.14% 160594 5.60% 
2007 132 1222 5632 62305 4.69% 168374 4.84% 
2008 139 1290 5715 65703 5.45% 183416 8.93% 
2009 139 1254 5638 65290 -0.63% 184600 0.65% 
2010 144 1204 5271 65589 0.46% 186371 0.96% 
Source: Annual Reports and Statistics New Zealand (www.stats.gov.nz) 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 Operating revenue as a percentage of New Zealand retail sales for the 
period 1998-2010 
 
Year Airways Post Telecom Total 
1998 0.24 1.84 8.84 10.92 
1999 0.26 2.04 8.85 11.14 
2000 0.24 2.23 10.55 13.02 
2001 0.24 2.28 13.09 15.61 
2002 0.24 2.08 12.01 14.33 
2003 0.23 1.98 10.52 12.73 
2004 0.24 2.01 10.25 12.50 
2005 0.24 2.16 10.00 12.39 
2006 0.22 1.87 9.33 11.42 
2007 0.21 1.96 9.04 11.21 
2008 0.21 1.96 8.70 10.87 
2009 0.21 1.92 8.63 10.76 
2010 0.22 1.83 8.03 10.08 
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Table 1.4 Operating revenue as a percentage of New Zealand GDP for the period 
1998-2010 
 
Year Airways Post Telecom Total 
1998 0.09 0.69 3.30 4.08 
1999 0.09 0.75 3.27 4.12 
2000 0.09 0.82 3.90 4.81 
2001 0.09 0.84 4.81 5.73 
2002 0.09 0.76 4.38 5.23 
2003 0.09 0.74 3.91 4.73 
2004 0.09 0.74 3.77 4.60 
2005 0.09 0.79 3.69 4.57 
2006 0.08 0.69 3.46 4.23 
2007 0.08 0.73 3.34 4.15 
2008 0.08 0.70 3.12 3.89 
2009 0.08 0.68 3.05 3.81 
2010 0.08 0.65 2.83 3.55 
 
 
 
From table 1.2 it is apparent that Airways is the smallest company and the only one to 
maintain growth in operating revenue over the 1998-2010 time periods.  Post, the 
middle-sized company, has shown slightly more variation in operating revenue.  
Telecom, by far the largest company, has also shown variation in operating revenue.
8
  
New Zealand retail sales have grown each year over 1998-2010, with the exception of 
the year 2009.  From tables 1.3 and 1.4, the magnitude of the companies in the New 
Zealand economy is apparent.  Whilst these may be fairly crude measures, they do 
provide some idea of the importance of the companies in the New Zealand economy.  
Over the time period 1998-2010, the operating revenue for the companies was 
maintained at least ten per cent of New Zealand retail sales (rising at its peak to over 
fifteen per cent), with an average of 12.1%.  Operating revenue for the companies as a 
percentage of GDP ranged from 3.55% to 5.73%, with an average of 4.4%.  For many 
years, these ratios were maintained, even as the economy was growing.  This evidence 
demonstrates that a sizeable portion of the New Zealand economy was subject to the 
EVA methodology.  Creation of value within these companies makes a significant 
contribution to value creation for the whole economy. 
 
                                                 
8
 Telecom underwent a structural split in March 2008, which will reduce the percentage its operating 
revenue comprises of total New Zealand retail sales.  Further information is provided in Chapter 2. 
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1.9 Summary 
 
For the following reasons, the approach adopted in this thesis is a beneficial way of 
studying EVA: 
 The case study method enables a detailed analysis of how EVA is used as a 
management control system with the firm.  It allows investigation of whether 
EVA can create value.  The use of questionnaires, semi-structured interviews 
and supporting documentation has the potential to reveal linkages and aspects 
that would not be possible with a large scale statistical model.  It can also 
provide evidence on EVA that cannot be discerned when looking at the 
aggregate level.  The inclusion of respondents from a variety of roles provides 
the opportunity to obtain a perspective wider than simply management 
accounting.    
 The longitudinal investigation will enable an understanding of the life cycle of 
EVA within the firms, from initial implementation through to evolution and 
eventual decline.  This will enable a holistic picture of EVA to be established. 
 The three theoretical frameworks used to interpret the evidence are drawn from 
different academic disciplines and the study will provide an original application 
of these frameworks, with the opportunity to develop and extend the 
frameworks.   
 The frameworks are employed to address different research questions, thus 
providing the opportunity to build a richer picture of EVA use.  It is anticipated 
that there will be synergistic gains through the use of the three frameworks.   
 The case study companies are important users of EVA.  Taken together the 
operating revenue of the companies comprises a significant portion of the New 
Zealand retail sales and GDP over the time period studied, meaning that the 
companies’ EVA decisions had the potential to impact upon the whole economy.  
 The case companies chosen have the potential to offer interesting insights into 
EVA.  All three are known to have fully implemented and used EVA as their 
management control system for a period of thirteen-fifteen years.   
 Since the two SOEs publish their EVA results, there is an opportunity to 
evaluate empirical hypotheses postulated in the literature using the ‘correct’ 
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EVA results, as verified and published by the firms, rather than having to rely on 
a constructed measure which may in fact be meaningless.   
 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The economic and accounting context for the case companies is presented in chapter 
two.  In this chapter the EVA results for the SOEs are also presented and discussed, 
including the detailed breakdown of the calculation of EVA for Airways.  It is this 
information that is used to test hypotheses concerning EVA performance and 
managerial action choices following implementation.  The detailed analysis of the case 
study evidence using the three theoretical frameworks is considered in three separate 
chapters; chapters three, four and five.  Chapter six provides the overall conclusions, 
synthesising the evidence that has been gathered and the contributions that have been 
made. 
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Chapter 2.  Economic and Accounting Context  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a description of the economic and accounting context for the three 
case study companies.  In order to understand the economic environment faced by the 
firms, the New Zealand regulatory context is outlined in the first instance.   
 
EVA in New Zealand SOEs has two unique features.  Firstly, an explicit link between 
regulation and EVA was established through the publication in 1996 of a ‘Protocol’ 
recommending the reporting of EVA by SOEs.  This made EVA central to the 
regulatory environment.  Secondly, around this time, two New Zealand SOEs began 
publishing detailed EVA information in their annual report and accounts.  The author is 
unaware of any other companies publishing such information.  One of the SOEs in this 
study, Airways, provides comprehensive EVA results, including a break-down of the 
calculations, EVA for two broad business units and reconciliation to operating profit.
9
  
The other SOE in this study, Post, publishes annual EVA results and EVA trend but no 
information on the methods used to calculate EVA.   
 
The accounting context for the case companies is provided through a consideration of 
industry and organisational structure.  This discussion provides an opportunity to 
evaluate empirical findings that have been developed in the literature relating to firm 
characteristics.  Also presented are the management accounting issues that each 
company may face.  These issues will form a central aspect of the research evidence that 
is gathered.   
 
The published EVA results for the two SOEs are then presented and discussed.  These 
results provide an opportunity to examine Lougee et al.’s empirical hypothesis that 
initially large improvements in EVA can be seen as companies pick the “low hanging 
fruit”.  Once picked, these rates of improvement cannot be sustained (Lougee et al., 
2006).   
 
                                                 
9
 The second SOE that published detailed information was Transpower.  This company published full 
EVA information until 2004.  Although part of the initial questionnaire survey, this company was not 
followed up as a case study since it employed EVA at the board level for reporting purposes only. 
27 
 
 
2.2 The Regulatory Environment in New Zealand 
 
2.2.1 The Commerce Commission 
 
 
In New Zealand, The Commerce Commission is the regulatory agency that oversees 
corporate behaviour.  It is an independent Crown entity established in 1986.  The 
Commerce Commission’s purpose is to achieve “the best possible outcomes in 
competitive and regulated markets for the long-term benefit of New Zealanders” 
(Commerce Commission web site, accessed February 2012). 
 
All companies are governed by the Commerce Act 1986.  The aim of the Commerce 
Act is to promote competition in markets within New Zealand.  The Act: 
  
“Prohibits conduct that restricts competition (restrictive trade practices) and the 
purchase of a business's shares or assets if that purchase leads to a substantial 
lessening of competition in the market.” (Commerce Commission web site, 
accessed February 2012). 
 
Through the Commerce Act, the Commerce Commission promotes competition without 
the use of separate regulatory bodies (unlike the UK).  Originally, regulation was ‘light 
touch’, with some specific actions prohibited.  Disputes between companies as to what 
constituted competitive and anti-competitive behaviour were resolved through the court 
system.  An example of such a dispute arose between Telecom and Clear 
Communications over access pricing.  This was resolved via the courts in the 1990s, 
after being heard in the High Court (which found in favour of Telecom) and the Court 
of Appeal (which overturned the original decision and found in favour of Clear 
Communications).  More recently, regulation by The Commerce Commission has 
become prescriptive, with the appointment of industry regulatory commissioners.    
 
2.2.2 The State-Owned Enterprises Act 
 
In addition to the Commerce Act, State-Owned Enterprises are governed by the State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986.  Part 1 of the Act begins with Principles and states 
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that the “principal objective of every State enterprise shall be to operate as a successful 
business and to this end, to be: 
 
(a) As profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the 
Crown; and 
(b) A good employer; and 
(c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to 
the interests of the community in which it operates and by endeavouring to 
accommodate or encourage these when able to do so.” 
 
These objectives suggest that a stakeholder approach should be adopted by the SOEs – 
there is a requirement to maximise value for the shareholders (the Minister for State-
Owned Enterprises and the Minister of Finance, who act on behalf of the Government), 
and to be responsible to employees and the community.  This means that SOEs are 
restricted in their actions and scope for out and out value creation.   
 
The SOE Act contains additional acts which require a Deed of Understanding and an 
annual Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) to be published by the firms.  The Deed of 
Understanding, which is specific to each company, defines the social obligations that 
must be satisfied.  It can be viewed as a determination of the rules for competition.  
These rules may be seen as ‘unfair’, as they require certain actions from the companies 
and/or restrict other actions.  The argument for unfairness arises because these rules are 
not imposed on potential competitors.  For example, New Zealand Post has a universal 
service obligation, which means that it must deliver mail to all New Zealand addresses, 
regardless of how remote (some homes can only be reached by plane).  Competitors can 
choose to enter the market but just deliver in high density locations, or can pay New 
Zealand Post to access their network.   
 
The SCI is written by the companies and agreed with the Shareholding Minister.  It 
outlines the strategies, the nature and scope of the business including its organisational 
design.  The SCI also contains performance targets and measures with clearly defined 
accounting policies.  This information together with the financial statements is tabled 
annually in the New Zealand Parliament.  The focus is on conventional accounting 
measures of performance.   
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2.2.3 The Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit (COMU) 
 
The New Zealand Treasury’s Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit monitors the 
Government’s investment in companies/entities owned by the Crown, assists with the 
appointment of directors, and provides performance and governance advice to 
Ministers.  COMU can require the SOEs to provide whatever information it requests, 
including EVA information, if desired.  
 
In 1996, representatives from the Crown Company Monitoring and Auditing Unit (the 
former name for COMU) were members of the Value-Based Reporting Steering 
Committee which published a document entitled ‘A Value-Based Reporting Protocol – 
For the Presentation by State-Owned Enterprises of Value-Based Reports to 
Shareholding Ministries’.10  The Protocol stated that: 
 
  “Shareholding ministries encourage SOEs to move to VBR (Value-Based 
Reporting) as they consider it advances the objectives of the SOE Act” (p1).   
 
Furthermore the Protocol recommended that for value-based reporting the SOEs should 
report a ‘Statement of Economic Performance’ which was exactly EVA.  The 
calculation was at the overall firm level and not drilled down to business units.  
However, despite the assertion that there was a belief that VBR advanced the objectives 
of the SOE Act, the Protocol failed to explain the link between EVA and the objectives.  
Therefore it was not clear how EVA would advance these objectives.   
 
Although the Protocol was never formally adopted, it did provide some motivation for 
the consideration of EVA as a reporting measure, with several firms in New Zealand 
implementing EVA as a result of the Protocol (including SOEs such as TVNZ 
(television company) and Transpower (power distribution)).  In this respect, the 
dovetailing of EVA with regulation may have been unique at the time.  It has not been 
repeated in New Zealand, although at a meeting with the author and The New Zealand 
Treasury in February 2011, representatives indicated that they were considering the 
introduction of a new requirement for SOEs to report EVA results.  A more recent 
                                                 
10
 The Value-Based Reporting Steering Committee comprised representatives from the Crown Company 
Monitoring and Auditing Unit, Chief Financial Officers from two SOEs and an academic consultant.   
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example of the requirement for SOEs to publish EVA results can be seen in China, 
where the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
announced that the commission will focus on the economic value added (EVA) measure 
to assess the performance of the 129 State-owned enterprises affiliated to the central 
government (China Daily, January 2010). 
 
2.2.4 The Accounting Standards Review Board 
 
The New Zealand Accounting Standards Review Board announced in 2002 that New 
Zealand entities should adopt international financial reporting standards (IFRS) on or 
after 1 January 2007, with the option to apply the standards from 1 January 2005 (van 
Zijl and Bradbury, 2005, p2).  The case study companies implemented IFRS in the 2007 
reporting year.  
 
2.3 Contextual Information on the Case Study Companies 
 
In this section, contextual information on the case study companies is provided.  It is 
designed to provide the contextual detail that will facilitate an introduction to the 
management accounting issues to be explored in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  However, while 
the three case study companies have been identified here, the precise identification of 
each company is not made in the detailed discussion of the research evidence that 
follows in later chapters.  This is because the respondents agreed to take part in the 
research on the grounds that they would not be explicitly identified.   
 
2.3.1 Airways Corporation of New Zealand (Airways) - SOE 
 
Airways was established as a SOE in 1987.  It is a highly capital intensive service 
business, with responsibility for the air traffic control network within the New Zealand 
airspace and well as the management of air traffic control towers and radar centres.  The 
New Zealand flight information region (the airspace) covers over 30 million square 
kilometres, one of the largest in the world.  Every year, Airways manages over one 
million flights in and around New Zealand (source of information: Airways.co.nz). 
 
Airways is the world’s first commercial air navigation service provider.  In other words, 
the business is not funded by the government.  Within New Zealand, Airways is a 
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monopoly provider and the industry is fairly stable and predictable, with few 
opportunities for growth within New Zealand and with little scope for competitors to 
enter.
11
  There are a number of factors that determine whether the airlines, its customers, 
operate in New Zealand; consequently revenue can be variable.  The price charged by 
the company would not be a key factor.  However, the price is not totally inelastic and 
the company could not decide to charge an infinite price for the service as it must adopt 
the industry-standard pricing structure.  International alliances and consultancy services, 
where the company manages or advises on the provision of the service in other 
countries, are becoming more important for the company as a means of achieving 
growth.   At the time of the interviews, these alliances comprised a relatively small, but 
increasing, percentage of overall revenue.   
 
The company adopts a functional form based around four customer-specific delivery 
units.  The customers are mainly network businesses and there is sometimes an overlap 
in their network across the units (for three of the units) leading to a sharing of assets and 
technology to deliver the service.   Supporting these units are technology and corporate 
units.  Therefore, an allocation system for the sharing of corporate costs and operational 
costs must be agreed.  In addition, as mentioned above, there are international and 
consulting functions which are treated as separate units. 
 
Cost cutting to drive efficiency is an important means of increasing profitability and 
EVA within the organisation.  In addition, new ventures provide possible opportunities 
for growth.  Within the airline industry, other factors are also important.  For example, 
the company must ensure that it meets targets relating to safety and carbon emissions, as 
laid down by the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand.   
 
2.3.2 New Zealand Post (Post) - SOE 
 
New Zealand Post was established as a SOE in 1987 as the universal postal service for 
all New Zealanders.  In 1998, the Postal Services Act was passed, which deregulated the 
market, opening it up to competition.  The Act removed the monopoly on the delivery 
of a standard letter, resulting in full competition for postal services.  Any company can 
now process and deliver mail, subject to registration with the Ministry of Economic 
                                                 
11
 The area identified by respondents where competition could feasibly enter concerns air traffic control at 
the regional airports. 
32 
 
Development.  This means that competitors have entered to ‘cherry pick’ or ‘cream 
skim’ service provision in certain pockets of the business, whilst Post is still required to 
provide a universal service.   
 
The company operates as a profitable integrated network business providing a chain of 
services to its customers.  The company has maintained its well known brand and it 
attracts a certain amount of loyalty from customers.  Service performance is vital for the 
company in order to retain this loyalty.  Adaptability and innovation are also important 
in order to respond to customers’ changing needs.  This is partly as a result of 
competition and partly due the core business being in its ‘sunset’ years, though 
opportunities exist and continue to be developed to stimulate growth in new and value 
added products.  Diversification into banking, through the Kiwibank venture 
(announced in 2001 and launched in 2002), has been very successful for the 
organisation and has helped to maintain brand loyalty.  The company has a global 
competitive advantage so it has been able to sell some of its services internationally.   
These international alliances involve the management of service provision and also the 
supply of equipment necessary to deliver the service.  Such ventures are becoming more 
important for the company.   
 
The company adopts a functional organisation structure with business units reflecting 
the different services that it provides to its customers.  These units are supported by 
corporate units, such as finance and human resources.  Overall the services provided are 
interdependent which means that the company comprises a huge matrix of inter-
relationships and transfer pricing between units is perceived by the units as being very 
important.  Structure is not fixed, in that reorganisation of the business takes place to 
reflect changing priorities and new business ventures.   
 
2.3.3 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (Telecom) – Listed Company 
 
Along with the Airways and Post, Telecom was established as a SOE in 1987.  In 1990, 
Telecom became one of the first telecommunications companies in the world to be fully 
privatised.  For many years it was the largest listed company in New Zealand, based on 
market value.  Telecom is a highly capital intensive service business which operates in a 
dynamic industry.  This dynamism is brought about by advances in technology required 
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to deliver the service, as well as increasing numbers of competitors and price pressure, 
together with regulatory changes.    
 
At the time of the 2001 interviews, Telecom was organised in a functional 
organisational structure around seven business units with corporate units, including 
Human Resources, Finance and Communications.  Some of the business units were 
effectively stand-alone units and others were very dependent on each other.  The 
interdependencies related to service provision, meaning that transfer pricing between 
units was very important.   
 
The company has been subject to regulatory changes since 2001.  The 
Telecommunications Act published in December 2001 required the separation of 
Telecom into at least three business units, including access, wholesale and one or more 
retail business units.  These units were required to supply certain relevant services to 
both external and internal customers on a non-discriminatory and equivalent basis.  On 
31 March 2008, a business unit to supply access services, Chorus, and a wholesale unit 
to supply various wholesale services, Telecom Wholesale, were established as part of 
the Separation Undertakings.  However, further changes took place in December 2011, 
after Telecom New Zealand shareholders had voted to structurally separate Telecom 
from its access network business Chorus, creating separate stock listings. Under the 
demerger agreement, Telecom moved its existing copper and fibre assets, the majority 
of the telephone exchanges, and network electronics into New Chorus, which became 
New Zealand’s primary fixed access wholesale provider. Telecom retained its mobile 
assets and retail business.  This move was been generated in order to enable New 
Chorus to compete in the tender for the Government’s Ultra Fast Broadband Initiative. 
 
2.3.4 Management Accounting Issues 
 
Overall, several potential management accounting issues can be discerned from the 
information on the companies.  These issues relate to the fact that the companies are 
decentralised organisations and they will impact upon the ability of EVA to create 
value.  They include: 
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 The allocation of corporate costs 
 The allocation of shared costs 
 The allocation of capital between business units and the transactions costs 
associated with restructuring or re-aligning business units 
 Transfer pricing (or inter-charge) between units 
 The split of shared assets 
 Assessment of risk for different business units 
 Company restructuring (to reflect changes in the environment such as regulatory or 
technological changes) 
  
These factors all have the potential to impact upon the information provided and the 
incentives created by the EVA system. Successful use of EVA as a management control 
system by the case study companies over a sustained period suggests that EVA is able 
to deal with these factors.  If this were not the case, problems over coordination could 
arise in the decentralised organisation, meaning that the system would have the potential 
to be value-destroying, rather than value-creating for the firm.   
 
2.3.5 Empirical Hypotheses Relating to Business Strategy  
 
As previously outlined in section 1.4, empirical results from academic studies have been 
used by researchers to develop hypotheses relating to the characteristics of firms 
adopting EVA, compared to non-adopters.  The hypotheses are as follows: 
 EVA is more suited to defender firms who pursue a strategy of cost leadership.  
Prospector firms tend to use non-financial measures (Lovata and Costigan, 
2002).    
 EVA is more suited to more capital intensive firms (Kleiman, 1999, Riceman et 
al., 2002). 
 EVA is less effective for firms in service areas (Riceman et al., 2002).  
 
For the three case firms in this study, it is apparent that the split between defender and 
prospector strategies may not be so simple.  Airways would be the most closely aligned 
to a defender approach but the expansion to international activities suggests elements of 
the prospector characteristic.   Both Post and Telecom would be classified as prospector 
firms as they continually respond to new opportunities in response to changes in the 
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environment and in the technology required.  Since EVA was employed in the case 
firms for an extended period of time, it can be concluded that the system can be used by 
prospector firms.   
 
Each of the three firms could be described as capital intensive service organisations, 
requiring investment in equipment, technology and other assets, in order to deliver the 
service.  Therefore, it is not possible to reject the findings of Kleiman (1999) and 
Riceman et al. (2002) relating to capital intensity.  However, the firms provide evidence 
that EVA can be used as the MCS by companies in service areas.  Although this does 
not constitute evidence to reject the hypothesis by Riceman et al. (2002), the continued 
use of EVA provides evidence that it is a system that is suited to service sector firms.   
 
2.4 Accounting Context 
 
2.4.1 Commitment to the EVA Philosophy 
 
There is explicit reference to shareholder value in the annual reports for the companies 
that were published in the earlier years of this study.  For example, the CEO of Airways, 
Craig Sinclair, stated in 1999 that: 
 
 “Any monopoly can maximise profit.  The real issue is, how effectively did that 
business apply its resources to create value for the customer and the 
shareholder?” (Craig Sinclair, Airways annual report, 1999, p13) 
 
This comment demonstrates the importance of value creation for the shareholder but 
importantly it also demonstrates that the customer focus is of equal priority. The 
customer referred to is the airline companies.   
 
In Post, a commitment to shareholder value is made explicit in the 1999 annual report, 
where the following is one of five business principles: 
  
 “Making investment and business decisions which protect and add shareholder 
value.” (Post annual report, 1999, p9) 
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Again, this is clear evidence of the commitment to shareholder value.  In addition, in the 
1999 annual report, there is a full page devoted to the use of EVA in New Zealand Post 
(Post annual report 1999, p31).  This page, which is presented in Appendix B, contains 
information on when EVA was introduced and the fact that Post followed the 
recommendations contained in the Value-Based Reporting Protocol.  There is a 
commentary on what is included in the capital base and the adjustments that are made to 
accounting profits but there is no detail of the calculations, nor is there information on 
the cost of capital that is employed.  A graph showing EVA results for the previous nine 
years is presented but not discussed in any detail.  Finally, there are statements 
confirming that EVA will be devolved through the organisation to business units and 
will be implemented as a major component in the management incentive compensation.  
Overall, this is strong evidence of a full commitment to EVA as the MCS within the 
firm.   
 
Telecom does not explicitly mention EVA in its annual report and accounts and there is 
no mission statement provided in the annual reports from the 1990s.  However, in the 
1998 report, the commentary by Roderick Deane (Chief Executive and Managing 
Director) finished with the sentence: 
 
 “We know that providing cost-effective, innovative, reliable services and 
products for our customers is the key to continued growth in the value of 
Telecom for our shareholders.” (Telecom annual report, 1998, p11) 
 
In 1999, Roderick Deane stepped down as Chief Executive and took up the post of 
Chairman.  In the 1999 annual report, the outgoing Chairman stated that: 
 
 “Roderick has generated a wonderful sense of purpose and direction for 
Telecom.  The strong shareholder focus that he has instilled in all Telecom 
managers underpins the strong performance history outlined in the highlights 
section of this report.” (Telecom annual report, 1999, p8) 
 
Roderick Deane was regarded as a key driver of EVA success in Telecom.  In fact, he 
was well known at the time for being a strong advocate of EVA and he worked closely 
with representatives from Stern Stewart.  Telecom and Roderick Deane were cited as 
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success stories in a number of Stern Stewart publications, for example, Ehrbar (1998, 
p150-153) and Stern and Shiely (2001, p206).   
 
An examination of the annual reports for the companies showed that by 2010, 
shareholder value was not promoted so strongly.  In fact, while it is assumed that a 
commitment to shareholder value must lie behind the companies’ strategy, this is not 
stated explicitly.   In the 2010 report for Airways, the company mission made reference 
to the customers and growing value but the shareholder was not mentioned directly: 
 
 “We work with our customers to get aircraft and their passengers where they 
want to go safely and efficiently.  We draw on our teamwork and expertise to 
grow the value of the business.” (Mission statement, Airways annual report, 
2010, p6) 
 
Similarly in Post, the annual report for 2010 makes no mention of shareholder value.  
The Chief Executive outlines the four foundations to the strategy for the company 
(including having a sustainable business model, driving international growth and growth 
in Kiwibank and actively managing the portfolio).  The overall theme is sustainability 
and there is no mention of an underlying objective of shareholder value.  However, the 
trend in EVA results was still published as part of the financial highlights.  
 
The 2010 annual report for Telecom makes reference to the mission that was published 
in 2008, to become number one in broadband, mobile and ICT in New Zealand.  It is 
explained that to achieve this mission, they must deliver a turn around in EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation).  There is no explicit 
reference to the maximisation of shareholder value. 
 
Overall, by 2010, while the companies may have retained an objective of shareholder 
value maximisation, this goal is not stated in the accounts.  Instead, the focus is more of 
a stakeholder approach, with customers, employees and the environment all mentioned 
in the commentaries. 
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2.4.2 The Publication of EVA Results 
 
Both the SOEs publish the annual EVA results (and EVA trend) in their annual report 
and accounts.  This information is clearly provided on a voluntary basis.  Airways 
publishes detailed information on the calculation of EVA, running to several pages in 
the accounts.  This information, which is audited, is discussed in the following section.   
 
Table 2.1 shows the published EVA results over the period 1998 to 2010.   
 
 
Table 2.1 Published EVA for the Period 1998-2010 (NZ$000) 
 
Year Airways Post 
 
Year end 
30 June  
Year end 
30 June 
1998 -1599 -11000 
1999 -3518 -18000 
2000 1390 2500 
2001 1980 -4800 
2002 2574 -3400 
2003 2522 2700 
2004 2986 10300 
2005 3307 19700 
2006 2375 25400 
2007 1993 28100 
2008 1137 33900 
2009 -1521 8600 
2010 1588 -25000 
Source: Annual report and accounts 
 
For Airways, the annual EVA results shown in table 2.1 are net of customer rebates and 
abnormal items (if applicable).  There was negative EVA performance for Airways in 
1998 and 1999.  From 2001 there was an overall trend of increasing EVA until 2006, 
when there was a 28% fall in EVA.  This decline continued, with EVA going negative 
in 2009, before a return to positive EVA in 2010.    
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For Post, the results are more volatile.  As with Airways, 1998 and 1999 EVA results 
were negative.  The year 2000 showed a positive EVA result which then became 
negative in 2001 and 2002.
12
  From 2003 until 2008 the company demonstrated strong 
EVA growth before this decreased in 2009.  According to the annual report for 2010, a 
one-off expense of $72.3 million had a significant impact on net operating profit for the 
year.  This expense resulted from tax changes to depreciation, and fair value 
adjustments on international business, domestic assets and a joint venture (annual report 
and accounts 2010, p13).  Given a degree of market power embedded somewhere within 
the firms it might be expected that the EVA would be positive or certainly non-negative.  
One reason for the move from the public sector to the private sector is to improve 
incentives within the organisations and remove a legacy of underachievement in the 
public sector.  However, making the change may just take time.   
 
The EVA results shown in table 2.1 refute the ‘low hanging fruit’ hypothesis postulated 
by Lougee et al. (2006).  From the initial negative EVAs in the early years shown, EVA 
then increases for six (Airways) or seven (Post) years.  This clearly counters the 
assertion that large improvements, once picked, cannot be sustained. 
 
2.4.3 The Components of EVA for Airways 
 
An example of the published EVA information for Airways is provided in Appendix C, 
which presents the EVA statements published in the 1999 annual report.  It is possible 
to see the extensive detail that is provided, including the breakdown of the EVA 
calculation (NOPAT, capital and adjustments) and specific information on how to 
calculate the cost of capital.  The audited information must have been costly to produce 
and to publish and this is further evidence of the commitment within the firm to the 
EVA philosophy.  The publication of this information continued throughout the period 
of this study.
13
 
 
Table 2.2 shows for Airways the breakdown of EVA into its component parts of net 
operating profit after tax (NOPAT), the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and 
                                                 
12
 Post changed its accounting year end to 30 June in 2000.  For each year in table 2.1, the full year’s 
figures (from the annual report and accounts) are given. 
13
 By 2011, the EVA information provided in the annual report had been reduced to one page. 
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capital.  Value is created by increases in NOPAT and decreases in the WACC and 
capital.
14
    
 
 
Table 2.2 NOPAT (NZ$000), WACC and capital (NZ$000) for Airways for the 
Period 1998-2010 
 
Year Airways 
 
NOPAT WACC Capital 
1998 6478 8.28% 101490 
1999 3512 7.70% 92987 
2000 7379 6.92% 91693 
2001 8846 7.18% 96010 
2002 9593 6.89% 107304 
2003 10225 6.89% 112402 
2004 12172 5.91% 108326 
2005 14390 6.73% 106114 
2006 13029 6.57% 111488 
2007 10123 6.93% 131351 
2008 12603 7.27% 139207 
2009 7548 6.21% 144621 
2010 10865 6.28% 147622 
Source: Annual Reports ` 
 
 
  
                                                 
14
 It is not necessarily possible to use the information in table 2.2 to obtain the EVA results presented in 
table 2.1.  This is because the published EVA results are net of any customer rebates and abnormal items.  
Also, in the calculation of EVA, Airways uses average capital for the year. 
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NOPAT and Capital 
 
One question that arises in the EVA literature is which if any of the components of 
EVA is the primary driver of EVA; is value largely to be found in NOPAT or is it 
capital or both?  Table 2.2 shows that for Airways changes in EVA are largely a result 
of changes in NOPAT.
15
  Perhaps the incentive properties are clear.  A unit increase in 
NOPAT feeds straight through to the bottom-line EVA, unlike capital where a unit 
decrease is weighted by the WACC and hence the bottom-line impact is the WACC. 
 
The information on the amount of capital in the company provides further support for 
the refutation of the low hanging fruit hypothesis (Lougee et al., 2006).  There is no 
evidence to suggest that dispositions have increased as a result of EVA, since levels of 
capital employed actually increase over the time period shown.  Consequently, there is 
no evidence that the firm sold its non-performing assets.  A company such as Airways 
must have a regular programme of capital investment, to ensure that passenger safety is 
not compromised.   
 
The WACC 
 
An initial question when considering the WACC is whether financial structure matters 
in the determination of the WACC, which will depend upon the theory of capital 
structure that is adopted.  For example, a standard static trade-off theory of Modigliani 
and Miller (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 and 1963) shows that under specific capital 
market assumptions financial structure does matter while under other assumptions it 
does not matter (Miller, 1977).  For Airways their published method for the calculation 
of WACC demonstrates that it is assumed that financial structure does not matter.  
Furthermore, two costs of capital are employed, one for the domestic business and 
another for the international business. 
 
For Airways, WACC is calculated as follows: 
 
 r* = rf*(1-Tc) + MRP*Bu       (2.1) 
                                                 
15
 For the time period shown, the correlation between EVA and NOPAT for Airways is 83.2%.  The 
correlation between EVA and capital is 3.5%.  Of course, the latter relationship is more complex; an 
increase in capital increases the capital charge (ceteris paribus) but ideally it should also lead to an 
increase in NOPAT. 
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Where: 
rf = Before tax risk-free rate of interest (calculated from 5 year Government 
stock) 
Tc = Corporate tax rate 
MRP = Market risk premium 
Bu =   Unlevered beta 
 
The evidence in table 2.2 shows that the WACC is fairly volatile over the time period.  
This volatility is largely the result of the change in interest rates, which is evident in 
table 2.3, where a breakdown of the WACC calculation for Airways is provided, as 
published in the annual report and accounts.  The correlation between the risk-free rate 
and the WACC over the time period is 93.5%.   
 
 
Table 2.3 WACC calculations for Airways (1998-2010) 
 
 
rf MRP Tc Bu Be re WACC 
1998 8.20% 9% 33% 0.31 0.54 10.35% 8.28% 
1999 7.19% 9% 33% 0.32 0.52 9.50% 7.70% 
2000 6.17% 9% 33% 0.31 0.47 8.36% 6.92% 
2001 6.90% 8% 33% 0.32 0.48 8.46% 7.18% 
2002 6.46% 8% 33% 0.32 0.51 8.41% 6.89% 
2003 6.47% 8% 33% 0.32 0.51 8.41% 6.89% 
2004 5.00% 8% 33% 0.32 0.42 6.71% 5.91% 
2005 6.10% 8% 33% 0.33 0.40 7.29% 6.73% 
2006 5.87% 8% 33% 0.33 0.39 7.05% 6.57% 
2007 6.41% 8% 33% 0.33 0.43 7.77% 6.93% 
2008 6.92% 8% 33% 0.33 0.45 8.23% 7.27% 
2009 5.10% 8% 30% 0.33 0.44 7.09% 6.21% 
2010 5.08% 8% 30% 0.34 0.40 6.76% 6.28% 
 
Key: rf = risk free rate; MRP = Market Risk Premium; Tc = Corporate Tax Rate; Bu = unlevered or asset 
beta; Be = levered equity beta; re = cost of equity capital and WACC = Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital 
Source: Annual report and accounts 
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The formal calculation of WACC is transparent, with the full methodology explained in 
the annual reports.  Airways follows the guidance issued by the New Zealand Treasury 
which advises the use of a modified capital asset pricing model (CAPM) where leverage 
does not matter (as described in Brennan, 1970).  The WACC is effectively an 
unlevered cost of equity, representing a Miller-type environment.  In using the CAPM 
the company must choose values for three parameters, the market risk premium (MRP), 
the risk free rate and beta; and the tax rate.  According to the CAPM theory the MRP 
and the risk free rate should be identical across all companies.  However, the MRP is 
not uncontroversial – while most of the international evidence points to a value in the 
range of 6-9% there is a view that it should be much lower and around 4% (Dimson et 
al., 2002).  If companies go to the top end of the range of acceptable MRP, clearly there 
is no motivation to minimise the cost of capital.  For the risk-free rate, Airways adheres 
to the New Zealand Treasury recommended five year rate at the beginning of the 
reporting period (NZ Treasury, 1997).   Beta should be the most difficult variable to 
measure for SOEs since these companies are not traded in the New Zealand capital 
market.  There are standard methods for computing a company’s beta, such as the use of 
the market model, which rely on companies being traded.  The New Zealand Treasury 
guidance suggests the use of an average beta from a set of comparator firms that are 
traded.  These comparator firms may well be from overseas.   
 
2.5  Conclusions 
 
The continued use of EVA by the case study firms over an extended time period 
demonstrates that the EVA system could be used successfully by firms facing different 
economic environments, with different organisational structures and pursuing different 
strategies.  EVA can be used as the MCS by prospector firms (Post and Telecom) as 
well as firms that are largely defender but with elements of prospector characteristics 
(Airways).  EVA is also suited to firms in the service sector, which is counter to the 
findings of Riceman et al. (2002).  This demonstrates the flexibility of the EVA system.  
Notwithstanding the management accounting issues identified, the EVA system worked.   
 
Zimmerman has criticised management accounting for merely providing a description 
of practice, with a failure to test hypotheses (Zimmerman, 2001).  In this research, an 
examination of the published EVA results for the two SOEs and the breakdown of the 
EVA calculation for Airways, led to the rejection of the low hanging fruit hypothesis 
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(Lougee et al., 2006): There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that initial large 
improvements in EVA, which, once picked, cannot be sustained.  On the contrary, the 
two SOEs managed to sustain growth in EVA over an extended period of time.  
Furthermore, there was no evidence of an increase in dispositions (i.e. a reduction in 
capital); in fact capital expenditure increased for the companies. 
 
Finally, the publication of the EVA information, particularly the detailed calculations 
provided by Airways, facilitated an opportunity for detailed analysis that is not normally 
possible.  The information on the calculation of the weighted average cost of capital 
demonstrated that the methodology employed does not minimise the cost of capital, 
meaning that the capital charge is not minimised.  In addition, there is evidence that 
there are two different betas employed in the business (leading to different costs of 
capital).  It would not be possible to draw such conclusions from a study of firms at the 
corporate level.  
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Chapter 3.  EVA as a Discovery Process 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the implementation and use of Economic Value Added (EVA), by 
considering whether the EVA performance measurement system can be viewed as a 
discovery process.  The central question is whether or not the implementation and use of 
EVA can assist with the discovery of value within the organisation.  In other words, 
does the introduction and use of EVA provide new information that leads to improved 
value adding managerial decisions?  That it can do so is a central claim of its 
proponents and advocates (Ehrbar, 1998, p2; Stern et al. 2001, p16).   
 
To address the research question, the focus is placed on whether EVA can be viewed as 
an economic process for economic decision making.  A framework for the discovery of 
value is developed.  This highlights the activities and processes that should be in place 
for EVA to discover value (the key influences) and the inhibiting factors that may 
prevent value discovery.  The framework draws on the ideas of Nelson and Winter’s 
evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) to examine the factors developed from 
Stern Stewart’s specification of the EVA model.  In their book, Nelson and Winter 
employed the idea of natural selection, stating that organisations are dynamic and they 
evolve over time.  The evolution represents a change in their routines.  It is a process 
that is path-dependent, depending on a shift in product demand or supply conditions or 
from innovation by firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p3).  Whilst innovation may most 
commonly refer to technical innovation, Nelson and Winter state that evolutionary 
theory can treat organizational innovation just as it treats technical innovation (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, p38).    
 
In the literature, EVA has been considered as an innovation in the management control 
system (for example, Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005; Worthing and West, 2001), i.e. an 
organisational innovation.  When it is introduced into an organisation, it leads to a 
change in routines.  Evolution occurs through the dynamic search and selection 
processes that precede action choices (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p19).  With the EVA 
system, the search and selection relates to the objective of the discovery of value. 
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In introducing EVA, it is recognised that there are certain aspects that must be put in 
place in order for the process to work.  Stern Stewart argues that first of all, EVA should 
be measured correctly, with adjustments to accounting numbers to make them more 
economically meaningful (Stewart, 1991).  The calculation and use of EVA should be 
pushed down through the organisation to business units (and possibly beyond to 
processes and products), in order to provide the right information to managers.  Finally, 
incentives must be aligned with EVA (Stewart, 1991).  Therefore in order for EVA to 
help in value discovery, these features must be present.  In addition, factors that inhibit 
the discovery of value must be absent or insignificant. 
 
The evidence used to address the research question is taken from questionnaire results 
and interviews conducted in the companies in 2001, as well as supporting 
documentation.  This generated evidence on whether EVA can be implemented and 
used to discover value within the case study firms, with a focus on the information 
provided and the incentives created by EVA.   
 
The analysis makes two main contributions to the understanding of EVA.  First of all, it 
provides detailed evidence on the experiences of EVA implementation and use.  This 
evidence should be of interest to other EVA users and to parties with an interest in EVA 
results of organisations, for example Government regulators.
16
  Secondly, it develops a 
framework for explaining and understanding the evolution of an organisational 
innovation within the firm.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  In the following sub-section the framework for 
analysis is developed.  Section 3.3 discusses the Stern Stewart methodology, including 
the measurement of EVA and the impact of incentives.  Section 3.4 outlines the key 
influences, with section 3.5 outlining the case for the balanced scorecard (BSC) as a 
complementary system.  Inhibiting factors are discussed in section 3.6, with the 
empirical results presented in section 3.7.  Section 3.8 provides the discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
  
                                                 
16
 The New Zealand Treasury indicated the possibility of requiring EVA results in a meeting with the 
researcher in February 2011. 
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3.2 Framework for Evolution 
 
This study is not designed to be a formal test of evolutionary theory; rather the ideas are 
used to inform analysis and explain the findings.  Nelson and Winter noted that: 
 
“When economists are undertaking applied work that is of interest for policy 
reasons or are explaining to an audience that is interested in that question per se  
why certain economic events happened, theoretical ideas tend to be used less 
formally and more as a means of organising the analysis.  Theory can be bent to 
fit the problem.” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p46)   
 
Whilst Zimmerman (2001) may take exception to this approach, since there is no 
scientific testing of hypotheses developed from theory, the economics perspective 
adopted here is the approach to managerial accounting research that Zimmerman 
advocated.  Furthermore, the employment of the framework leads to suggestions for its 
development.  Thus, the research offers an explanation of practice and ideas for theory 
advancement.   
 
3.2.1 Evolutionary Theory 
 
Evolutionary theory can be contrasted to the more ‘orthodox’ neo-classical economic 
theory of profit maximisation (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Neo-classical economic 
theory takes as its core assumptions rationality and equilibrium (Dobbs, 2000, p3).
17
  In 
evolutionary theory, it is assumed that the organisation is motivated by profit but the 
actions of managers are not assumed to be profit maximising (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
p4).  It is dynamic and evolution is a process that arises due to changes occurring over 
time.  These changes can arise as a result of an external change (for example a change in 
product demand or supply conditions) or an internal change (for example technical or 
organisational innovation).  The focus in this chapter is on the process that arises 
through internal change, the introduction and use of EVA. 
 
When the change occurs, it is predicted that it will cause a modification in the rules and 
routines of the organisation due to deliberate problem-solving efforts and random events 
                                                 
17
 Dobbs recognises that neo-classical economics can be extended to include other schools of thought 
(Dobbs, 2000, p4). 
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(Nelson and Winter, 1982, p4).  Rules and routines have been discussed extensively in 
the economics and accounting literature (for example Cyert and March, 1992; Polanyi, 
1967; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Lam, 2000).  Recently, there 
has been much discussion on the differences between rules and routines (for example 
Quinn, 2011; van der Steen, 2011).  Whilst not central to this discussion, it is useful to 
have a working understanding of the concepts, since the notion of routines in the firm 
suggests on-going action or activity that constitutes a process.  To follow Burns and 
Scapens (2000), rules tend to be conceptualised as the formalised statements of 
procedures, whilst routines are the procedures habitually in use (Burns and Scapens, 
2000, p10).  Rules may be described as formal or informal (North, 1990, p3).  Routines 
may be considered at the organisation or the individual level.  Routines at the 
organisational level have been described as a governance or control device (Becker, 
2004) and the building blocks providing the ability to respond to changes in the 
environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  To distinguish organisational from individual 
routines, Lam (2000) describes ‘embedded knowledge’ (individual level) in contrast to 
‘embodied knowledge’ (firm level).  It is argued that explicit and tacit knowledge is 
stored in routines.  Explicit knowledge is generally held by all individuals whilst tacit 
knowledge results from the learning processes that cannot be pulled from the 
individuals and their social context (Polanyi, 1967).
18
  In other words, there is a 
collective and local character to knowledge; the firm is a knowledge processor (Amin 
and Cohendet, 2004).  This localised knowledge arises through dynamic interaction (i.e. 
a process) and it is context specific (Becker, 2004).  This view is supported by van der 
Steen, who describes recurrent interaction patterns in the firm, suggesting processual 
sequences of action (van der Steen, 2011). 
 
Taken together, the ideas on rules, routines, knowledge and processes suggest that even 
when there is a known change to the routines, the end point cannot be predicted.  It is 
path-dependent, arising from localised knowledge and the response of individuals to the 
process of evolution.  Whilst the firm may be profit maximising, the fact that 
individuals are coordinating the learning process leads to the possibility of 
heterogeneity in firms, even in the same industry.  This would not be possible in neo-
classical economics as firms would need to be homogeneous in order to compete and to 
reach equilibrium.   
                                                 
18
 Feldman and Pentland describe tacit routines as ‘ostensive’, in contrast to ‘performative’ routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003). 
49 
 
 
Whilst evolutionary theory explicitly allows for the consideration of responses of 
individuals to information provided by the innovation during the dynamic learning 
process, one shortcoming is that the impact of incentives is absent from the Nelson and 
Winter model.  It has been argued that an understanding of the impact, persistence and 
change of non-technological features requires the consideration of incentives (Grief, 
2006, p7).  Incentives are a key feature of the EVA system (after all, Stern Stewart were 
originally remuneration consultants).  Therefore, in order to understand EVA and 
whether it can be used to discover value, incentives must be considered.   
 
3.2.2 Consequences of the Evolutionary Process  
 
The path-dependent dynamic process of evolution arises from a sequence in decision 
making (see for example, Simon, 1982; van der Steen, 2011).  This has consequences 
both for the firms themselves and for analysts and researchers investigating them.  The 
consequence for firms implementing a system like EVA is that whilst they may have the 
same starting point (a change to the rules and routines through the introduction of EVA 
using the Stern Stewart methodology), the benefits and costs of EVA cannot be 
predicted ex ante.  Any evaluation of the prospects for EVA at the time of introduction 
depends on the information available at the time of evaluation and this may be very 
limited.  Moreover, as more information comes to light there will be an element of 
experimentation within the EVA measure itself so that over time its use will evolve as 
part of the learning process.  Experience may lead to changes in both the rules and the 
routines.  Therefore, there is no such thing as a perfect EVA measure.  How it will be 
used will depend upon the specific context.   
 
For analysts and researchers looking at the share price impact of EVA introduction in 
public limited companies, an absence of a capital market response may be found.  This 
is because the value consequences of EVA cannot be predicted at the time of 
introduction.  With the capital market uncertain about what is uncertain, the likelihood 
of an event, however great in payoff terms, will have such a small probability that there 
is no measurable market reaction.  But a lack of correlation between share price and the 
introduction of EVA does not imply that EVA is an irrelevant proposition for a 
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company.  What it does mean, however, is that the standard event study methodology to 
assess the value implications is not applicable in the case of EVA.
19
   
 
An alternative, to ask managers within EVA companies if they believed it was 
successful in identifying and capturing value is not in itself strong evidence.  However, 
Jazayeri and Scapens (2008) suggest otherwise in their study of the business values 
scorecard (BVS) at BAE Systems: 
 
“Nevertheless, the BVS is generally regarded as a success story by the 
management of BAE Systems, as it provides a complete view of the business 
and highlights where there are problems, and these can be traced directly to 
specific projects.  A manager commented: I think the major benefit for us is that 
it captures the complete view of the business very, very simply” (Jazayeri and 
Scapens, 2008, p67).   
 
This is not compelling evidence, as it is difficult to understand the notion of a ‘complete 
view’ in a large multinational decentralised business.  Why was the previous MCS not 
highlighting and tracing problems?  How representative is one manager’s view of the 
success of BVS?   
 
An alternative methodology to investigate the impact of an innovation is not to focus on 
corporate performance but to focus upon the activities and processes that would be 
expected to arise in a specific setting for EVA to be value adding.  In other words, 
rather than focus upon the outcome, focus upon the process required to discover and 
create value.  Initially, and notwithstanding the inability to assess costs and benefits ex 
ante and the inability to learn from others, it is possible to hypothesise that the EVA 
system would be introduced with the aim of discovering value.  As the firm moves 
through the evolutionary process, managers will respond to the EVA system depending 
upon their localised knowledge.  This dynamic interaction will in turn lead to further 
evolution in its measurement and use.  It is proposed that this is a process of discovery 
that is path-dependent, so will not lead to the same end point for the firms. 
 
                                                 
19
 There is an increasing literature on these high consequence-low probability events – which Taleb refers 
to as Black Swans – which argues that the standard framework of firstly determining expected values and 
secondly allocating resources is irrelevant.  Taleb argues very strongly for flexibility of response to what 
are very uncertain events (Taleb, 2007). 
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Of course, the dynamic process does not guarantee that EVA will be able to discover 
value.  However, what can be concluded is that if certain factors are not in place then it 
is very unlikely that EVA will be successful as a tool for creating value.  In particular, 
key influences are the information provided and the incentives created by the EVA 
system.  Both the information and incentives must be appropriate so that they give 
managers the impetus to discover value.
20
  In addition to the key influences, there are 
other factors that may inhibit the discovery of value.  Together these lead to a 
framework for a consideration of the process of the discovery of value with EVA, as 
depicted in figure 3.1.  A discussion of the Stern Stewart methodology can assist with 
an understanding of the key influences and inhibiting factors.  This discussion follows 
in section 3.3.  
  
                                                 
20
 The idea of complementarity is well understood in economics with the notion of economies of scope on 
the supply side and product bundles on the demand side.  It is a key concept for organisation design 
(Roberts, 2004, ch.2).   
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Figure 3.1 Framework for the process of the discovery of value through the 
introduction of EVA  
Key Influences: 
 Incentives 
 Information provided 
Recognising the prospects for 
the discovery of value: 
Evolution in rules and routines 
through EVA introduction 
Inhibiting factors: 
 Transactions costs 
 Inertia 
 Strategic Investments 
 
Context-specific EVA 
system, possibly 
complemented by 
other systems 
Can EVA discover 
value? 
Evolution through the process of 
discovery: dynamic interaction 
using localised knowledge, to work 
on the key influences 
Evolution through the process of 
discovery: dynamic interaction 
using localised knowledge, to 
minimise the inhibiting factors 
No No 
Yes 
The measurement of EVA 
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3.3 The Stern Stewart Methodology 
 
3.3.1 The Measurement of EVA 
 
The Stern Stewart general definition of EVA for a time period is as follows: 
 
 EVA = NOPAT – (Capital*WACC)      (3.1) 
 
Where: 
NOPAT  =  Net operating profit after tax 
Capital  =  Book value of capital (opening or average capital) 
WACC = Weighted average cost of capital 
 
Since decision making and control relies heavily on accounting information that 
substantially records historic or past transactions and contracts, a major justification for 
EVA over other measures, in addition to the alignment of incentives, is that the 
adjustments made to the accounting measures make them more like economic measures.  
It has already been noted in Chapter 1 that EVA promoters suggest 120-160 possible 
adjustments, although it is recognised that many of these adjustments will be firm-
specific and that 10-12 adjustments may be appropriate (Young and O’Byrne, 2001, 
p267).  For example, EVA proponents argue that operating leases are part of debt 
capital, and research and development spend should be capitalised (and subsequently 
amortised) as equity capital.  While these changes have the potential to move EVA in 
the direction of economic values and indeed in certain cases towards opportunity cost, 
not least the opportunity cost of capital, it is still a measure rooted in the past because 
what is being valued is something similar to that which already exists.21   The key 
difference between EVA and other performance measures is the capital charge; WACC 
multiplied by the capital base.  What this may do is create a focus upon risk within the 
business and the business units, since the capital cost is a risk-adjusted benchmark 
return, and hence a focus upon value and risk.  It may not matter that EVA is no more 
than NOPAT computed under traditional financial accounting rules (less the capital 
charge) for the change in focus may be sufficient to enable the process of discovery. 
 
                                                 
21
 Following the notion of economic income, EVA would be for a period of time the change in value after 
compensation to all capital providers but where value is defined as the present value of future cash flows. 
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3.3.2 The Theoretical Case for EVA as a Value-Adding Metric 
 
Given the path-dependent nature of EVA discussed above, the promoter of an EVA 
system would be unlikely to promote EVA as a discovery process, as it would be 
difficult to convince clients of its merits, since the benefits are not immediately tangible, 
there is no clear and simple cause and effect relationship and where the case can only be 
made on the basis that EVA will bring forward new unexpected information but the 
consequences are uncertain.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the idea of discovery has 
not been used by Stern Stewart.  Instead, they justify EVA using two linked empirical 
hypotheses.  It is also possible to show a justification for EVA using the abnormal 
earnings model.  Both of these are now discussed.   
 
Empirical Hypotheses 
 
In the EVA literature it is generally understood that the notion of value to be created is 
that of shareholder value (for example Ehrbar, 1998; Stern and Shiely, 2001; Young and 
O’Byrne, 2001).  With shareholder value as the ‘end’, the case for EVA as the ‘means’ 
to the ‘end’ can be reduced to a process showing how the managerial interest is aligned 
with the shareholder interest;  for example see Stewart in Ehrbar (1998, p198).  This 
process shows that the case for EVA as a value adding metric or measurement system 
for a company is made up of two important but linked empirical hypotheses: 
 
1. Financial or extrinsic incentives will influence decision making and motivate 
performance.   If the incentives are based on EVA then, in general, managers 
will be influenced to make decisions on this basis.  There is considerable 
discussion in the EVA literature around the specific design of incentives.  Young 
and Byrne (2001), for example, discuss traditional incentives versus bonus bank 
type incentives (pp135-139) and how far to extend EVA down the organisation 
(p115), it is assumed that the general point holds true – incentives work.  
   
2. With incentives working then the case for EVA is made on the simple premise 
that EVA is more highly correlated with shareholder value than any other 
financial metric.  Since shareholder value maximisation is the assumed goal of 
the organisation, the justification for EVA is provided.  It is argued that EVA is 
better than alternative measures that may be available (see for example Young 
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and Byrne (2001) for EVA over Cash Flow Return over Investment or Ehrbar 
(1998) for EVA over Return on Equity and Return on Assets).  Furthermore, the 
correlation between EVA and shareholder value improves if specific accounting 
adjustments are made to traditional accounting measures (Ehrbar ch 11). 
 
Thus, the proponents of EVA have claimed that there is an explanation for EVA and 
value creation based on the linking of two empirical hypotheses.  However, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, evidence on correlation with share price is mixed.  On incentives, there is 
new evidence that questions the empirical foundation of the first hypothesis.  
Specifically this simple link between managers being motivated solely by their own pay 
and effort has been questioned.  In particular it is now understood that preferences 
change over time, that an individual’s ‘utility’ is not solely determined from within (so 
notions of fairness and altruism matter) and importantly, that extrinsic incentives do not 
simply add to existing intrinsic motivation and moreover can drive out internal or 
intrinsic motivation (Layard, 2003).
22
   
 
Abnormal Earnings 
 
Whilst not explicitly promoted by Stern Stewart, a theoretical justification for EVA can 
be provided using another of their concepts, market value added (MVA).  MVA links 
directly to the abnormal earnings valuation model.
23
   MVA at a point in time (for 
example time period 0) can be defined as follows: 
 
 MVA0 = MV0 – BVA0       (3.2) 
 
MVA0 = Market value added at time 0 
MV0  = Market value of debt plus equity at time 0 
BVA0  = Book value of debt plus equity at time 0 
 
Whilst equation (3.2) is stated at the overall firm level, it could also be written at the 
equity level.  Debt holders do not share in any positive net present value (since debt 
                                                 
22
 The Layard reference is particularly apposite here since it refers to performance related pay in the 
public services which is exactly that of the New Zealand companies now being considered.  This may be 
the case if one of the intrinsic rewards was a feeling of contributing to society. 
23
 For a description of the abnormal earnings valuation model, see for example, Palepu et al. (2010, 
p344), Barker (2001, p168) and O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998). 
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returns are contractually fixed, all gains accrue to shareholders).  Therefore, the MVA 
accrues entirely to equity.   
 
Equation (3.2) can be rearranged, as follows: 
  
MV0 = BVA0 + MVA0       (3.3) 
 
MVA equals abnormal earnings in the abnormal earnings valuation model (see Palepu, 
p344): 
 
 MV0 = BVA0 + 
                
        
 
                
         
 +…  (3.4) 
 
From equations 3.2 and 3.4 it is apparent that MVA is the present value of future EVAs 
(see Ehrbar, 1998, ch3; Stern et al; 2001, ch2; Young and O’Byrne, 2001, ch2).  It is 
argued that future EVAs come from two sources: a continuation of the performance 
levels already achieved and EVA improvement, with the capitalised value of EVA 
improvement known as future growth value (Young and O’Byrne, 2001, p36).  Some 
listed companies advised by Stern Stewart have adopted the concept of future growth 
value and expected EVA improvement as additional measures.  
 
According to Young and O’Byrne, (2001, p34), the justification for the focus on EVA 
as a measure is that it: 
 Can be calculated at the divisional level, unlike MVA (so it provides ‘line of 
sight’ for divisional managers); 
 Is a flow measure (so it can give an indication of the creation of wealth over 
time, rather than a stock measure (such as MVA) that provides a snapshot at a 
point in time); 
 It promotes the creation of shareholder wealth. 
 
However, as will be discussed in the following section, the incentives created by EVA 
and the information provided must be carefully worked through in order for there to be 
any prospects for value discovery.   
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3.4 Key influences for the discovery of value 
 
Key influences for the discovery of value centre around the information provided and 
incentives created by the EVA system.  These influences are drawn from the key 
aspects of the Stern Stewart EVA system, together with an understanding of possible 
management accounting issues that may arise in the decentralised organisations, as 
highlighted for the case study firms in section 2.3.4. 
 
3.4.1 Incentives 
 
Incentives are a key component of the EVA system, where the motivation for 
employees to pursue the objective of EVA creation is provided via the reward 
mechanism (indeed the Stern Stewart organisation was originally a remuneration 
consultant).  Stern Stewart argues that managerial incentives must be based on the 
measured EVA performance and that EVA will not deliver the increases in value 
without significant or highly levered EVA based incentives.  Ehrbar makes the position 
clear.  He stated that: 
 
“The real key to the success of the EVA framework lies in using improvements 
in EVA in a unique type of incentive compensation plan that fires the 
imagination and initiative of managers and workers... EVA bonus plans 
effectively give managers an ownership interest in performance improvements 
by paying bonuses that are a fixed percentage of all changes in EVA.  They give 
managers the opportunity to earn an unlimited upside bonus in exchange for 
facing genuine downside risk.  The absence of bonus caps is made possible by 
holding back part of the bonus earned in very good years and making it subject 
to loss if EVA subsequently falls.  This banking feature – genuinely having 
something at risk – is what transforms managers into owners.”  (Ehrbar, 1998, 
p93)   
 
This statement has several important assumptions.  First of all, it implicitly assumes that 
extrinsic incentives, in particular EVA based bonuses, are the key to motivating 
employees to operate in the best interests of shareholders, rather than intrinsic rewards 
such as the opportunity to contribute to society, a feeling of achievement, or recognition 
by colleagues of a job well done.  Secondly, it is assumed that when managers are 
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‘transformed’ into owners, EVA is perfectly aligned with increases in shareholder 
wealth.  Thirdly, it assumes that managers clearly understand the measure that they are 
working with and there are no issues of understandability or complexity to resolve.  A 
further assumption is that managers perfectly understand the lack of a bonus cap, the 
associated ‘banking’ feature and in particular the exposure to downside risk, and that it 
does not create any form of disincentive or damage the ability to pay competitive 
rewards.  Finally, it assumes that such a system, with unlimited upside and downside 
risk, will be suitable in the organisation.   
 
Given the importance of incentives in the EVA model, all these features need to be 
explored within the companies concerned to establish the facts.  While the aspects 
above appear plausible, it may be that these extrinsic incentives do not work as 
prescribed.  There is an area of debate surrounding extrinsic incentives and in particular 
the role of cognition – how managers understand the meaning of things.  Layard (2003) 
notes that in the standard agency model of incentives, managers as agents are assumed 
to have constant preferences.  Their utility is determined only by monetary reward and 
effort – in other words utility is determined purely from within and additional extrinsic 
incentives add to the manager’s existing intrinsic motivation.  He argues that all three of 
these assumptions are the subject of debate and as a result there are important 
consequences for the design of reward structures.  He argues that “people must be 
comparing their income with some norm” and that over time this norm is moving up 
and that this: 
 
“is coming from two sources – first habituation and second rivalry.  First, I 
compare what I have with what I have become used to (through a process of 
habituation).  As I ratchet up my standards, this reduces the enjoyment I get 
from any given standard of living.  Second, I compare what I have with what 
other people have (through a process of rivalry).” (Layard, 2003, p4-5)   
 
This suggests that reward structures should constantly be under review because 
habituation changes the impact of rewards over time – this is a challenge to constant 
preferences - and rivalry changes the impact of rewards across managers; it is a 
challenge to the idea that utility comes purely from within.  In addition Layard (2003), 
drawing on the psychology literature, emphasises the impact of extrinsic incentives 
upon intrinsic incentives and in particular argues that extrinsic can drive out intrinsic 
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incentives.  In other words, there is a ‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic incentives so that 
extrinsic incentives do not add to intrinsic incentives.  This argument is different from 
the extant argument that extrinsic incentives may be a better form of motivation than 
intrinsic incentives (Atkinson et. al., 2007).  Thus although standard agency theory is in 
place to align agent and principal objectives by resolving asymmetric information 
issues, there is a trade-off in the loss of intrinsic incentive which serves to reduce the 
effectiveness of an extrinsic incentive.  While much of this discussion of managerial 
motivation may be seen to apply to all firms, Layard makes the point that the 
‘crowding-out’ argument may be more relevant to firms that have been ‘public 
services’.  He commented: 
 
“In the light of this it seems that British governments over the last 20 years had 
made serious errors in their approach to the reform of public services.  They 
have stressed ever more the need to reward individual performance, rather than 
providing an adequate general level of pay and stressing the importance of the 
job and the promotion of professional norms and professional competence.” 
(Layard, 2003, p15).   
 
This view can also be applied in the context of the three companies in this study.  If 
Layard is right then it may be that EVA can fail but this would not be the fault of the 
measure of EVA per se, but rather the role of extrinsic incentives that is inextricably 
part of the EVA ethos.   
 
The proponents of EVA assume that managers clearly understand and are motivated by 
EVA, and moreover that the capital market also understands EVA and how it correlates 
with shareholder value.  Furthermore, within the decentralised firm there is the potential 
for business units to have very low reported EVA, notwithstanding the fact that the 
managers and other employees are doing a professional job.  How are managers 
motivated when business unit EVA is very small?  What if the EVA that is being 
generated occurs in a different business unit?  It is probable that for business units with 
poor EVA prospects there will be little performance incentive when they have little 
investment incentive.   
 
Finally, in designing any extrinsic incentive scheme the problem of short-termism in 
decision making has to be addressed.  Most managerial reward schemes will feature 
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both a short-term and a long-term incentive scheme where the latter will usually feature 
the reward of shares or share options.  The bonus bank is another form of long-term 
solution but is not exclusively part of an EVA based incentive. It involves holding back 
some of the current bonus and paying it out in later years providing it has not been 
eroded through subsequent EVA losses.  There are possible variations in this bonus 
bank scheme where the current bonus that is held back is used to buy shares in the 
company (assuming that the company is listed), which may be matched with the award 
of additional shares providing the managers earn subsequent positive EVA.  Of course, 
such a scheme is not available to SOEs.  There is an issue when the managers face the 
downside risk from seeing the bonus disappear or even go negative.  Furthermore, this 
loss of bonus may occur when the companies are facing difficult trading conditions and 
are therefore not in a position to improve the current reward structure.  Again, it is not at 
all clear that the bonus bank will work in the way intended, that is, to recruit and retain 
good people who will be instrumental in the discovery process.   
 
3.4.2 The Information Provided by the EVA System 
 
Whilst some proponents of EVA may gloss over the specific difficulties in the 
application of EVA down the organisation (for example, Ehrbar, 1998), others 
recognise that there can be practical problems, particularly in an integrated decentralised 
organisation (for example, Stern et al., 2001).  If EVA is pushed to the business unit 
level, measurement issues to be addressed include transfer pricing, cost allocation, the 
cost of capital and risk shifting.  If challenges are created within these areas, then value 
may be destroyed, rather than discovered, within the organisation.   
 
Transfer Pricing  
 
With decentralised firms, internal trading through the network is usually an important 
feature.  For value to be correctly identified then there should be a strong central focus 
upon transfer pricing and a restriction of the opportunity to establish prices from 
incongruent behaviour.   While it is generally understood that there is no such thing as 
an optimal transfer price in a decentralised company, it is clear that controls need to be 
in place to minimise the loss of value through its appropriation by those units playing a 
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transfer pricing game.
24
  If managers are responding to business unit EVA incentives 
where their rewards are based on unit performance then it is predicted that supplying 
units would overstate costs in order to obtain a higher price and the buying units would 
understate the value of the transferred goods in order the reduce the price.  The result is 
that either too little or too much internal trading will take place.   
 
While there may be operational losses from non-economic transfer prices, it is 
important to emphasise that such actions will crucially impact upon investment.  
Investments cannot create value if the prices used in their calculation are not value 
relevant.  In other words, the discovery of value in the various sub-units of the company 
is seriously at risk without a strong managerial lead on the setting of transfer prices.  
This is recognised by the Stern Stewart promoters (for example, Young and O’Byrne, 
2001, p102). 
 
Cost Allocation 
 
The appropriate allocation of central costs (for example human resource and finance 
costs) and the allocation of shared costs (for example operational costs that apply to one 
or more business units) is a key feature of the ability of EVA to discover value.  This 
suggests that the EVA system needs to be accompanied by sophisticated costing 
systems, for example Activity Based Costing (ABC) and indeed Activity Based 
Management (ABM).  The need for such systems is recognised by Stern Stewart (for 
example, Young and O’Byrne, 2001, p103).  However, even these methods cannot 
avoid cost allocation and they inevitably have some inherent arbitrariness.   
 
Cost of Capital 
 
Given the central importance of the cost of capital to the EVA construct, it is 
conceivable that there will be incentives to manipulate the cost of capital at both the 
corporate and business unit level.  The cost of capital differs from many costs in that it 
is not directly observable either ex ante or ex post and needs to be estimated.  This 
creates an opportunity to introduce bias into the estimation process.  Just like transfer 
                                                 
24
 If there is a competitive market for the product or service being transferred then the appropriate transfer 
price is the competitive market price.  However, in the absence of competition, there is no market based 
competitive price. 
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prices, it is to be expected that there will be a formal corporate estimation process that 
produces the ‘best’ estimates of the cost of capital.  Importantly, the cost of capital 
should be seen to correlate with general market rates.  Secondly, there should be some 
consistency across firms in both the way that the cost of capital is estimated and the 
parameters that are applied.  Thirdly, to facilitate the discovery of value process, the 
cost of capital should reflect the risks of the business units of the company.  This is 
emphasised by the Stern Stewart promoters (see for example, Ehrbar, 1998, p180 and an 
explanation provided by Bowens and Specklé, writing in Hopper et al., 2002, p254).  If, 
say, a company was to introduce a corporate wide cost of capital across all business 
units when it was recognised that the business units were in different risk classes, this 
would compromise the discovery of value through EVA. 
 
Risk Shifting 
 
One way to create the illusion of value is to shift risks across the internal boundaries of 
the company to both reduce the cost of capital and the capital requirement.   For 
example, if a network business was structured so as to comprise wholesaling and 
retailing units, all the risk from the final customer would fall on the retailing unit.  This 
perhaps requires a further investment in working capital and so may destroy EVA.  As a 
result, the retailing unit may have incentives to adopt internal pricing and working 
capital strategies to shift some of that risk ‘upstream’ to the wholesaling unit and 
thereby reduce its own working capital investment.  Behaviour such as this is consistent 
with rewards based on business unit EVA which would be substantially lessened if 
capital was not part of the performance measure of a unit.  Given these business unit 
incentives, one way of reducing this incongruent effect would be to have a strong 
central focus on capital measures at the unit level.   
 
3.5 Complementary Systems: the Balanced Scorecard as Part of the Process 
 
It has been noted that in the evolutionary process it is difficult to forecast what 
information will be discovered and when it will be discovered.  However, the sequence 
of discovery may be important.  There may be some key pivotal discoveries that are best 
made first.  It is natural to assume that EVA and the balanced scorecard (BSC) are 
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competing alternatives in the field of value based management.
25
  This may not be the 
case and they may in fact be complementary.  Their complementarity may, in part, be 
due to the delivering of an appropriate sequence of decision making.  The BSC has 
evolved to encompass a strategy map that “translates the strategy into a plan of action 
that identifies specific objectives and performance drivers to help determine if the 
organisation is moving in the right direction” (Zimmerman, 2009, p672).  A key feature 
of the strategy map is the recognition of a sequence in decision making with the 
Learning and Growth objectives as the “foundation for any strategy” (Atkinson et al., 
2007, p401).  However, the BSC may do more than identify a sequence of decision 
making.  For example, another feature claimed for the scorecard is that it can balance 
both short and long term performance indicators, creating incentives for managers to 
discover value in long-term projects that are going to reduce short term performance.  
This is useful, since EVA is sometimes criticised as promoting a short-term focus (see 
3.6 below).  Furthermore, the value drivers developed within a BSC framework may be 
pivotal in discovering value.  EVA and the BSC could together generate a system of 
complementary changes which develops its own evolutionary momentum making both 
even more effective at creating value.   
 
3.6 Factors Inhibiting EVA as a Discovery Process 
 
Transaction Costs 
  
Transaction costs are a key component to understanding whether an institution will lead 
to good economic performance (North, 1990).  EVA as a benchmark/performance 
measure may inhibit EVA as a discovery process because it may create transaction costs 
for the company.  In particular, the calculation of EVA can become very complicated if 
the boundaries of the firm are re-drawn over time, as both the capital costs and 
accumulated EVA balances of the business units will need to be continually reassigned.  
Therefore, although there is a case to be made for finding value, in the redefining of 
internal boundaries the realisation may well be difficult.
26
   
 
                                                 
25
 For references on the balanced scorecard, see Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a 
and 2001b). 
26
 If the company cannot deal with these transaction cost difficulties, then rather than EVA as a discovery 
process, it may well be that it is external competition that reveals what the internal boundaries of the 
company should be in order for the company to compete properly. 
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Inertia 
 
Although the firm commits to an EVA methodology, inertia may mean that it is not 
easily implemented throughout the whole firm.  Managers may be reluctant to give up 
their previous routines and will indeed retain them even in the presence of the new 
initiative.  This applies to the information aspect of EVA (for planning, decision making 
and control) and also to incentives (for an example of the impact on incentives, see 
Stern et al., 2001, p200).   If EVA is simply an additional criterion to be satisfied and is 
indeed, not the principal criterion, then it is expected that EVA would have a much 
diminished role within the firms as a result of the loose-coupling of the system. 
 
Strategic Investments 
 
One difficulty with EVA concerns the incentive to invest.  Whilst the focus on capital 
and the cost of capital is a central feature of EVA, it is not desirable for the system to 
encourage managers to reject profitable investments.  However, they may have the 
incentive to do so if they believe that their EVA will suffer.  This can arise if an 
investment is made (and thus the capital charge increases) but the future positive cash 
flows are expected in the medium to long-term future.  In other words, the opportunity 
represents a real investment option, or strategic investment, that managers may reject.  
The Stern Stewart promoters recognise this aspect of EVA and recommend that 
investment costs relating to such investments are placed in a ‘suspense account’, so that 
they have no impact on the EVA calculation.  The capital charge on these investments 
also accrues in the suspense account.  The balance in the account is brought back 
gradually into the EVA calculation (via that capital charge) when the investment begins 
to contribute to NOPAT (Ehrbar, 1998, p170; Young and O’Byrne, 2001, p94). 
 
 
Summary 
 
The above discussion outlines the framework for an evaluation of EVA as a discovery 
process, highlighting key aspects of EVA that must be addressed in order to best place 
the company in a position to discover value.  This framework will be used to structure 
the analysis of the research evidence, which is presented in the following section.   
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3.7 The Research Evidence  
 
3.7.1 The Research Method 
 
The research method comprised a four step process involving a questionnaire 
(reproduced in Appendix A), semi-structured interviews, primary evidence from 
internal company documents and regulatory bodies and further e-mail communication.  
The design had several objectives to achieve: 
 The respondents and interviewees were representatives of their companies and 
not selected through the researchers’ personal connections.  This was to ensure 
independence and eliminate, as much as is possible, bias in responses. 
 The respondents and interviewees were ‘well informed’ and involved with the 
use of EVA within the company.  This was to ensure that meaningful evidence 
was gathered. 
 The evidence should be collected from throughout all levels of the company.  
This was to ensure triangulation of responses. 
 The evidence could be collected that was systematic across all the EVA 
companies or systematic within a company or specific to part of a company.  In 
other words, the evidence had to be collected in a consistent manner. 
 Expectations were not raised about the idea of EVA as a discovery process.  
That is, the respondents and interviewees were ‘blind’ to the discovery idea.  
Questions were framed in such a way that respondents and interviewees were 
not led in a particular direction. 
 
Within the firms, a lead person was identified who was previously unknown to the 
researcher.  This person completed the questionnaire and also distributed copies to a 
range of colleagues working with EVA at different levels of the organisation.  The same 
questionnaire went to all firms and individuals.  In total, 11 completed questionnaires 
were returned.
27
 
 
The questionnaire results helped to establish areas for further investigation through 
semi-structured interviews which were conducted in New Zealand within the three 
companies.  Again, within each firm contact was established with a new previously 
                                                 
27
 These questionnaires were part of a larger survey of EVA companies in New Zealand.  Eleven of the 
questionnaires relate to the case firms, with a fairly even split across the three. 
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unknown lead person who organised a number of interviews.  Prior to visiting the firms, 
the researcher specified the broad areas to be covered and suggested the number of 
people to interview.  This was to obtain consistency across the interviews so that 
comparative analysis could be undertaken.  The broad areas covered the spectrum of 
EVA use, from implementation through to its measurement and use for planning, 
investment decision making, control, remuneration determination and evolution within 
the firm.  Within each company, the number of interviews and the choice of 
interviewees were at the discretion of the lead person.  However, within each 
organisation the current EVA ‘owner’ was interviewed and all the other interviewees 
had experience of working with EVA at different levels of the company.  In total 13 
interviews took place as follows: six in Company X, four in Company Y and three in 
Company Z.
28
  Participants held financial or non-financial managerial positions within 
the firms at the time of the interviews, including one Chief Executive, Group Managers, 
Human Resources Managers, Group Controllers, Strategic Managers, Corporate 
Finance Managers and accountants.   There was some overlap in the questions discussed 
in the interviews, in an attempt to ensure triangulation of results.   Each interview lasted 
between 2-3 hours, with each interview recorded and subsequently transcribed.  Within 
each firm the lead person checked all transcripts and the preliminary analysis of the 
results.  In addition, they all had an opportunity to verify the summary results (and make 
factual corrections if necessary) for their business prior to the use of the evidence.  Each 
lead person approved the use of the transcripts for research purposes.  In other words, 
whilst respondents and interviewees may have provided their independent personal 
opinions on EVA nevertheless the lead person was happy for those opinions to go 
forward. 
 
At this stage the questionnaire and interview evidence was supported by further primary 
evidence in the form of internal company documents and checked against annual 
reports.  Further documentary evidence was also employed, for example Commerce 
Commission publications.  This triangulation of the evidence helped to ensure 
independent and consistency.  Finally where clarification was needed further e-mail 
communication with the company participants was conducted. 
 
                                                 
28
 To preserve anonymity this order does not correspond with the alphabetic order.  This was a constraint 
but necessary for the research. 
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3.7.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
In the presentation of the case study evidence quotes from participants are recorded and 
discussed within the framework established in section 3.2.2 above.  To avoid excessive 
quotation not all evidence from each company is presented.  However, it is made clear 
whether the quotes are either firm specific or more systematic. 
 
Recognising the Prospects for Value Discovery 
 
Interviewees unanimously supported the idea that there is value to be created within 
these companies but that this value is constrained by the institutional framework of 
government regulation.  The following remark from the Chief Executive of Company Z 
is representative of the two SOEs where he commented on the impact of the Deed of 
Understanding (explained in section 2.2.2): 
 
“Those social obligations have a dampening effect on what we can do in terms 
of starting to create value.  We could exercise some market power for example, 
work against the Deed and we’d create any amount of value that you want.  
We’re not doing that because the Deed defines the long term strategic direction.” 
(Chief Executive, Company Z) 
 
The notion of EVA as a process for discovering value was not directly discussed with 
the participants (so as not to lead them).  However, some indirectly recognised the role.  
For example, in Company Z the Corporate Finance Manager stated: 
 
“EVA actually regardless of whether or not it’s a success or failure in (Company 
Z), you can say that it’s instilled a whole different way of thinking around acting 
on a commercial basis and improving resource allocation.” (Corporate Finance 
Manager, Company Z.  Italics added for emphasis) 
 
In Company Y the Group Manager, Human Resources remarked: 
 
“In my understanding, it did focus everybody much better to what is the real 
return to the shareholder and thinking about the cost of capital and so on. So I 
think that certainly probably helped the mind shift towards thinking about what 
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delivers true value...It does focus attention on what is happening but it also 
removes the attitude from just thinking about cost accounting if you like.  It 
moves the focus onto how else can we generate profit at the end of the day as 
opposed to just driving down my costs.” (Group Manager, Human Resources, 
Company Y) 
 
Documentation from Company Y also indicated that EVA was introduced to cement 
customer relations and demonstrate that the company could be as efficient as possible 
for everybody’s benefit.  EVA was implemented as a means of discovering value that 
could then be shared. 
 
Therefore, in terms of the prospects for value creation, there was evidence that these 
opportunities are recognised and that EVA could be used to find this value.  EVA 
appeared to be a mechanism for focusing managers in the ‘right’ way to ensure value 
can be created, including thinking on a more commercial basis, the returns to 
shareholders and the cost of capital.  The regulatory constraints imposed in the Deed of 
Understanding prevented the SOEs from having free rein and thus these constraints 
inhibited the prospects for value creation, even though these prospects were recognised 
within the firms (see Chapter 2 for more information on the Deed of Understanding). 
 
The Definition of EVA and Accounting Adjustments 
 
It has been argued that one reason for choosing EVA over other performance measures 
is that after adjustments to both the asset base and the liability base of the business, it 
may offer better information for economic decision making and control.   This was 
recognised by respondents in the companies.  For example the Corporate Finance 
Manager of Company Z stated: 
 
  “We’re converting accounting information, from accounting to economics.” 
(Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
It is normal for EVA to be generated from conventional accounting systems but 
Company Y was unusual in that its accounting system was run on an EVA basis with 
adjustments made to obtain conventional accounting information.  The Group Manager 
Finance stated that: 
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“We’re an EVA company so all our accounting systems are basically designed 
to do EVA.  All our costing of the budgets, cash flows, unlike other companies 
our internal accounting and internal reporting is EVA.  When we’re expected to 
do half year accounts or annual accounts we actually convert them to 
conventional.  Most companies have conventional and convert them to EVA." 
(Group Manager, Finance, Company Y) 
 
Since all the companies had been advised by Stern Stewart it was therefore expected 
that (at least) some of the major adjustments would be in place.  For Company Y this 
would involve reversing the adjustments to obtain conventional financial statements.  
The other companies at implementation did start with adjustments that were 
recommended by Stern Stewart.  There are three points to make about this.  Firstly, as 
noted by Young and O’Byrne (2001, p267), the actual adjustments were specific to the 
companies.  One respondent noted: 
 
 “At the end of the day everyone will be using different EVA adjustments so you 
couldn’t really compare the EVA of (Company X) with us.  People’s 
interpretation and how they want to apply EVA is different.” (Manager, Human 
Resources, Company Z) 
 
Secondly, and again as noted by Young and O’Byrne (2001, p267), to make EVA work, 
the number of EVA adjustments had to be decreased.  This happened over a relatively 
short period of time in the firms.  For example: 
 
“We kept simplifying it and truthfully they (the Board) preferred the accounting 
numbers and they didn’t want differences between the accounting numbers and 
EVA numbers because they didn’t understand all the adjustments.  And today 
we effectively make no adjustments... We looked at it and actually decided 
ourselves that none of the adjustments themselves made enough impact to make 
it worth the complexity that they added on.  So truthfully when you say we’ve 
got EVA, purists would argue, in fact most people would argue that we only 
kind of do.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X) 
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Similarly, a respondent in Company Z stated: 
 
 “After two years, what we’ve concluded is that by having ten adjustments, 
that’s too many. I’ve talked to many organisations in Wellington, the major 
corporates, and all of them who have introduced EVA have gone more complex 
than us on introduction and have gone vastly simplified. Now this goes against 
what Stern Stewart says but so what if they are the trademark of EVA...  People 
just don’t understand them. It’s too complicated. People get bogged down in the 
cost of capital, their capital allocation, there’s just too many issues... there’s a 
proposed simplified EVA and there’s going to be three main adjustments.” 
(Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
These quotes highlight issues over complexity in the measure and the lack of decision 
influence of the specific adjustments.  However, Company Z also made the 
measurement of EVA more complicated by having two EVA calculations, 
distinguishing the number of adjustments made internally from the number made for the 
calculation of the disclosed EVA result.  Perversely, there were more adjustments made 
for the disclosed figure, suggesting that the additional adjustments could not help with 
the discovery of value.  The Corporate Finance Manager stated: 
 
 “You can see there’s 10 for internal.  For external there’s 5 on top of that, you 
can see it’s getting pretty complicated... We each eventually decided that we’d 
have two EVA numbers - an internal number whereby we’d have a figure based 
on information that we could gather at the business unit level. We’d have an 
external number which was probably more accurate but that was only done at a 
total company level, so we didn’t need all that information at lower levels... 
We’re pretty comfortable with it, in terms of the way we’re simplifying EVA.” 
(Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
Consequently, it appeared that there was a trade-off between the desire to move to more 
economically relevant information and the need for simplicity and understanding.  It 
was the latter that dominated.  Moreover, the last quotation demonstrated that one of the 
Stern Stewart claims that EVA can be aggregated throughout the organisation to 
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accumulate to corporate EVA was not of value for all firms, certainly not in the detail 
that was proposed.  Furthermore, the measurement of EVA had undergone a process of 
evolution, with a simplification of the rules of measurement as a result of the learning 
process. 
 
Understandability of the Measure 
 
Respondents revealed in interviews that EVA was not a well understood concept either 
outside of the company or different levels within the business.  This lack of 
understandability suggested that for some companies EVA will not provide a strong 
extrinsic incentive.  For example, the Corporate Finance Manager of Company Z stated: 
 
“Obviously in the annual report profit is the only measure that’s audited, that’s 
the one that (the Chief Executive) is managed to.  While we may use EVA, our 
shareholders may not care for it to the same extent.  Certainly the public looking 
at us may not know or understand so we’ve still got to manage accounting profit 
so that's a challenge that all EVA companies will have.  We know that EVA is 
important but when we go to the market, it’s ‘what’s your profit?’’’. (Corporate 
Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
Similarly, the Group Manager, Technology and Support of Company Y commented: 
 
  “One of the problems with EVA, it even happens at the Board level at times, is 
that as soon as they see something like EVA or a small EVA figure, people start 
thinking in their minds back to more conventional profit approach and say that’s 
too low.  We record both but you’ll find that some of the business press 
reporters were still getting mixed up and they’ll be quoting your EVA as if it 
was a profit” (Group Manager, Technology and Support, Company Y). 
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Key Influences for EVA as a Discovery Process 
 
Incentives 
 
In the discussions with interviewees on the subject of incentives, there were two key 
areas that emerged.  First of all, sharp extrinsic incentives were created through the use 
of EVA for rewards.  Secondly, intrinsic incentives were crowded out. 
 
Extrinsic Incentives 
 
Extrinsic rewards were based on EVA for all business unit managers and above, for all 
the companies.  However, there was no universally agreed reward scheme for 
incentivising managers: 
 Company X based rewards on annual corporate EVA results for its integrated 
businesses.  An extract from a training presentation to employees on the EVA 
scheme is presented in Appendix D.  This extract demonstrates the use of EVA for 
incentive purposes.
29
 
 Company Y had a scheme whereby all employees shared equally in the annual 
corporate EVA above a specific threshold.   
 Company Z based rewards on a combination of business unit and corporate annual 
EVA results (for business unit managers) and 100% EVA for employees in the 
corporate team.  A long term reward scheme was available for only the top thirty 
managers.  An extract from the Annual Incentive Plan Guidebook is presented in 
Appendix E.
30
  
 
Company Z is closest to the Stern Stewart recommended practice of business unit EVA 
in the reward scheme.  However, as discussed below, this company operated an annual 
scheme, with no bonus bank or other links to future performance.  The schemes 
reflected the different ethos of each company.  For example, the aim in Company X was 
to foster co-operation between business units and to encourage managers to adopt a 
company perspective, as indicated by the Human Resources manager: 
 
                                                 
29
 Some of the pages have been omitted where they were either not provided or where it was deemed 
prudent to omit them due to the sensitivity of the contents. 
30
 Again, some pages have been omitted for the same reason highlighted in the previous footnote.  The 
company name has been removed from any text. 
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“Basically having separate EVA results would seem as not really part of the co-
operation... it is as much as a reward as an incentive.  It’s as much about saying, 
we’re successful, we’ll share some of it as opposed to truly incenting 
individuals.” (Human Resources Manager, Company X) 
 
In contrast, in Company Y the aim was to reward all the stakeholders in the business in 
addition to building teamwork.  The Human Resources manager remarked: 
 
“We operate on a triangle that has the shareholder at one point, our customers at 
another point and employees at another point... Plus it tries to reinforce some of 
the company values that we’ve got in terms of teamwork and everybody 
contributes so the nature of that reward isn’t broken down into any individual 
performance assessment it’s just a common payment across the board.” (Group 
Manager, Human Resources Company Y) 
 
This situation was not always the case; there was an evolution in reward mechanisms 
that led to changes in the rules regarding incentives.  For example in Company X there 
was a move away from uncapped bonuses and business unit rewards because they 
generated rivalry that was viewed as damaging for the company.  This constitutes 
evidence of the Layard (2003) position on incentives.  The Manager for Strategy and 
Architecture stated: 
 
“Regardless of EVA incentives for the company, line managers were more 
concerned with EVAs for their own units... in order to have business unit results 
you have to have a transfer pricing mechanism.  Basically (they) fought over it 
constantly, it was a major distraction.”  (Manager, Strategy and Architecture, 
Company X) 
 
While the Group Controller stated: 
 
“What it was causing was a lot of divide between the business units.  They spent 
a lot of their time fighting internally, that’s what there EVA was driven off.  In 
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the end... the Chief Executive said no I don’t what this to continue, I want much 
more collaborative relationships between my executives and that should flow all 
the way down.  Therefore we’ll have one EVA for the company.” (Group 
Controller, Company X) 
 
A further problem highlighted by Layard (2003) is the trade-off between extrinsic and 
intrinsic incentives which he argues is particularly appropriate in businesses that were 
previously state controlled.  There is evidence for this from Company Y. While 
Company Y has, like the others, focused upon extrinsic incentives for the reward and 
recruitment of staff, there have been concerns expressed about general pay and the 
maintenance of professional standards.  For example, the Group Manager, Human 
Resources commented: 
 
“It’s quite interesting when talking with employees, they always question why 
there’s the shareholder, well they always question why they only get 25% of the 
target and why they don’t get more.  I think part of that question comes from the 
fact that in the past we were a public service department.  We were an arm of 
government under the Ministry.  People almost think it’s not quite like a 
community service but it’s an essential industry that needs to be done.  The fact 
is that we have such a huge focus on safety but that we also try and run the 
business at a profit.  I think that there are individuals within the organisation that 
struggle with that concept.” (Group Manager, Human Resources, Company Y) 
 
This last sentence emphasises the difficulties created by the trade-off or conflict of 
extrinsic and intrinsic incentives for employees of the business.   
 
The Bonus Bank  
 
Only the listed company operated a bonus bank but even here it was not operated in the 
way suggested by Stern Stewart with unlimited caps on the bonus (Ehrbar, 1998, ch7; 
Stern et al., 2001, ch9).  The arguments for the bonus bank are twofold – first to resolve 
the problem of short-termism and second to better align managers with shareholders.   
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Short-termism was created for many employees because rewards were linked to annual 
EVA results.  Although the company had implemented the Stern Stewart concepts of 
expected improvements in EVA and future growth value and used these for corporate 
planning purposes, (as discussed in section 3.3.2 above), there was no longer term 
perspective created.   In fact, quite perverse incentives resulted, as one respondent 
commented: 
 
“My incentive is almost to have a low share price and a high EVA because the 
calibration (split of expected EVA improvements by planning year) is set on 
share price, well share price is one part, but my bonus is measured on actual 
EVA.” (Financial Management Advisor) 
 
In other words, the respondent could be better off if the share price was low, so that 
expected future improvements were lower, which meant that targets would be lower, 
and so more easily met.  Current EVA needed to be as high as possible, to maximise the 
bonus.  Clearly this had the potential to damage shareholder wealth. 
 
The bonus bank employed did not solve the short-termism problem.  The features of the 
scheme meant that when the company was successful there was a continual build up of 
bonus in the bank that would be forever in the future.  This created resentment amongst 
employees and it was viewed as a ‘death in service’ reward.  Furthermore the alignment 
of managers with shareholders was substantially curtailed because there were caps and 
floors in the scheme and no negative multipliers.  For example, another respondent 
commented: 
 
“One of the reasons we got rid of negative multipliers was the impact on 
recruitment and retention.  If you’ve got so far as your bonus bank was negative, 
you could see that you needed two good years to get any money out of it.  We 
could see that that was never going to be any good.  You can’t recruit people in 
that situation.  You can’t retain people in that situation.  I guess we’ve 
moderated it down so it’s never that bad.” (Human Resource Manager) 
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This view is an example of Layard’s habituation feature showing that incentives do not 
necessarily work as intended (Layard, 2003). 
 
The SOEs did not operate a bonus bank because it was viewed as not politically 
acceptable.  In addition there were caps on the maximum bonus that can be paid as part 
of remuneration.  One manager commented: 
 
“We have capped it because we are an SOE, we don’t have a bonus bank 
whereby there could be unlimited profits and unlimited losses.” (Corporate 
Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
Overall, within each of the firms, the reward schemes in place did not provide managers 
with the incentive to discover value.  The Stern Stewart approach to rewards had been 
modified and diluted to ensure that co-ordination and communication between business 
units could continue so that value was not destroyed.  Furthermore, the short-term focus 
on annual EVA meant that incentives to discover longer-term value were severely 
restricted.     
  
Information Provided by the EVA Measure 
 
It has been argued that for EVA to serve as a discovery process it should be computed at 
the business unit level with appropriate market and internal prices, cost allocation and 
externalities formally dealt with.  It has been seen that transfer prices were a concern in 
these network businesses, so much so that business unit EVA had been abandoned as 
part of the incentive scheme for one of the firms.  However, there was further evidence 
suggesting that where business unit EVA is calculated it was of very little significance.  
For example, the Manager, Corporate Finance of Company Z stated: 
 
“Well actually we don’t pay a lot of attention in Corporate to the way a lot of 
business units calculate their EVA.  We encourage them to do it because we’re 
an EVA company and that’s the basis of our performance management system 
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but when we do EVA, we consolidate the results first and then do EVA.  
Basically consolidate first, you get a set of group accounts and from there you 
calculate your EVA.” (Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
Recall that this company perversely provides rewards based on both corporate and 
business unit EVA. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
 
In network firms where there is interdependence, it is expected that transfer pricing 
would be a key challenge.  This was the case in the firms, where in Company X, one 
unit was able to manipulate prices to another unit, too boost their EVA.  Within 
Company Y the transfer pricing (or ‘inter-charge’ as it was called) policy was set to 
ensure that there is no EVA gained through internal trade.  This is possible where there 
are no external transactions that are squeezed out by internal transactions (for example, 
if there is no external market).  On the other hand, within Company Z, where an 
external market exists, transfer prices are set on a commercial basis.  The Corporate 
Finance Manager stated: 
 
“We have a lot of discussions and conflicts about transfer pricing.  What we are 
trying to say is that transfer pricing must be on commercial basis, it must be 
open and transparent.  We don’t say to people you can go out and use an 
external provider.  If you say to me that I’ve got to buy my IT services from the 
IT part of the company - but I can see that I can get it for a cheaper price and 
same quality outside, then I should tell the internal supplier and he might agree 
to cut a deal.” (Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
This quote highlights the fact that transfer pricing is an issue.  He went on to say: 
 
“We’re going to have a transfer pricing regime where both parties are happy.  
Now we are still working towards that.” (Corporate Finance Manager, Company 
Z) 
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This suggests that there are tensions created within the firm and that they wish to 
resolve them to ensure that the managers of different business units are happy with the 
decisions made.  Furthermore, it has been noted above that for Company X, transfer 
pricing issues led to changes in the way extrinsic incentives are designed.   
 
Of course there could be real consequences to a transfer pricing dispute in terms of 
either too much or too little output and perhaps, more importantly, an incorrect signal 
for investment decisions.  But there was an upside to this pricing dispute in that the 
companies became more focused upon their business unit direct costs with the creation 
of cost models. 
 
Cost Allocation  
 
As expected cost allocation for a network business is a complex and difficult activity.  
Activity-based costing (ABC) is often recommended as a system for providing finer 
cost information in the quest for value creation.  However, it has been noted that 
incentives were not information based; rather they were focussed upon both simplicity 
and fairness.  In terms of cost allocation, Company Y decided not to implement cost 
allocation at the ‘micro level.’  Instead the company chose simplicity over accuracy and 
therefore reduced the opportunity to discover value.    One respondent commented:  
 
“We do a bit of activity-based costing but we don’t want to get into micro level 
inter-charging.   For some companies you see this happening and you end up 
with a huge financial tracking system and we decided that just wasn’t on.  I 
think we’ve actually got a reasonable level of simple inter charge system which 
is based on the cost agreed for the year divided by 12 for the cost per month and 
then every quarter we review and we make some adjustments.” (Group 
Manager, Technology and Support, Company Y) 
 
In contrast, Company Z allocated all non-corporate costs using an ABC system to 
determine product profitability.  For those products making a profit at the company 
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level they then set transfer prices in order to ensure that the overall profit margin was 
shared between the business units.  This sharing of the overall profit margin was to 
avoid internal disputes.  Within Company X, such disputes were still an issue.  
Although an ABC system was employed, there was explicit recognition of the fact that 
some costs were not generated by activities, that some of the cost allocation was 
arbitrary and that cost allocation was causing “lots of arguments” (Manager for Strategy 
and Architecture). 
 
Overall the evidence suggests that cost allocation of both revenue and capital costs is a 
difficult issue which together with actions on transfer prices to share margin means that 
there was no internal signal on costs which could be relevant for both pricing and 
investment strategies.  Together they reduce the ability of EVA to discover value. 
 
The Cost of Capital 
 
There is a formal and transparent approach to the calculation of the WACC at the 
corporate level.  However, at least two questions arose concerning its use within the 
companies.  First, was this corporate rate formally decomposed at the business unit level 
to reflect different risk return characteristics of the units and second was the rate used 
for EVA calculation the same as for investment decisions? These questions were put to 
the interviewees and on the questionnaire.  The evidence was clear cut.  First, as 
previously noted, with the exception of Airways there was no attempt to formally 
calculate a business unit cost of capital in any of the companies.
31
  The response from 
one questionnaire participant was representative: 
 
“They’re the same because our risk return is not calculated down to business 
units.  The company cost of capital is used for all our business cases as well.” 
(Questionnaire response) 
 
However, there was some evidence of an informal recognition of different risks at the 
business unit level where the units were seen as more stand-alone.  For example, one 
respondent commented: 
                                                 
31
 In this sub-section, company initials and job titles are not attributed to the quotes provided, as this 
would be too revealing, given that it has already been noted that Airways publishes business unit costs of 
capital. 
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“What we are saying if we make investment decisions we want to look at it from 
the company return perspective.  We also want to look at it from the business 
unit perspective to say if our property people have a lower cost of capital rate 
they could be making, bringing forward to the Board and SMT (Senior 
Management Team) proposals that are very good in their market, that is the 
property market.   We say we need to have an account of how good a return that 
is in your business environment.”  
 
The rate used for the EVA calculation was not always the rate used in investment 
decision making.  Again there was an informal recognition of increased risk for some 
planned activities.  For example, one respondent, when asked about the use of the 
corporate cost of capital for planning in a particular area, replied: 
 
“So we are going to have to lift that.  Add on a premium like another 1%.” 
 
The general evidence was, therefore, that the companies did not disaggregate in a 
formal sense the corporate cost of capital for investment decision making or necessarily 
use the rate used for the EVA calculation in their investment decision making.  Given 
the earlier evidence that transfer prices were set to ‘fairly’ allocate profitability across 
the company, this result was not surprising.  It would be difficult to defend within the 
company the use of different costs of capital.   The consequence is that these procedures 
would not help in the discovery of positive net present value projects.  
 
Risk Shifting 
 
Interestingly, the evidence for risk shifting was not through the internal boundaries of 
the firm.  Instead, two of the companies looked to reduce the capital base through 
outsourcing.  It is normally understood that managers have an incentive through the 
EVA measure to reduce the capital base in order to reduce the capital charge.  However, 
while the positive correlation between introducing EVA and the (perceived) reduction 
in capital may be observed, the reason for it is more subtle.  The following quote from 
the Chief Executive of Company Z illustrated this, together with his view on the role of 
EVA within the business: 
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“I couldn’t say that we wouldn’t have conceived of doing it in the absence of 
EVA because it has a beneficial impact anyway.  It’s less an argument 
sometimes about reducing your capital base as it is avoiding either future capital 
needs or an alternative to raising funds in capital shortage situations.” (Chief 
Executive, Company Z) 
 
With hindsight, this comment was particularly pertinent, given the credit crunch and the 
volatility of stock markets.  It demonstrated a more sophisticated understanding of the 
nature of credit and capital markets. 
 
Complementary Systems: EVA and the Balanced Scorecard  
 
All three companies were operating EVA together with the BSC.  They were not seen as 
competing value management tools.  However, the BSC was not introduced after the 
introduction of EVA.  Indeed some participants took the view that EVA improved the 
BSC with the latter being the more fundamental value management tool.  This was 
perhaps not surprising in former state owned businesses, where non-financial measures 
such as safety, on-time delivery and customer satisfaction would have been paramount.  
For example, the General Manager of Human Resources of Company Z stated: 
 
“The balanced scorecard approach had been very strongly inculcated in the 
business culture for years so nothing really new.  It (EVA) was seen as a further 
evolutionary step about getting smarter and crisper and sharper around what’s 
done.” (General Manager, Human Resources, Company Z) 
 
Therefore EVA was seen to improve the BSC and the fact that the BSC has not been 
withdrawn upon the introduction of EVA suggests that there was some synergy in the 
other direction as well.  The application of the BSC in the incentive scheme is apparent 
in the weightings for organisational performance measures presented in Appendix D.  
These weightings demonstrate the importance of the different performance areas, where 
EVA is central to the making money area.  
 
There was also evidence that the companies were well aware of the idea of a strategy 
map.  However, like other aspects, the strategy map idea has evolved, in one case from a 
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formal to an informal mechanism.  For example, a member of the Finance Team at 
Company X commented:   
 
“In the very early stages a strategy map was done.  It’s a little bit away from that 
now; there is an informal map that goes with our scorecard.” (Finance Team 
member, Company X) 
 
Furthermore, respondents in the companies understood that there was a sequence of 
decisions to be taken even though they were uncertain about what they would discover.  
For example, when discussing the modelling of EVA drivers, the Manager of Corporate 
Finance in Company Z stated: 
 
“That’s going to drive our strategy. It’s going to drive our projections and value 
creation at a company level.  We have actually done that modelling also at the 
XXX business unit level because that as I have mentioned is the key business. 
That’s what creates all the value.” (Corporate Finance Manager, Company Z) 
 
While it is costly to formalise the EVA drivers, model the process and determine the 
strategy there are at times substantial benefits to be gained.  For example, in Company 
X this type of analysis revealed that there was an omission in the strategic objectives of 
the company whereby the major source of value creation was not included in the BSC; 
meaning that the strategy would never be implemented.  It took managers some time to 
realise this, and to revise the strategy. 
 
Inhibiting Factors to EVA as a discovery process 
 
Transaction Costs 
 
The difficulties of operating EVA at the business unit level have already been noted.  
However, the extent to which the EVA system itself becomes costly to use as both an 
information and incentive institution for the businesses was also investigated.  If EVA 
was working effectively, it would be expected that an evolution would occur in the 
structure of the firm as it discovered where the value in the business was to be created.  
However, it appeared that EVA made the evolution more difficult.  For example, the 
Human Resources Manager of Company X commented: 
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“One of the things we never really realised and have never really grasped is that 
we’ve been slicing and dicing our business units.  When this first scheme started 
we had what was called an operations business unit but that then got split about 
three ways but it wasn’t a clean split.  The next year following the split we had 
no history for the EVA based on growth.  So there was about 8 months and then 
these people just said we can’t do it.” (Human Resources Manager, Company X) 
   
This comment demonstrates that for a network business there were problems with the 
allocation of revenue, costs and capital costs when an operations unit was split but also, 
and more pertinent here, that the history of EVA needs to be reallocated to provide 
information on EVA growth. 
  
With any restructuring there is always the prospect of changing the manager at the same 
time.  This leads to questions about what to do with the EVA legacy for the new 
manager and how it may impact upon incentives.  For example, the Group Manager 
Finance for Company Y commented: 
 
“With a new guy coming in, we thought from a management incentive 
perspective, to lump him with all these expensive things from the past, to say 
you owe us however many dollars through your capital charges, was actually 
disincentivising.  We restructured that business, we wrote it all off and we 
moved forward.” (Group Manager, Finance, Company Y) 
 
Notwithstanding these operational issues of EVA surrounding the evolution of the 
business there was a more fundamental business philosophy question to address.  The 
EVA model seeks to organise the business around value drivers rather than say 
managerial leadership.  If the management philosophy of a company is one of 
leadership then the EVA model itself cannot generate an evolution in organisational 
design centred on value creation.  Any evolution must come from a different source.  
On this point, the Manager of Corporate Finance of Company Z stated: 
 
“If you were going to introduce pay on EVA drivers at the organisational level 
in a big way, management would have to be prepared to restructure the business 
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around the drivers of the business, not around so and so is a really good leader 
so they can have this group.  That’s not going to happen.” 
 
This is an example of the substantial transaction costs associated with the 
implementation and use of the EVA mechanism. 
 
Inertia 
 
Another aspect that may inhibit the success of EVA as a discovery mechanism is the 
reluctance of board members and managers to abandon their previous information 
systems and indeed their experience of how business works.   There was evidence 
within each of the firms that both board members and managers demonstrate inertia as 
they continued to use existing routines for planning and control.  For example, the 
Financial Management Advisor of Company X remarked: 
 
“I’m also a strong advocate of never using a single measure in making an 
investment decision.  NPV is never perfect.  EVA is never perfect.  What they 
provide you with is a framework to put your management decisions within and 
think about your management decisions... I guess all the models I’ve set up, it’s 
more natural for me to set up a free cash flow model using EBITDA and 
CAPEX rather than EVA.” (Financial Management Advisor, Company X) 
 
Similarly, in Company Y the Group Manager of Finance commented: 
 
“When we look at it we’ll look at payback and all the rest of it... You don’t 
necessarily need to do others but you can’t change all the years of experience 
you’ve got in other companies so we still use payback and I still use some sort 
of discounted cash flow model.” (Group Manager, Finance, Company Y) 
 
This is a telling remark.  EVA contains implicit assumptions about how capital markets 
are meant to work.  Specifically, that liquidity is never an issue (Young and O’Byrne, 
2001, p8).  In other words, it is assumed that companies can go to the market at any 
time and raise capital at the WACC.  However, from experience the managers know that 
capital markets can be illiquid and this leads to a justification of the payback model.  It 
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is also important to emphasize that the managers were not incentivised by EVA to shed 
capital.  Rather they wished to use the capital but in its most liquid form. 
 
The lack of an agreed framework for EVA and the resulting discretion that must be 
exercised can also lead to inertia.  The Chief Executive of Company Z explained: 
 
“There’s the heart of the problem.  We’ve never let go of traditional accounting 
measures.  Traditional accounting measures are driven by accounting standards.  
EVA doesn’t have those.  So we are making somewhat arbitrary choices with 
EVA. So managers really can’t get to grips with it... Managers think oh well, 
there’s some juggling; I don’t quite understand what it means.  So they stop 
paying any attention to it.” (Chief Executive, Company Z) 
 
The above quotes highlight a real difficulty with EVA.  Since there are no accounting 
standards to justify or support the calculations, this creates arbitrariness, leading to a 
lack of understanding.  In this situation, it is preferable to return to traditional 
accounting.   
 
Strategic Investments 
 
Respondents in the companies all recognised that strategic investments (or real 
investment options) are not explicitly encouraged in the EVA model.   Within Company 
X, there was a formal mechanism for dealing with such investments, as explained by the 
Financial Management Advisor: 
 
“We do also have a framework for dealing with what we call strategic 
investments under the EVA system.  The way that works is that where we go 
into an investment that’s strong EVA negative, it has to be EVA negative for 
about three years.  It has to be over a certain level of investment.  The third rule 
is that there has to be a Board approved EVA plan.  Then we get forgiveness 
against the EVA losses” (Financial Management Advisor, Company X)   
 
The ‘forgiveness’ is applied through assessing performance based on the EVA plan, 
rather than on the actual EVA results.  In addition, a suspense account of EVA losses 
was created, called suspended losses, on which a capital charge must be paid.  This is a 
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way of encouraging strategic investments that is not exactly the same as the Stern 
Stewart recommended practice of ‘keeping capital off the books’ by creating a suspense 
account but it has the same purpose: to limit underinvestment that may otherwise occur.    
 
Summary of the Evidence 
 
The summary of the case study evidence by company is presented in table 3.1.   
All three companies were network firms that were previously run as government 
departments.  Within each firm it was recognised that there was value to be created by 
the institutional framework and over time, there was been evolution in the 
organisational structure as the firms move through the discovery process.  
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Table 3.1 Summary of the Evidence 
 
 Company X Company Y Company Z 
Understanding the specific 
context (See Chapter 2) 
 State-owned monopoly moving to private 
sector 
 Network firm 
 Evolution in organisational structure and 
company boundaries  
 State-owned monopoly moving to private 
sector 
 Network firm 
 Recognition of stakeholders 
 Evolution in organisational structure and 
company boundaries 
 State-owned monopoly moving to private 
sector 
 Network firm 
 Explicit recognition of institutional 
constraint 
 Evolution in organisational structure and 
company boundaries 
Recognising the prospects 
for value creation 
 There is value to be created by the 
institutional framework  
 There is value to be created by the 
institutional framework 
 There is value to be created by the 
institutional framework 
Measurement 
 Adjustments 
 Understandability 
 
 Evolution from adjustments originally to 
no adjustments now 
 
 Technically need to adjust to move from 
EVA accounts to conventional accounting 
 
 Explicitly recognised 
 Adjustments differ between the internal and 
external measures of EVA  
 Evolution in the number of adjustments 
(substantially reduced) 
Key Influences: 
Incentives 
 Extrinsic incentives 
 
 
 
 
 Bonus bank 
 
 
 Rewards are based on EVA for business 
unit managers in the ‘integrated’ units 
 Company EVA   
 Evolution from business unit to company 
EVA focus 
 
 
 Rewards are based on sharing EVA 
between all the stakeholders  
 Company EVA 
 Evolution from business unit to company 
EVA focus 
 
 
 Rewards are based on EVA for business 
unit managers 
 Combination of business unit and company 
EVA 
  Bonus bank  No bonus bank  No bonus bank 
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Information Provided 
 Transfer pricing 
 
 Cost allocation 
 
 
 Transfer pricing was a key influence on 
incentives 
 ABC but cost allocation can cause 
‘arguments’ 
 
 
 Simple inter-charge system 
 
 Some ABC.  No cost allocation at the 
‘micro’ level 
 
 
 Transfer pricing as a sharing rule 
 
 ABC system for cost allocation 
 
 The cost of capital 
 
 Risk Shifting 
 
 
 One cost of capital 
 
 Reorganisation of business units an issue 
 
 
 More than one cost of capital 
 
 No issues reported 
 
 
 One cost of capital 
 
 Outsourcing to protect future capital needs 
 
 
Complementary Systems: 
the BSC 
 
 EVA and EVA drivers improve the BSC 
 
 EVA improves the BSC 
 
 EVA and EVA drivers improve the BSC 
Inhibiting Factors: 
 Transactions costs 
 
 
 Inertia 
 
 Strategic Investments 
 
 EVA analysis difficult when there is 
evolution 
 
 Other measures used 
 
 Formal system for dealing with strategic 
investments 
 
 EVA analysis difficult when there is 
evolution 
 
 
 Other measures used 
 
 Recognition of real investment options but 
no formal system 
 
 EVA cannot generate evolution when other 
factors such as leadership are important 
 
 Other measures used 
 
 Recognition of real investment options but 
no formal system 
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3.8 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
3.8.1 Summary by Company 
 
Within Company X there was recognition that value could be created but after 
implementation of EVA it was discovered that incentives did not work as predicted.  In 
fact they hampered the discovery process.  From a process of rivalry exhibited through 
transfer pricing and cost allocation disputes, value was being destroyed.  This led to an 
evolution in the measurement and use of EVA within the business.   Furthermore there 
was no attempt to formally calculate the cost of capital at the business unit level.  Also 
there was a formal system for dealing with strategic investments, transaction costs as an 
inhibiting factor were particularly pronounced because the organisational structure of 
the company was itself evolving; creating issues over the reassignment of capital and 
previous EVA losses.  These factors together with inertia mean that there was little 
scope for the institution of EVA to discover value. 
 
For Company Y, it may appear that there was scope for EVA as a discovery process 
since the structure of the MCS meant that all systems were on an EVA basis.  
Furthermore, EVA was used as a mechanism for the evolution in the organisational 
structure and it was used as a means of allocating value between the stakeholders.  
However, several aspects meant that the scope for EVA was limited.  Surprisingly there 
was evidence of a lack of understanding within the business, transfer prices were based 
on a simple inter-charge system, there was very little cost allocation at the ‘micro’ level 
and the corporate cost of capital was adjusted only informally for particular investment 
projects.   Overall EVA rewards were based on the sharing of EVA at the corporate 
level meaning that there was no focus on business unit incentives.  Furthermore, whilst 
the institution of EVA may be used to evolve organisation structure, it was recognised 
that there are significant transaction costs associated with EVA in such an evolution. 
 
Within Company Z it appears that there was greater potential for EVA as a discovery 
process.  Incentives were linked to business unit and company EVA, an ABC system of 
cost allocation was in place and there was a focus on value drivers at the business unit 
level.  Furthermore there was an understanding of the importance of the sequence of 
value discoveries in the network and an awareness of the impact of their specific 
institutional constraints which led to a focus on costs and cost reduction.  However, 
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there were two important influences that significantly reduced the EVA impact.  Firstly, 
transfer prices were set as a sharing rule to reduce internal conflict and therefore were 
not set to promote the optimal internal exchange within the business.  Secondly, the 
focus for organisational structure was not EVA and value drivers, rather personal 
qualities such as leadership were much more important. 
 
3.8.2 EVA as a Discovery Process 
 
The general framework involved recognising the prospects for value creation and an 
understanding of the key influences, the inhibiting factors that shape incentives and the 
role of complementary systems such as the balanced scorecard in the discovery of value.  
With discovery as the driver for evolution there is naturally a focus upon dynamic 
change and the mechanisms for that change.   
 
The framework was applied to three New Zealand network companies which had 
moved from the state sector into one of private enterprise where it was to be expected 
that shareholder value could be created through the opportunity of exerting market 
power.  The central question investigated was whether the introduction and use of EVA 
was a discovery process that led to improved value adding decisions.  The case study 
evidence provided support for the existence of a discovery process with the prospects 
for value discovery recognised by the firms.  In implementing the EVA system, a 
business unit mapping could take place with EVA used for planning, decision making, 
control and remuneration decisions.    
 
Evolution to the rules and routines took place after the introduction of EVA.  There was 
a major change when EVA was introduced, followed by further evolution as managers 
learned to work with the system.  Furthermore, it was demonstrated that there were 
some important differences in the pathways of evolution.  There also appeared to be no 
convergence of these pathways to a common end-point.  It was a therefore a path-
dependent process, with a sequence of decision making as managers reacted to the 
system, employing their localised knowledge.  Finally, the impact of incentives was 
strong, suggesting that it is vital to consider these as part of the evolutionary theory 
framework.  
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Despite being able to model the EVA system as a discovery process, within each of the 
companies EVA failed to discover value.  There were limitations in the information 
provided by the system, due to the complexity of the measure.  Furthermore, the system 
failed in its ability to motivate managers to discover value.  The key to understanding 
this failure concerned incentives, particularly the behavioural assumptions of 
habituation, rivalry and extrinsic versus intrinsic incentives.  As a consequence, through 
a process of discovery, there was an evolution in the EVA system, both in terms of its 
measurement and use.  When discoveries were made that specific adjustments were not 
influential, these adjustments were abandoned.   When it was discovered that the 
application of EVA at the business unit level created rivalry, EVA was taken back up 
the organisation.  This evolution can be interpreted as a transition to reduce the 
transaction costs of EVA.  Whilst EVA has not been abandoned by any of the firms, its 
prospects for value creation have become increasingly diminished. 
 
3.8.3 The Framework Employed 
 
The framework for evaluating EVA as a discovery process, as depicted in figure 3.1, 
worked very well.  The key influences were the factors that needed to be in place for 
discovery to take place and the inhibiting factors were aspects that could prevent the 
discovery of value.  The categorisation of the key influences as information and 
incentives was appropriate.  Information provided included not only the output of the 
measure (i.e. the actual results or figures) but also the inputs (how the measure was 
calculated).  The dimensions of transfer pricing, cost allocation, the cost of capital 
calculation and risk shifting were useful as a means of considering the impact of the 
EVA information provided and for assessing the ability of EVA to discover value.  In 
addition, some of these dimensions were also relevant for incentives.  In particular, 
transfer pricing arrangements impacted upon the information provided and the 
incentives created.  Therefore information and incentives are not independent (nor 
would we expect them to be).  Incentives are a vital part of the discovery process.  
 
Inhibiting factors included dimensions surrounding the calculation of the EVA measure 
(such as the calculation of EVA when there is evolution in the structure of the firm and 
the valuation of strategic investments) and the reluctance to give up using other 
measures of performance.  Again these factors did impact on the ability of EVA to 
discover value. 
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This framework could be adapted to evaluate other organisational innovations.  The 
consideration of the implementation and use as a process explicitly allows for evolution 
(it will evolve over time as managers respond to the information provided and the 
incentives created).  For example, the implementation of the management accounting 
technique of activity based costing could be modelled in such a way. 
 
For researchers interested in management accounting change, the conclusion is that 
when investigating the design, introduction and use of a technique it should not be 
expected that the firms under investigation will necessarily follow the same path 
concerning that technique.  As managers work within firms and learn from their own 
experiences, the applications evolve so that different firms are likely to be on different 
paths.  These paths may well converge to the same point, for example abandonment of a 
technique, but the routes to get there may differ. 
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Chapter 4.  Can Accounting Inform Management? Management 
Accounting and Management Models 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Overall, the aim of this chapter is to employ a theoretical framework from the 
management literature to examine whether the use of EVA can be viewed as a 
management model to ensure that corporate objectives can be met.  Over the years, 
developments in the management literature have been important for management 
accounting researchers and practitioners, leading to linkages between the literature 
bases.   One development of this type in recent decades is that of business models and 
business strategy, i.e. what business the firm is in and how it makes money (Birkinshaw 
and Goddard, 2009).  Ideas from the management literature on the theory of business 
and business models (for example, Drucker, 1994) can be seen in the management 
accounting literature in the form of the balanced scorecard (see for example Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a and 2001b; Lord in Hopper et al., 2007; 
Hoque and James, 2000).  More recently, linkages have been explored between 
leadership, a dominant subject in management literature over the last thirty years 
(Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009, p.83; Mintzberg, 2009, p1) and the firm’s management 
control system (for example Abernethy et al, 2010), with Kaplan calling for further 
work in the area of leadership and the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, 2010, p30).  
 
In both the examples of business models and leadership cited above, it is the 
developments in management that have led the developments in management 
accounting.  Thus there is the potential for there to be a ‘gap’ between management and 
management accounting when there has been a development in the management 
literature and this provides an opportunity for management accounting researchers to 
respond.
32
  One possible gap is in the area of management models, the understanding of 
which is recognised as a key recent innovation by leading management academics (for 
example Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009; Hamel, 2007; Mintzberg, 
2009).  It is argued that the management model is essential to help the manager evaluate 
how to do business, running alongside the business model and leadership.  Thus the 
management model is central to the nature of management. Furthermore, it is argued 
                                                 
32
 There may also be a gap between management and management accounting where is there is no 
prospect of cross-disciplinary development.  In this situation, there is no need for closure. 
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that the management model can provide the potential for competitive advantage and 
distinctiveness that cannot be achieved simply through the business model (Birkinshaw 
and Goddard, 2009, p81).   
 
There are many management models, and thus, the term has many meanings (for 
example Guillen, 1994; Hamel, 2007).  Because the models are so voluminous and 
diverse, a synthesis is needed that captures both traditional models and new and 
experimental models.  Provision of such a synthesis has been claimed by Birkinshaw 
and Goddard (2009) and further developed by Birkinshaw (2010).  Birkinshaw and 
Goddard reviewed management models over the past 150 years, examined new models, 
and reviewed the academic literature, with the aim of diagnosing the principles that 
underlie all management (Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009, p82).  Their synthesis led to a 
definition of the term management model as: 
 
“The choices made by a company’s top executives regarding how they define 
objectives, motivate effort, coordinate activities and allocate resources; in other 
words, how they define the work of management’ (Birkinshaw and Goddard, 
2009, p82).   
 
These four choices are viewed by Birkinshaw and Goddard as the dimensions which 
provide a theoretical framework that underpins all existing management models. 
 
The gap between management accounting and management is not only created by the 
lack of reference to developments in management in the accounting literature.  Looking 
from the other direction, there is scant mention of accounting in the management 
literature.  For example, activity based costing is the only accounting construct in the 
best-selling book ‘Key management models: the 60+ models that every manager needs 
to know’ by Van Assen et al., (2009) and in its predecessor ‘Key management models: 
the management tools and practices that will improve your business’ by Ten Have et al., 
(2006), where it appears as a tool for solving a tactical problem.   This suggests that 
accounting based measures may not be seen as complete models by management 
academics.  Rather, they are viewed in a more narrow way as tools that may be used as 
an input to parts of the model.    
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In this chapter, an investigation is made into whether there is more to the function of 
management accounting than the supply of information.  The research question is 
addressed in two parts.  Firstly can EVA be interpreted as a management model?  
Secondly, does the analysis of EVA in the framework of management models further 
enhance the understanding of management models?  The overall aim is to establish a 
link between developments in management accounting (through EVA) and 
developments in management (through the management model) and to assess whether 
this link is an example of accounting closing the gap and contributing to the 
development of management models. 
 
4.2 What is a Management Model? 
 
4.2.1 Understanding the Differences between the Business Model and the 
Management Model 
 
The term ‘business model’ has been in use for a number of years to describe what 
business a company is in and what it should do to achieve its objectives.  There have 
been several prominent attempts to define the term.  For example Drucker (1994) 
developed a ‘theory of the business’ or business model that incorporates three aspects: 
assumptions about the environment, the specific organisational mission and its core 
competencies.  This business model, he argued, can be used to define what an 
organisation gets paid for, what results it considers meaningful and what it must excel at 
to maintain its competitive position.  In other words, the business model is about the 
strategy of the business.  Conceptually the model draws heavily on ideas from 
economics, including for example economies of scale and scope, and industry structure 
and competition (see for example, Porter, 1980).  A popular management accounting 
based application of a business model is the balanced scorecard, developed by Kaplan 
and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a and 2001b). 
 
In the management model, Birkinshaw suggests that it is important to consider how the 
discrete choices fit together, so that it can support and enrich the company’s strategy 
(Birkinshaw, 2010, pxi).  It is suggested that an understanding of the structure of the 
business model provides answers to the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of business and that the 
management model addresses the ‘how’.   
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4.2.2 Three Management Models 
 
Three important but contrasting management models used by prominent contemporary 
management thinkers are chosen for discussion.  The first is that of Mintzberg (2009).  
Mintzberg has been writing in this area for a number of years, with his seminal book 
published in 1973 still used as ‘an important reference that informs management 
research and education despite a number of challenges from academic scholars’ 
(Tengblad, 2006, p1437).  The Mintzberg model is chosen because in this model much 
of the existing academic research from the twentieth and early twenty-first century is 
drawn together, alongside empirical evidence.  Secondly, the model of Hamel (2007) is 
discussed.  Hamel advocated a change from extant management practices and argued 
for an innovative approach to the job of management, to reflect the changing nature of 
companies in the twenty-first century.  Finally, the Birkinshaw and Goddard model 
(2009) is considered.  In their paper, Birkinshaw and Goddard synthesised many 
management models, from the traditional to the latest approaches, in a form of factor 
analysis to provide a theoretical framework that describes the key roles of management.  
Different approaches to the dimension of the framework suggest different management 
models.   
  
In the development of his management model, Mintzberg states that “the overriding 
purpose of managing is to ensure that the unit serves its basic purpose” (Mintzberg, 
2009, p45).  He described management as a “practice, learned primarily through 
experience, and rooted in context” (Mintzberg, 2009, p10).  He stated that management 
is “controlling and doing and dealing and thinking and leading and deciding and more, 
not added up but blended together” (Mintzberg, 2009, p43).  Mintzberg’s management 
model drew together the results of existing descriptions and research in the form of a 
diagram that placed the manager at the centre between the unit for which they have 
responsibility, the rest of the organisation and the outside world relevant to the unit.  
Within the model, the manager’s role is to frame and schedule, with management taking 
place along three nested ‘planes’; the information plane (coordinating and 
communicating), the people plane (leading inside the unit and linking to people outside) 
and the action plane (doing on the inside and dealing on the outside).   
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Whilst the discussion by Mintzberg on his management model drew on research 
evidence from early work in the 1940s to the 2000s and his own empirical evidence (his 
‘29 days’ study of 1973), his model comprised a comprehensive description of what 
managers do, i.e. a job description.  The model and the resulting discussion did not form 
a prescription of ‘how’ to manage, nor did they explain the different approaches that 
could be adopted or how the management model may contribute to or support the 
business model.   
 
In contrast, Hamel (2007) argued that the ‘how’ of management is vital.  Although 
Hamel argued that the ‘what’ of the business model is essential, he suggested that the 
emphasis on the business model imposed a discipline that can stifle initiative, creativity 
and passion (Hamel, 2007, p136).  However, unlike Mintzberg, Hamel proposed that 
traditional management thinking needs to be abandoned, with innovations to 
management practice necessary for companies to succeed.  He wondered initially 
whether we have reached the end of management – that ‘perhaps we have more or less 
mastered the science of organizing human beings, allocating resources, defining 
objectives, laying out plans and minimizing deviations from best practice’ (Hamel, 
2007, p4).  However, he dismissed this initial thought by arguing that the practice of 
management must change, the future of management must be invented.  He provides 
examples of how management models can lead to value creation (p23) and how the 
management model can lead to success rather than the business model, using the case 
study of Google (ch.6).  Unlike Mintzberg, Hamel focussed on the approach to 
management, or the underlying philosophy.  He was less concerned with the detailed 
job descriptions of what managers do.  However, his ideas seemed to be aimed at a 
particular type of company, the new style firms of the twenty-first century. 
 
The final management model considered is that developed by Birkinshaw and Goddard 
(2009).  Through their analysis of the management literature, they provided an 
explanatory model ‘framework for dimensionalizing management’.   Their work was 
based on a “150 year analysis of the evolution of management models, studies of recent 
cases of management models, studies of recent cases of management innovation and a 
theoretical investigation of the underlying principles of management” (Birkinshaw and 
Goddard, 2009, p83).  Their work represented a more comprehensive analysis than that 
of Mintzberg and Hamel.   
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Their synthesis or factor analysis of the literature suggested that management activity 
should be grouped into four core sets or dimensions: managing objectives, motivating 
individuals, coordinating activities and making decisions.  This part of the analysis 
represented a positive approach as it was derived from an explanation of the existing 
models in the literature.   
 
For each of the dimensions, Birkinshaw and Goddard identified polar points on the 
spectrum, with different combinations of ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ applications leading to 
different management models.  In his book, Birkinshaw referred to these applications as 
‘traditional’ (in use for generations) and ‘alternative’ (just beginning to be adopted, or 
have been talked about for a long time but are not widely used), (Birkinshaw, 2010, 
p37).  Examples of companies that adopt these different combinations are provided to 
illustrate their models, with an average mapping for UK firms provided – both for firms 
today and a conjecture for where (new, innovative) firms may plot five years from now, 
based on a survey of 70 UK-based organisations.   Finally, Birkinshaw and Goddard 
extended their explanatory model and used it as a predictive or normative model, 
providing descriptions of the general characteristics of firms that would suit four 
different management models (with different combinations of traditional and alternative 
principles), as a means of enabling managers to choose the ‘right’ management model 
for their company.   
 
Their first dimension is that of managing objectives, concerning the choices made about 
the company’s objectives.  At the traditional end of the spectrum is a direct approach, 
where each manager has a clear set of targets for their team, comprising of a set of 
clearly defined short-term objectives.  An alternative principle, at the ‘loose’ end of the 
spectrum, is to set the goals obliquely.  The concept of obliquity has been described by 
Kay, who stated that: 
 
“In obliquity there are no predictable connections between intentions and 
outcomes… Problem solving is iterative and adaptive, rather than direct” (Kay, 
2010, p9).   
 
The second dimension is motivating individuals - a consideration of what motivates 
employees in a firm with the two polar ends being extrinsic (monetary) rewards and 
intrinsic (pride, sense of achievement) rewards.   Together the first two dimensions were 
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described by Birkinshaw and Goddard as the ‘ends’ with the ‘means’ being the final 
two dimensions of coordinating activities and making decisions.  The coordinating 
activities dimension concerns how the firm is organised and how people work together, 
with bureaucracy the traditional principle and emergence, the ‘spontaneous coordination 
through self-interested behaviour of independent actors’ being the alternative principle 
(Birkinshaw and Goddard, 2009, p85).  Finally, the making decisions dimension 
described how decision making takes place in the firm, from a hierarchical approach 
with managers wielding authority over their subordinates, to collective intelligence, 
where decisions made by the pooled expertise of many people can be better than those 
of a small number of experts. 
 
Birkinshaw and Goddard describe four management models, based on the traditional 
and alternative applications of the principles, as summarised in table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 Four management models in the Birkinshaw and Goddard framework 
 1 2 3 4 
Managing Objectives Goal Setting Goal Setting Obliquity Obliquity 
Motivating 
Individuals 
Extrinsic Extrinsic Intrinsic Intrinsic 
Coordinating 
Activities 
Bureaucracy Emergence Bureaucracy Emergence 
Making Decisions Hierarchy Collective 
Wisdom 
Hierarchy Collective 
Wisdom 
Model: Planning Quest Scientific Discovery 
 
With these four models, Birkinshaw and Goddard described the characteristics of firms 
for which these models may be most suited, whilst recognising that these represent 
extremities in the framework.  According to Birkinshaw and Goddard, the planning 
model is suitable for mature businesses operating in a stable predictable industry, with 
the quest model suited to established and growing businesses facing dynamic market 
conditions.  The scientific model is for the human capital intensive business such as 
research and development organisations facing benign market conditions but with 
plenty of opportunities.  Finally, the discovery model with its loose means and ends 
would suit an early-stage business operating in an uncertain and dynamic environment. 
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This represents the normative aspect of their analysis, as it contains prescriptions 
concerning what firms should do.   
 
The Birkinshaw and Goddard model provides a more comprehensively developed 
framework than the models of Mintzberg and Hamel, since it provides a theoretical 
framework claimed to underlie all prior management models.  It incorporates both 
traditional theoretical management ideas and models whilst retaining the flexibility for 
the inclusion of firms that are more ‘creative’ or ‘innovative’, using evidence drawn 
from a variety of firms.  In other words, Birkinshaw and Goddard combine the key 
elements of both the Mintzberg and Hamel models.  Furthermore, Birkinshaw and 
Goddard provide a theoretical framework that can be used to assess whether EVA can 
be interpreted as a management model.   For these reasons, this model is chosen as the 
framework for analysis.   
 
4.3 Applying the Birkinshaw and Goddard Framework to the Stern Stewart Measure 
of EVA  
 
Whether EVA can be interpreted as a management model within the firm is now 
discussed, in the context of the four theoretical dimensions of the management model 
outlined by Birkinshaw and Goddard (hereafter BGM).  Each of the dimensions is 
discussed in turn, together with a consideration of how the Stern Stewart measure of 
EVA fits within the dimensions.   
 
4.3.1 Managing Objectives 
 
This dimension concerns the choices made about the nature of the company’s 
objectives.  The traditional principle is a direct approach, where each manager has a 
clear set of targets for their team, comprising of a set of well-defined short-term 
objectives.  An alternative principle is to set the goals obliquely.  This oblique approach 
was described by Kay (2010), who stated that successful companies often pursue a 
higher order long-term goal rather than profitability per se.  Commitment to the higher 
order goal is designed to lead to an increase in profitability.  However, there is no clear 
cause and effect between the two.  In other words, pursuing goal A leads to achievement 
of goal B in a more successful way than if goal B was the sole objective even if there is 
no precise mapping from goal A to goal B.  Birkinshaw and Goddard (2009) state that 
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both tight goal setting and obliquity have their places in the modern firm, with the 
former more suited to a relatively simple organization in a predictable environment.  
Obliquity may be more suited to firms facing greater uncertainty as careful planning 
cannot be undertaken due to the rapidly changing environment (Birkinshaw and 
Goddard, 2009, p84).   
 
The clear objective within the Stern Stewart EVA system is to maximise the value of 
EVA, as it is claimed that it is consistent with the over-riding objective of shareholder 
wealth maximisation.  The goal of EVA maximisation leads to a focus on its 
components, NOPAT, capital and the cost of capital.  Whilst this objective can be 
divided into corporate versus business unit, projected (ex ante) EVA for planning and 
actual (ex post) for control, or short-term and long-term EVA, there is a clear financial 
goal that is set.  Although the implementation of the Stern Stewart EVA model may 
require the introduction of explicit longer-term incentives, the objective is still clear.
33
  
Thus the EVA model would be regarded as a traditional goal setting, as opposed to 
obliquity. 
 
4.3.2 Motivating Individuals 
 
The foundation for this dimension in the BGM is a consideration of what motivates 
employees in the firm.  The two extremes in this dimension are ‘extrinsic’ rewards 
(placed with the traditional principles) and ‘intrinsic’ rewards (placed with the alternate 
principles).  Extrinsic rewards include material inducements such as salary and bonuses.  
Intrinsic rewards come from within, such as a sense of achievement for a job well done.  
The concepts of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards have their original roots in the work of 
Barnard, who is credited as the first person to define a general theory of incentives in 
management (Barnard, 1938, also cited in Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  Barnard 
outlined the various types of incentives that may be offered, for example from material 
and non-material inducements, to desirable physical conditions and the opportunity of 
enlarged participation.  Barnard also stressed the ineffectiveness of material incentives 
and the need for a delicate balance between the various types of incentives.  
Importantly, and linked to the third and fourth principles below, Barnard argued that the 
                                                 
33
 Longer term objectives may be achieved through for example share options and the creation of a 
‘suspense account’ to encourage investment, where capital is kept ‘off the books’ and so does not enter 
the EVA calculation, ensuring that no capital charge is incurred.  Please see the previous chapter for a 
more detailed discussion. 
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incompleteness of contracts and the bounded rationality of members in an organisation 
require that there should be a distribution of authority along communication channels in 
order to achieve coordination and promote cooperation (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).   
 
The ideas of Barnard were used by McGregor (1960) who identified principles of 
human motivation.  He stated that individuals require extrinsic rewards to motivate 
them, in addition to intrinsic rewards.  However, as discussed in chapter 3, Layard 
(2003), emphasised the impact of extrinsic incentives upon intrinsic incentives, arguing 
that extrinsic can drive out intrinsic incentives.  In other words, there is a ‘crowding-
out’ of intrinsic incentives – extrinsic do not add to intrinsic incentives.  The Layard 
argument is different from the extant claim in the accounting literature that extrinsic 
incentives may be a better form of motivation than intrinsic incentives (Atkinson et. al. 
2007).   
 
With the EVA model, one of the key selling points is the link to incentives and 
remuneration (indeed Stern Stewart were originally remuneration consultants).  There 
are clear extrinsic incentives advocated by Stern Stewart, including payment based on 
actual EVA at the firm and/or business unit level.  Stern Stewart advocated the use of 
levered schemes where the employees are offered bonuses based on EVA results that 
have no cap or floor.  Intrinsic motivation does not feature in the Stern Stewart EVA 
model; therefore, EVA would be placed at the traditional end of the spectrum.  Indeed, 
one reason suggested for the failure of EVA to become well established in companies 
from certain countries, for example France and Germany, is the focus by the EVA 
model on extrinsic incentives where the desired corporate culture is one where intrinsic 
incentives (such as personal development, recognition and respect of peers, and long-
term career position) are important (Stern and Shiely, 2001, p164-166). 
 
4.4.3 Coordinating Activities 
 
The dimension of coordinating activities concerns the processes whereby outputs are 
delivered, with the polar extremes described as bureaucratic or formal processes and 
informal spontaneous coordination, called emergence.
34
  In a bureaucratic process, rules 
and procedures are imposed, with little room for discovery of alternative ways of doing 
                                                 
34
 The spontaneous coordination has been described in the management literature as the principle of 
emergence.  See for example, Johnson (2002). 
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things.  At the other end of the spectrum, spontaneous coordination involves no formal 
forward planning on projects or activities, rather teams are assembled and coordination 
takes place as the need arises.  Although this may appear attractive in theory since 
‘experts’ can be employed for specific activities, the reality of labour laws and staff 
turnover mean that the application in practice may be more problematic.  With informal 
coordination, there is no forward thinking and continuity in activities. 
 
In the BGM, the process of coordination is described but not the actual means of 
achieving coordination, nor the different levels of coordination.  At the strategic level, 
the strategy map may be one means to achieve coordination, whilst at the operational 
level, budgeting may be viewed as one of the formal means of coordinating activities.   
With budgeting, there could be a top down or bureaucratic approach with targets 
imposed on managers.  Discipline can also be imposed via the transfer pricing system, 
with the use of market based or arm’s length prices wherever possible.  Units trading 
with each other may have formal service level agreements specifying the inter-charge 
rates that will be employed.  Formal systems such as activity based costing may be 
employed for the allocation of some costs.   Thus there are formal mechanisms in the 
firm for achieving coordination of activities.  Clearly these activities need not be solely 
‘top down’ as they may be participatory in nature, or ‘bottom’ up.  In other words, there 
is interdependence between coordinating activities and making decisions, the fourth 
dimension.   
 
It is argued that EVA can be used within the decentralised organisation and indeed 
mapped all the way ‘to the shop floor’ (Stern and Shiely, 2001, ch.6), which 
demonstrates that EVA can, in theory, help with the coordination of activities, as there 
can be one measure for all employees.  EVA is part of the formal process for budgeting, 
target setting and transfer pricing.  This means that it is more likely that EVA would be 
at the bureaucratic end of the spectrum.  However, it is conceivable that EVA could also 
be part of an ‘emergence’ approach, where EVA is used as a basis for coordination of 
‘spontaneous activity’ as the need arises.   
 
For this dimension, it could be that the structure of the firm determines the approach.  
Within a vertically integrated firm, a lot of coordination is required, both inter and intra 
the business units.  Firms that are horizontally integrated or conglomerates may place 
less emphasis on the importance of coordination between the units. 
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4.3.4 Making Decisions 
 
The final dimension concerns the way that decisions are made within the organisation.  
At the traditional end of the spectrum, the existence of organisational hierarchies makes 
managers accountable for the decisions they make.  Hierarchy refers to the breakdown 
of totality into parts in an ordered and structured way (Birkinshaw, 2010, p88) but there 
is no description of the structure of the firm as centralised or decentralised.   The 
hierarchical approach to decision making can be consistent with the allocation of 
decision rights in both the centralised and decentralised firm.  Decisions such as those 
concerning strategy and resource allocation are made on behalf of the whole 
organisation, without recourse to the views of subordinates.  Higher level managers are 
assumed to have the experience and best judgment when faced with difficult decisions.  
Further down the organisation, managers have certain clear decision rights in a 
decentralised organisation.  At the other end of the spectrum, collective wisdom 
considers the views and suggestions of a wide range of people, in order to arrive at a 
consensus decision.   Whilst such a philosophy may open up many new ideas that may 
not have otherwise been generated, there are well documented risks attached 
(Birkinshaw, 2010, ch.4).   
 
Birkinshaw and Goddard were not prescriptive regarding the types of decisions covered 
under this dimension.  Clearly there are many decisions being made in a firm, for 
example, strategic decisions, capital investment decisions, operating decisions and 
supplier decisions.  Accounting is implicated in all these decisions but there may be a 
number of measures that are employed to assist with the decision making.  Proponents 
of the EVA model argue that EVA can be used for all decisions from investment 
planning (using ex ante EVA), to performance measurement and remuneration 
determination (using ex post or actual EVA results) – it is the only measure that is 
required.  
 
There is also prescription for the decision making rights in the decentralised firm, with 
the principle of “making managers into owners” (for example Ehrbar, 1998, ch7).  
Managers are given the responsibility for decision making, where all decisions are made 
on an EVA basis with direct links to EVA incentives.  There is a transparent hierarchy 
of EVA within the firm and a clear designation of where the decision making takes 
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place.  This would place the EVA model at the traditional end of the spectrum.  
However, in a similar vein to the coordinating activities dimension, it is conceivable 
that EVA could be employed in the collective wisdom approach to decision making.  
With this style of decision making, managers can collectively make decisions, with 
EVA as the basis for these decisions.  
 
4.3.5 Summary 
 
Each of the four dimensions in the BGM can be addressed by the Stern Stewart model 
of EVA.  The dimensions are inter-related.  For example, the dimension of decision 
making impacts upon coordinating activities and also on motivating individuals.  
Decisions taken within the firm cannot be independent of these other activities.  
 
Overall, the use of the Stern Stewart EVA model indicates the use of traditional 
principles within the first two dimensions.  For the third and fourth dimensions, it is 
more likely that traditional principles are in use, but it is possible that EVA can fit with 
the alternative principles, i.e. EVA is flexible in terms of the type of management model 
it can support.  It is predicted that EVA would align most closely with the planning 
model (outlined in table 4.1) that is suited to large mature firms operating in stable, 
predictable industries.  A fit to the quest model is also feasible; this model is suited to 
firms in established and growing businesses facing dynamic market conditions. 
 
In the following section evidence on the practical application of EVA is considered for 
three case study companies, together with the characteristics of these companies.   
 
4.4 Empirical Evidence 
 
Otley suggested three different approaches to the study of management control systems 
(Otley, 1999, p379).  The first involved a longitudinal element (to understand the inter-
relationship between different control systems over a period of time).  The second 
comprised a study of a single organisation in some depth (to appreciate the context in 
which it operates and the reciprocal impact of context and organisation) and the third 
involved a survey component within a case study of a single organisation.  Otley (1999) 
explicitly discussed EVA (along with budgeting and the balanced scorecard) in the 
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context of a framework for management control systems research.  The methodology 
employed in this chapter adopts the second and third approach as it involves the in-
depth investigation of three organisations, with data gathered by interview and 
questionnaire (please see Appendix A for a copy of the blank questionnaire).   
 
Using the information from chapter 2 on company characteristics, together with the 
characteristics specified by Birkinshaw and Goddard for their different management 
models, the case study firms are described as aligning with the following models: 
Company X: Quest 
Company Y: Planning (with an element of Quest through the international activities) 
Company Z: Quest (with an element of Planning for the core business) 
 
It is apparent that two of the firms don’t fit neatly into the Birkinshaw and Goddard 
descriptions as they operate in environments that fit both models.  Therefore, it should 
be recognised that one model may not fully describe a firm.  The research evidence will 
consider whether this has an impact on the way that the firm positions itself within the 
four dimensions.   
 
4.4.1 Results from Company X 
 
Managing Objectives 
 
Within Company X the over-arching objective upon introduction of EVA was to 
maximise the measure for the company with each of the newly created business units 
having their own EVA objectives.  The objectives, which were strategic and 
operational, were short-term (annual) in nature and clear to all business unit managers.  
In other words, there was no obliquity.   
 
Annual corporate EVA growth targets for each year were constructed from component 
(for example business unit) targets over a three year rolling planning horizon, making 
use of ‘bottom up’ targets from the corporate plan.  Threshold targets for annual 
corporate EVA were based on improvement from the previous year, with targets set on 
107 
 
a rolling three year basis.  The focus each year was only on the current targets.  Thus the 
targets were seen as short-term objectives.  However, this led to short-termism.  In an 
attempt to find a solution, the company introduced a new Stern Stewart calibration 
scheme, based on the fusion of the corporate plan and market expectations to focus on a 
three year time horizon.  Whilst the time horizon had increased, the objectives remained 
clear.   
 
At the business unit level, managers were initially set objectives for their units that were 
based on their annual EVA.  However, this resulted in some challenges that required 
modification of the approach.  Problems arose in the measurement of EVA at the 
business unit level as a result of the nature of the business.  Firstly, it was difficult to 
ring-fence assets in order to establish the appropriate capital charge for each unit, since 
several assets were mapped to more than one unit.  Secondly, the dynamic nature of the 
business meant that units were often being reorganised or: 
 
“…Sliced and diced, so there was no continuity in units, or managers, meaning 
that establishing objectives for EVA growth became difficult.” (Human 
Resources Manager, Company X)   
 
Subsequent difficulties with EVA at the business unit level resulted from the incentives 
that were created through the use of business unit objectives.  Managers became driven 
by their business unit incentives, to the detriment of the corporate goal.  This impacted 
upon coordination of activities within the firm.  In other words, in the context of the 
BGM, this demonstrates interdependence between three of the dimensions; managing 
objectives, motivating individuals and coordinating activities.  These interdependencies 
are discussed further below.   
 
Motivating Individuals 
 
At the time of EVA implementation, explicit extrinsic incentives were established, with 
a scheme introduced for business unit managers where the annual bonus was based a 
split between corporate EVA and business unit EVA performance against target.  The 
scheme was designed to motivate individual accountability through the business unit 
focus (i.e. controllability) and also for managers to have an incentive to act in the 
company’s best interests (i.e. goal congruence).  This formally recognised that what 
108 
 
may be in the best interests of the business unit may not be in the company’s best 
interests.  A heavier weighting placed on corporate EVA suggested that goal 
congruence was of primary importance. 
 
However, as noted above, the incentives created through the business unit objectives 
and remuneration led to problems within the company, particularly a breakdown in 
coordination between units.  The sharp extrinsic incentives created through EVA at the 
business unit level impeded collaboration between units.  They crowded out any 
intrinsic incentives to ‘do the right thing’.  To solve these problems, there was an 
evolution in the way that EVA was linked to incentives.  Although incentives continued 
to be extrinsic, they were modified so that they were based on corporate EVA for those 
business units where there was interdependence with other business units. The aim was 
to achieve a common corporate goal.   
 
Coordinating Activities 
 
The setting of targets and budgets is one way of achieving coordination down the 
organisation.  This may be seen as a formal or bureaucratic approach to coordination, in 
contrast to informal spontaneous coordination that occurs as the need arises.  This was 
the approach adopted in Company X, although modification was required as a result of 
the incentives created through business unit EVA.  As previously discussed, Company 
X moved to corporate EVA targets that were designed to achieve goal congruence in a 
formal (i.e. still bureaucratic) way.  At the business unit level, the evolution in the use 
of EVA meant that business unit EVA targets and budgets were no longer set.  Instead, 
earnings before interest and tax became the focus.  This meant that there was no longer 
a focus on capital and the capital charge at the business unit level.  This development 
was mainly due to the fact that EVA at the business unit level was damaging 
coordination.  The nature and structure of the business and the interdependencies meant 
that internal trading arrangements were (and continue to be) very important.  Setting 
service level agreements each year and negotiating over costs was devolved to business 
unit managers and it took up a big part of their time.  This may be value adding for the 
company if trading arrangements are designed appropriately so that incentives are 
aligned in order to ensure that the company value ‘pie’ becomes bigger as a result of 
this trading.  However, the danger is that business unit managers may use trading 
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arrangements to maximise their slice of the pie and in so doing sub-optimise from the 
overall corporate perspective.  This is a common problem of performance management 
system design.   
 
Because of the impact on business unit EVA, managers became very preoccupied with 
their trading arrangements.  They saw these as a way of increasing their slice of the pie, 
and this pursuit became more important than increasing the total size of the pie.  
Managers “fought to the last” (Corporate Finance Team Manager) over these 
agreements.  The evidence from the company was that the actual traded prices depended 
upon the skill of the units in estimating costs.  If the manager of one unit was better 
skilled at cost estimation and management, then that unit did very well out of the 
trading arrangements, often to the detriment of other units.
35
  The introduction of EVA 
did not therefore help substantially with the coordination of activities.  In fact, EVA 
heightened issues over transfer pricing because of the business unit focus in the 
remuneration scheme.   
 
Approximately five years after implementation, there was a change of Chief Executive 
in the firm.  The new Chief Executive was unhappy with the issues associated with the 
use of EVA, particularly over the resulting tensions surrounding internal trading 
arrangements.  The view of the Human Resources Manager was that the Chief 
Executive viewed EVA as: 
 
“An impediment to collaboration as it was creating conflicts of interest between 
different business units and the corporate goal.” (Human Resources Manager, 
Company X) 
 
Given the business unit structure, there has to be interaction between the units.
36
  Hence 
there is a motivation for the evolution in EVA for objectives and target setting in order 
to achieve coordination.   
                                                 
35
 Costs are used as a starting point in the setting of the internal traded prices.   
36
 One possibility is to restructure to integrate the units into a centralised firm.  However, this would 
destroy the advantages that a functional, decentralised structure can bring.  Presumably these advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages. 
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These problems in achieving coordination with EVA were recognised by Stern and 
Shiely (2001), who stated that: 
 
“In many organisations, it is difficult to measure EVA deep down in the 
structure, because of the problems of shared resources and transfer pricing.  The 
resolution of these problems means that only a part of EVA will be measured 
and rewarded” (Stern and Shiely, 2001, p189-190) 
 
This was certainly the case for Company X.  To make it work, the EVA measure had to 
taken back up to the corporate level.   
 
Making Decisions 
 
Company X operated a clear hierarchical structure where decisions over investment and 
asset utilisation were made at the highest level and there was no empowerment of 
business unit managers to make capital investment decisions.   
 
For investment decision making, business cases are assessed at the Board level, with 
business units submitting their proposals via the corporate unit.  Forecasts of EVA were 
constructed together with evaluation based on other tools, for example net present value, 
real options (using the binomial model) and payback.  This was partly for the benefit of 
members of the Board as they did not trust EVA.  According to the Financial 
Management Advisor:  
 
“The Board just didn’t know what was reasonable and whether we were just 
pulling the wool over their eyes.” (Financial Management Advisor, Company X) 
 
 The practice of decision making at the Board level was consistent with the corporate 
EVA focus adopted in the company.  It also demonstrated a direct cause and effect 
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between decisions, outcomes and returns to capital, with a clear understanding of this 
within the company.  The Human Resources Manager commented:  
 
“I think it’s been important because it drove two key messages.  It really drove a 
look at capital.  We’re a capital intensive business and it was highly supportive 
of that.  From that point of view, when worrying about your capital is important, 
it’s achieved that.  The other thing is that it has educated people about 
shareholders and investors.  It’s well understood in this organisation now that we 
have to deliver shareholder value.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X) 
 
The company had to modify its use of EVA for investment decision making for its 
stand-alone units when dealing with what are deemed to be ‘strategic investments.’  The 
model adopted was one of ‘forgiveness’, whereby targets for certain investments were 
relaxed, if the investments were classed as strategic.  For such a classification, there 
were clear rules for the decision making: investments must be of a certain minimum 
level and they must be ex ante EVA negative for around the first three years yet overall 
EVA positive, with approval from the Board for such investments.  Once the investment 
had been made, ex post EVA was evaluated with reference to an approved plan (i.e. 
against negative targets, rather than with reference to a base of zero).  A suspense 
account of EVA losses was then created from year 1, called suspended losses, on which 
a capital charge had to be paid.  As soon as the EVA was predicted to switch to being 
positive in a particular year, then the manager was judged against EVA growth. This is 
not the Stern Stewart approach of ‘keeping capital off the books.’  Indeed, this method 
increased the capital charge in return for ‘forgiveness’ on the revenue side.  However, 
overall the objective is the same – to provide a direct incentive to invest when using 
EVA for decision making.    
 
Complementing EVA within Company X is the balanced scorecard as the business 
model.  At the time of the interviews, the corporate finance team were investigating the 
possibility of installing software that linked the scorecard, strategy map and EVA.  A 
team member commented: 
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“We’re definitely looking to go to some sort of system like that would formalise 
the links between measures all the way up to the corporate EVA objective.  It 
would co-ordinate the flow-through.” (Corporate Finance Team Member, 
Company X) 
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the company adopted a hierarchical, rather than a 
collective wisdom, approach to decision making.  There was no suggestion that decision 
rights were not clear, nor that decisions were made on a collective wisdom or consensus 
basis. 
 
4.4.2 Results from Company Y 
 
Managing Objectives 
 
For Company Y, a target of zero corporate EVA was established initially, over a rolling 
three year period.  The zero EVA target was set because the firm is a state owned 
enterprise so it was deemed appropriate that positive EVA should not be earned.  One 
Business Unit manager commented that:  
 
“EVA of zero was seen as being an appropriate return for a monopoly over a 
long run, whatever that might be.”  (Business Unit Manger, Company Y) 
 
However, it became difficult for the company to achieve the target of zero EVA.  When 
the target was exceeded, the customers were given a rebate and if the EVA result was 
below target, then the company appealed to the customers for an increase in prices.  It 
was the latter situation that caused tensions and conflicts.  After a large restructure in 
the late 1990s, the objective was changed to EVA maximisation, but on the 
understanding that prices should be held or reduced.  In other words, in the monopoly 
business the firm could not achieve EVA maximisation through large increases in 
prices.  The company then implemented a scheme in place for the sharing of positive 
EVA between the three main stakeholder groups: the employees, the customers and the 
shareholders.  Essentially, once a threshold level of EVA was reached and certain 
business objectives were met, the employees took the first slice of the EVA surplus, 
followed by customers and the shareholders.  If the threshold was not met, then only the 
customers and shareholders were entitled to any positive EVA. 
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Although the company had changed its goal from EVA of zero to the maximisation of 
annual EVA, the company was consistently operating a direct approach to goal setting.  
Thus only clear goal setting was apparent and there was no obliquity whatsoever.  The 
clear objective was to maximise annual EVA at the corporate level.   
 
Motivating Individuals 
 
The sharing scheme for stakeholders in the firm was very interesting.  It was an 
extrinsic scheme, with EVA as the financial incentive.  One of the motivations for its 
introduction was to help align objectives with the shareholders (clear objectives) and to 
foster a sense of teamwork amongst all employees (coordination of activities).  Thus 
Company Y provided an example of the application of the EVA model linking these 
three dimensions together.   
 
At the individual staff level, some dissatisfaction with the scheme was expressed via the 
questionnaires and interviews.  This dissatisfaction arose largely because some 
employees took the view that whatever they did in their job, they couldn’t influence the 
EVA result.  There was a “removal of action from results” to quote one Business Unit 
Manger.  As a consequence, the Human Resources Manager and their team worked hard 
to communicate the idea that without a particular individual’s contribution the target 
may not be met, even though the individual’s contribution cannot be specifically 
identified.
37
  Overall, the approach was an extrinsic approach to motivating individuals.     
 
Coordinating Activities 
 
The sharing scheme, as discussed above, is a key means of achieving coordination both 
within the firm and between the firm and its outside stakeholders.  A minimum 
threshold level of EVA is set.  If the annual EVA result is below the threshold, any 
positive EVA is shared between the customer and the shareholder (the Government).  
Beyond the threshold level, the employees have the first slice of the EVA surplus, 
followed by customers and the shareholders.  If the threshold is not met, then only the 
customers and shareholders are entitled to any positive EVA.  An EVA result that is 
                                                 
37
 A subsequent review of the scheme showed almost universal report for its retention, according to 
follow-up communication.   
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below zero would lead to an investigation of revenues, costs and the capital charge.  
This is an unusual application of EVA that works well for the company.   
 
Within the company, there was evidence of EVA being used in a formal process of 
target setting.  The Group Manager, Finance, commented: 
 
“We’re one company; we don’t want to stretch or fragment the one company 
philosophy with the business units.  What we try and do at the planning stage at 
the target setting stage, we pull all the key business unit managers together and 
we set EVA targets at business unit and global basis that gives us in corporate 
finance what we need for shareholder requirements, to return our business plan 
targets.”  (Group Manager, Finance, Company Y) 
 
The budgets flowed from the targets, with budgets at the business unit and sub-unit 
level prepared on an EVA basis.  Assets were allocated to business unit and the sub-unit 
level, so that EVA calculations could be performed.  The calculation of EVA was 
designed to be summative, so that the sub-unit EVA results total the firm result.  Where 
there was some sharing of assets and labour across business units, there were clear 
agreements in place to determine where the assets and costs lie.  Overall, in the BGM, a 
bureaucratic approach to coordination was adopted, with clear rules and procedures.  An 
emergence approach was not adopted as there was no evidence of spontaneous 
coordination. 
 
Making Decisions 
 
Company Y used EVA for its entire decision making, from the formalisation of 
corporate strategy into objectives.  For example, the decision to restructure back in the 
late 1990s was based on EVA, decisions concerning international business ventures and 
investment decision-making and target setting were also EVA based.  There was a clear 
hierarchical approach to decision making.  Much of the capital expenditure planning 
was top down from the ten year plan, based on life cycle replacements of existing 
assets.  This was formalised into the annual capital expenditure budget via the rolling 
three year plan.  Business unit managers were involved with the setting of annual capital 
expenditure targets.  Based on the plan, they would put proposals for new investments 
to the Board.  There was some evidence of sharing information to inform investment 
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decision making.  However, this was not the same as collective wisdom, as ultimately 
decisions were made by the Board.  The EVA mentality of the company meant that 
projected EVA was the focus for the analysis.  At the Board level, however, additional 
measures would be evaluated, such as payback and net present value.  According to the 
Group Manager, Finance: 
 
“You can’t change all the years of experience in other companies that use more 
traditional measures.” (Group Manager, Finance, Company Y) 
 
Within the business units, operational decisions could be taken by the unit managers.  
These decisions were on an EVA basis.  The Group Manager, Technology and Support 
stated:  
 
“I think that in terms of driving EVA down into the company, it’s a question of 
just being careful that you’re doing it to enough of a level that’s useful for a 
business manager to make proper business decisions.  But you’ve also got to 
make sure that you’re looking at it across the whole company.  They need to be 
aware of the overall EVA position.” (Group Manager, Technology and Support, 
Company Y) 
 
Company Y also made use of the balanced scorecard to help to formalise strategy 
within the firm.  The Group Manager, Technology and Support commented that: 
 
“We’ve tended to go for a balanced scorecard type approach with our 
managers… on an EVA basis.”  (Group Manager, Technology and Support, 
Company Y) 
 
 
In other words, the EVA model complemented the balanced scorecard as the business 
model.   
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4.4.3 Results from Company Z 
 
Managing Objectives 
 
Initially the company established an EVA methodology at the company level.  
Subsequently members of the Board decided to implement EVA at the business unit 
level and to pay incentives based on EVA so the development of the EVA framework 
was initiated.  The separate Business units were to be treated as if they were real 
businesses, with the aim of “creating some tension between them” (Chief Executive).  
This runs counter to the one company philosophy and it provided incentives to act in the 
best interests of the business unit, which may not be the best interests of the company.  
Clear EVA objectives were established for managers, based, in part, on their business 
unit performance and in part on organisation performance.  In other words, to some 
extent, the corporate viewpoint was also maintained.  Again, this is evidence of clear 
goal setting, and not an oblique approach to the management of objectives.  Given the 
nature of the company (SOE), EVA could not be construed as being an objective for a 
higher level aim such as survival. 
 
Motivating Individuals 
 
Company Z made explicit use of extrinsic EVA incentives for its employees.  Around 
800 employees were an on annual EVA plan with the top 30 senior managers on a 
rolling three year plan.  As illustrated in Appendix E, Corporate groups and the senior 
management team had incentives linked to the overall EVA result (80% of incentive 
plan), whilst the incentives for business unit managers were based on company 
performance (50% of plan) and business unit performance (30%).  The remaining 20% 
for both groups related to revenue and extrinsic non-financial targets such as customer 
satisfaction, service delivery.  The current EVA incentive plan involved more levering 
of the bonuses than was the case with the prior plan (based on earnings before interest 
and tax).  According to the Manager, Corporate Finance, this increase in extrinsic 
incentives had been beneficial because it: 
 
“Crystallised managers’ thinking around capital and the cost of capital, and it 
provided a robust and acceptable tool to measure performance and to incentivise 
managers.”  
117 
 
 
Coordinating Activities 
 
To manage the interdependence between business units there was a bureaucratic or 
formal coordination within the firm, rather than informal or spontaneous coordination.  
With the business unit focus, managers may have the incentive to act in their unit’s best 
interests, to the detriment of other business units, thus inhibiting coordination.  This is 
particularly the case in Company Z, where the EVA system was designed to allow 
competitive behaviour across the business unit managers.  However, participants were 
of the view that EVA has provided “a goal to focus on when setting transfer prices” 
(Business Unit Manager) and it had led to a more commercial focus within the units.  If 
ever any tensions arise they are resolved by the senior management team.   
 
Coordination was also achieved through EVA targets and budgets, with the business 
unit target EVAs designed to sum to the corporate EVA target.  Managers were held to 
account over their targets, again demonstrating the formal approach to coordination.  
Indeed less formal approaches may be difficult to operationalise in a decentralised 
organisation.   
 
Making Decisions 
 
Company Z adopted a hierarchical approach to decision making, with clear decision 
rights assigned.  Strategic and major capital investment decisions were made at the 
Board level, using EVA primarily but with other measures presented for comparative 
purposes.  For example, Net Present Value and payback period would be considered for 
investment decisions, as well as EVA.  Although the ultimate decisions are made at the 
Board level, there was involvement with the business unit managers and the Corporate 
team, in drawing up the three year expenditure plan.  In the implementation of the plan, 
business unit managers put forward business cases based on forecasted EVA at the 
business unit cost of capital.  These must be approved before investment can take place.  
According to the Manager, Corporate Finance: 
 
“EVA has brought a real discipline to business cases that means that decisions 
are more clearly understood.” 
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The introduction of EVA deepened the hierarchy of decision rights, with managers 
given more of a free rein to run their units.  For example, recently the manager of one 
unit had taken the decision to outsource an element of the service delivery.  This 
decision was made on an EVA basis – the manager considered the impact on the capital 
charge (through shedding redundant capital) and more importantly, the saving on the 
NOPAT side (through savings in the payroll cost).  This is interesting as it demonstrates 
the use of EVA as a model for managing in the business unit.   According to the Chief 
Executive, EVA means that managers are now “thinking in a different light.”      
 
Company Z also makes use of the balanced scorecard as the business model (see 
Appendix E for details in the incentive plan guidebook for 2000/2001).  The company 
had been using this model for a number of years prior to the introduction of EVA.  
According to the Manager, Corporate Finance:  
 
“The balanced scorecard approach had been very strongly inculcated in the 
business culture for years so it was nothing really new.  The introduction of 
EVA was seen as a further evolutionary step about getting smarter and crisper 
and sharper around what’s done.”  
 
As with Companies X and Y, Company Z provides evidence that the balanced scorecard 
complements the EVA model.   In fact, the EVA model adds to the balanced scorecard 
model within this company.  Overall, this is still a hierarchical approach to decision 
making.   
 
4.4.4 Summary of the Evidence 
 
The results demonstrate that the EVA model can play a role in all four dimensions.  
Despite the firm characteristics aligning to both planning and quest descriptions, within 
the BGM, the companies would locate at the ‘traditional’ end of the spectrum in their 
use of EVA.  The companies demonstrated a similar application of EVA within the 
dimensions of managing objectives, motivating individuals and making decisions.  The 
firms operated with clear short-term objectives at the corporate level, with extrinsic 
incentives linked to overall company performance and clear hierarchical decision rights. 
One company, Company Z also makes use of business unit objectives and incentives, 
which sit alongside those at the corporate level.  Differences arose between the 
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companies within the dimension of coordinating activities.  EVA had either been seen 
as an impediment to coordination (Company X), or as an aid to coordination 
(Companies Y and Z).  Summary results are presented in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Summary results for the case companies 
 Company X Company Y Company Z 
Managing 
Objectives 
Clear short-term 
objectives. Evolution 
from business unit to 
focus on corporate EVA 
Clear short-term objective 
of EVA maximisation 
Focus on corporate EVA 
 
Clear short-term 
objectives 
EVA objectives at the 
corporate and business 
unit level 
Motivating 
Individuals 
Extrinsic incentives  
Evolution from business 
unit to focus on corporate 
EVA 
Extrinsic incentives 
Focus on corporate EVA 
Extrinsic incentives 
Focus on corporate and 
business unit EVA 
Coordinating 
Activities 
Bureaucratic  
Business unit EVA 
damaged coordination 
Bureaucratic 
EVA aids coordination 
Bureaucratic 
EVA can promote 
beneficial competition 
between business units 
Making 
Decisions 
Hierarchical with clear 
decision rights 
Hierarchical with clear 
decision rights 
Hierarchical with clear 
decision rights 
Complementary 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
business model 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
The evidence from the companies suggests two key points.  Firstly, the use of EVA led 
to interaction between the dimensions, with the extrinsic incentives associated with 
EVA having an impact on coordination between individuals.  This interaction was most 
apparent in Company X, where the motivating individuals dimension came to dominate 
the other dimensions.  This prompted a change in the extrinsic EVA incentives and 
objectives in order to achieve coordination.  Secondly, the evidence suggests that the 
dimensions in the BGM should not be regarded as independent.  The key dimension is 
motivating individuals as it drives behaviour which impacts upon the other dimensions.  
120 
 
In figure 4.1 the BGM is modified for the case firms, to show motivating individuals as 
the central dimension, as well as the interdependence between the dimensions.   
 
Figure 4.1 Diagrammatic representation of the Birkinshaw and Goddard Model 
for the case study firms
  
Motivating 
individuals 
Managing 
Objectives 
Making  
Decisions 
Coordinating 
Activities 
121 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The literature bases in management and in management accounting have the potential to 
be mutually enhancing when developments in one base can contribute to developments 
in the other.  However, where there are developments in one disciplinary area to which 
researchers in the other have not responded, then a ‘gap’ is created.  This study focussed 
on one key development in the management literature, the management model.  The 
management model is one example of a development in management that has preceded 
developments in management accounting.  Thus a gap has been created.  This study 
aimed to close the gap in two ways.  From the management perspective, accounting is 
traditionally viewed as a source of information relevant to decision making.  It is 
considered to be a tool or measure that can be used only in parts of the management 
model.  This chapter investigated whether an accounting based measurement system, 
EVA, could be interpreted as a management model that supported the achievement of 
corporate objectives.  This involved the establishment of a link between developments 
in management accounting and developments in management.  Accounting, in the form 
of an EVA system, played the lead in developing the management model.  From the 
management accounting perspective, the use of a management model as a means of 
analysing the status of an accounting system also helped to close the gap.   
 
Although none of the companies employed EVA in the way that Stern Stewart 
recommended and there was no systematic application of EVA across the firms, this did 
not alter the principles within each of the four dimensions.  For each of the case firms, 
EVA involved traditional, rather than alternative, principles indicating that however 
EVA is applied, it led to a particular management ‘style.’  There was considerable 
variation within the dimensions as each of the firms operated EVA differently, 
suggesting that the definition of the principles as traditional or alternative within the 
Birkinshaw and Goddard framework is wide.  The EVA management model provided 
flexibility as it worked for firms aligning to both planning and quest style 
characteristics.  
 
The EVA evidence demonstrated that the structure of the BGM framework needed 
modifying for the case firms.  Firstly, the model is static, describing dimensions for 
managing but with no recognition that it is a dynamic activity, with learning and 
evolution playing an important role within the dimensions.  Secondly, the specification 
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of one dimension meant that the other dimensions themselves may be specified 
indirectly.  For example, specification of objectives can impact upon decision rights.  
Managers in a firm that operates a corporate perspective may find that their decision 
rights at the business unit level are constrained.   In other words, EVA has established 
that, within the framework, the dimensions are not independent.  Furthermore, there is a 
hierarchy or ‘pecking order’ in the dimensions, with motivating individuals the key 
dimension.   The incentives given to managers can drive behaviour that impacts 
adversely upon coordination.  For one case company, this led to a change in objectives 
and a realignment of incentives.  The Birkinshaw and Goddard theoretical framework 
could be adapted to recognise the evolution and interdependencies.   
 
Despite the interdependence between the dimensions and the fact that the Stern Stewart 
model of EVA was not strictly applied, the case studies demonstrated that each of the 
three firms used EVA successfully as a management model and continued to do so for a 
number of years.  The biggest challenge was in the dimension of coordinating activities 
and this required modification to the other dimensions to ensure that the model 
continued to work.  Each of the case companies also operated with the balanced 
scorecard as the business model, which may have either pre-dated or come after EVA 
implementation.  The case companies demonstrated that the balanced scorecard as a 
business model complemented EVA as a management model.  For these companies, one 
model did not exist without the other.   
 
Through EVA, management accounting has provided a more comprehensive service 
and contributed more than a measure that is a component of the management model.  It 
has formed the model itself.  For these companies, this demonstrated a revision of the 
potential significance of accounting for organisational management and a potential to 
close the gap between the two disciplines.   Since these results are taken from three case 
study companies, further research could be undertaken to widen the perspective.  For 
example, studies could apply the revised management model to assess the central 
importance of motivating individuals to the role of management.  Further investigation 
of EVA could be undertaken in businesses that are not characterised by the planning and 
quest models of management explored in this paper.  It would also be interesting to 
investigate EVA as a management model in companies based in different countries, to 
analyse whether there is a cultural dimension to the application of EVA as a 
management model.   
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Chapter 5.  A Dynamic Contingency Model of EVA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine EVA using the perspective of a dynamic 
context-specific analysis.
 
 The analysis is dynamic because it investigates the changing 
nature of the EVA system over a long time period.  It is context-specific as it considers 
the barriers to and forces for EVA adoption, use and abandonment within the context of 
the three companies in New Zealand.  The key focus is on the longer-term experience of 
EVA within the firms, with evidence covering a time period of fifteen years, spanning 
three broad stages in the life cycle sequence of the EVA MCS: implementation, 
evolution in the measure and eventual decline.  It has already been noted that within 
each firm, Stern Stewart consultants were employed to ensure a comprehensive 
introduction that was phased from the company level and mapped down to business 
units.  As such EVA was ‘properly’ implemented in that it was not simply a 
performance measure but was used fully throughout each organisation as a central 
component of the MCS.  After implementation, each of the firms found it necessary to 
modify the measure of EVA, due to issues over both the information provided and the 
incentives created.  The final stage for the firms, the decline in the measure to the extent 
that there was very little EVA legacy, has not yet been analysed in the thesis.     
   
The chain of evidence for each company and for each of the three stages was collected 
from questionnaires distributed in 1999 (please see Appendix A), 21 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with key staff members in each company in 2001 and 2011 and 
from scrutiny of supporting documentation.   
 
The analysis was conducted using a contingency theory framework.  The basic premise 
of contingency theory is that there is no ‘best’ way to structure the MCS and 
consequently it is not possible to identify a universally appropriate management 
accounting system that will apply in all circumstances (Otley, 1980).  However, many 
studies have been conducted that attempt to identify the impact of one or more variables 
on the MCS and the outcome, such as profit (for a review of such studies, see Chenhall, 
2003; and Fisher, 1995).   These studies tend to be cross-sectional statistical studies 
which use data from one point in time.  Weaknesses associated with these studies are 
that they may only focus on one variable and one outcome so that the full complexity of 
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relationships and causality patterns between the variables is not taken into account 
(Fisher, 1995).  Relevant variables may be omitted and therefore it would be preferable 
for studies to focus on multiple factors simultaneously and to examine the inter-
relationships.  This suggests a longitudinal approach would be preferable to enhance 
internal validity (Brownell, 1995, p64; Fisher, 1995, p45; Otley, 1980, p424).  Such an 
approach is adopted in this study; where the overall objective is to investigate the 
contextual variables that were important for the companies at each phase of the EVA 
life cycle, using a dynamic perspective.  This approach is advocated by Brignall (1997), 
who suggested normative research propositions concerning changes in business strategy 
and accounting controls over the life cycle of a product or service (Brignall, 1997, 
p341).   
 
The research makes four main contributions to the theoretical and empirical 
management accounting literature.  Firstly, the extension of traditional cross-sectional 
contingency analysis to a dynamic longitudinal application is a contribution.  The study 
spans many years and covers the life cycle of EVA, from implementation, through to 
evolution and then finally the eventual decline.  This facilitates an understanding of how 
EVA has persisted and changed over the time period.  A second contribution is the 
identification of the contingencies that were influential at each stage of the cycle.  The 
study is not restricted to particular variables (omitting other potentially relevant 
variables).  It thus examines how contingencies emerge and wax and wane in terms of 
their influence on EVA use over time.  The micro-study approach enables an 
understanding of the causal relationships between the variables and how they may act 
collectively to change the EVA MCS over time.   Thirdly, the time-series approach 
suggests the relevance of a new contingency variable, termed dynamic interaction, 
which occurs as a result of the passage of time.  This approach enables an investigation 
of the dynamic interaction between managers, the EVA MCS and the contingency 
variables, as they learn and gain experience from working with the EVA system.  
Finally, the model of technique decline is itself a contribution, as it has been noted that 
it is difficult to find evidence of the demise of management accounting techniques 
(Chanegrih, 2008; Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005.
38
)   
                                                 
38
 Although the study by Ezzamel and Burns (2005) arguably covers implementation and abandonment of 
EVA in one UK company, the time period between introduction and demise was extremely short (6 
months), so it could be argued that EVA was never fully embedded as the financial management system 
for the firm.  Rather, the idea of EVA was adopted but EVA itself was not fully embedded.  Furthermore, 
the introduction and abandonment of EVA took place at the time of the de-merger of the company, so 
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The chapter is organized as follows.  In the following sub-section, the dynamic 
contingency theory framework is developed.  In section 5.3 the EVA MCS is discussed 
and the research propositions are developed.  In section 5.4 the empirical methods are 
outlined and the evidence is presented.  Section 5.5 contains a discussion of the results 
from which the contingency model for the micro-study companies is developed.  
Conclusions are presented in section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Developing the Dynamic Contingency Theory Framework 
 
The contingency theory framework for management accounting research stems from 
work by organisational theorists in the 1960s and 1970s, who proposed that contextual 
variables influenced an organisation’s structure and business (see for example Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1970; Woodward, 1965).  The 
general assumption is that for an organisation to be effective there must be an 
appropriate fit between structure and context (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999). 
Researchers such as Gordon and Miller (1976), Hayes (1977 and 1978); Otley (1980) 
and Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) introduced the contingency theory framework to 
the management accounting literature.   Since that time, a number of studies employing 
contingency theory have been published, together with summary or review articles (for 
example, Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1995; and Langfield-Smith, 1997).  
These studies have identified a number of contingent variables that are relevant for 
management control system design.  Fisher (1995) illustrated the sequencing in the 
framework, where initially the firm directly selects contingent variables such as its 
corporate and business strategy.  Given these choices, the firm will also face 
contingency variables beyond its control, including the environment and national 
culture.
39
  In response to these factors, the organisational control package is determined, 
including the control system, structure, culture, human resource management and other 
control mechanisms.  These factors feed into organisational outcomes which in turn are 
measured and used for rewards.  The system then feeds back into future strategy and 
operational decisions.   
                                                                                                                                               
there was a ‘confounding event’ which calls into question the results.  Malmi (1997) looked at 
perceptions of success and failure of ABC in one firm – again the time period was extremely short (within 
a matter of months), so the ABC system was never fully embedded.   
39
 Hambrick and Lei (1985) noted that in the long run, a firm can reposition itself and fundamentally 
change the contingent variables its faces. 
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5.2.1 Contingency Variables Identified in the Literature 
 
The most common contingency variables identified in the management accounting 
literature include strategy, environment, culture, technology, structure and size.
40
  Each 
of these variables is discussed in turn.    
 
Strategy 
 
Strategy was not initially identified as a contingent variable for accounting (Chapman, 
1997; Langfield-Smith, 1997); rather it was described as a means of influencing the 
other contingency variables (Chenhall, 2003, p150).  However, the importance of 
strategy was recognised in the management organisation literature from an early date.
41
  
It is clearly important that strategy and the MCS are aligned; the MCS must fit the 
strategy.  It has been argued that firms that achieve this alignment are more likely to 
effect better control and are therefore likely to enjoy superior performance (Merchant 
and Van der Stede, 2012, p690). 
 
Strategy has been split into two levels: corporate strategy (the overall business a firm 
wants to be in – for example related or unrelated diversification) and business strategy 
(how a firm or business unit wishes to compete), (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012, 
p688).  Firms pursuing related-diversification need MCSs that exploit synergies such as 
economies of scope and reflect the communication that must take place between 
business units.  To signal that cooperation is important, related-diversified firms will 
tend to use incentives for managers that base some element of the reward on a higher 
level (for example business group or the whole organisation).  Important aspects of 
business strategy are marketing and production; the decisions concerning the markets in 
which to compete and the location of business units (for example national versus 
multinational operations), creating a natural link with environment and culture.   
Taxonomies for strategy have been described including product differentiation (for 
example related and unrelated diversification)/cost leadership (Porter, 1980); 
prospectors/analysers/defenders (Miles and Snow, 1978); build/hold/harvest (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984).  In essence, strategies characterised by defender and harvest 
                                                 
40
 See for example, Chenhall (2003); Langfield-Smith (1997); Otley, (1980); Waterhouse and Tiessen, 
(1978).   
41
 See for example, Chandler (1962) whose study of major US organisations found that managerial 
organisations developed in response to the corporation’s business strategy.  
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orientations and following cost leadership are associated with formal performance 
measurement systems (Chenhall, 2003, p151).  Controls should be tight and results 
should emphasise cost reduction and budget achievement.  Conversely firms pursuing 
prospector/differentiation strategies should have more informal control systems and 
performance related to any number of financial and non-financial indicators, including 
innovation, customer service and growth (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012, p690).  
Such firms may be more likely to adopt innovative techniques (Gosselin, 1997, p108).  
More recently, an additional organisational strategy, confrontation strategy, has been 
postulated (for example, Cooper, 1995; Adler, 2011).  Cooper (1995) stated that 
industries whose products and services have reached a mature stage and which feature a 
high level of competition are likely to experience a shrinking survival zone.  Companies 
in these industries will compete head to head with each other, thus a confrontation 
strategy ensues.  Adler argues that this type of strategy is likely to become more 
prevalent as competition amongst business intensifies.
42
  He presented an empirical 
study that suggested the appropriate type of performance management system for these 
firms, in contrast to the systems already suggested for cost leader and differentiator 
firms (Adler, 2011, p261).
43
  For the purposes of this study, Porter’s taxonomy is used 
for strategy, as this reflects the whole business environment and the marketing and 
production decisions a firm must make.  The notion of confrontation strategy is also 
considered.   
 
External Environment 
 
The overall impact of the environment depends on the level of uncertainty that is 
generated by it, through for example regulation, competition or innovation.  In other 
words, whether the environment can be stable or whether it is the source of 
unpredictable change (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999).  The proposition is that the more 
uncertain the environment, the more a firm will need to devote specialised functions to 
cope with problems and the more resources it will need to devote to managing the 
interface with the environment.  The unpredictability of changes creates the need for 
                                                 
42
 It is interesting to note that Adler implicitly assumes that firms facing intense competition must be 
pursuing confrontation strategies.  However, firms in this situation may choose to collaborate.  For 
example, airline companies and automobile manufacturers (an industry cited as being confrontational) 
choose to pursue strategic alliances that have been successful for a number of years. 
43
 Such a system includes workgroup-inspired work procedures, collective responsibility and naturally 
coordinating mechanisms, interactive strategic planning, hybrid customer-oriented and tight budget 
control systems, group-based incentive compensation and the promotion of empowerment, multiskilling, 
and collective responsibility (Adler, 2011, p261). 
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‘continuous environmental scanning’ so that costing and performance measurement 
systems can respond to these changes (Brignall, 1997, p341).  
 
The external environment is a “powerful contextual variable that is at the foundation of 
contingency based research” (Chenhall, 2003, p137).  Chenhall (2003) stated that 
uncertainty in the environment is the most widely researched aspect  and he cites 
examples of research featuring this variable including Burns and Stalker (1961); 
Galbraith (1973); Hayes (1977); Lawrence and Lorsch (1967); Tymond et al. (1998).  
Similarly, in their studies, Innes and Mitchell (1990) and Cobb et al. (2005) found that 
the external environment was a major influence on management accounting change. 
 
Khandwalla (1977) classified environmental factors as turbulence (risky, unpredictable, 
fluctuating, ambiguous), hostility (stressful, dominating, restrictive), diversity (variety 
in product, inputs, customers) and complexity (rapidly changing technologies).  
Similarly, in her study of ABC at General Motors, Anderson (1995) focussed on 
uncertainty caused by external turbulence, competition and external communication 
networks (the role of external experts).  She also included heterogeneity of external 
demands on the organisation as an external factor.  As a specific example of external 
demands, Woods (2009) used the Government as an environmental variable in her study 
of risk management at Birmingham City Council.   
 
For the purposes of this study, the environmental uncertainty factors discussed above 
are grouped together as the business cycle (the general state of the economy or the 
particular industry); competition (number of competitors, ease of entry); innovation in 
products and processes (complexity due to changes in technology, inputs, outputs); and 
Government and regulatory impact (changes in the law, for example changes to the 
rules of competition and reporting requirements, Government regulatory requirements, 
and uncertainty over regulation).  
 
Culture 
 
Culture may refer to national culture, with the primary idea being that specific countries 
will have particular cultural characteristics, meaning that individuals from within these 
cultures will respond in distinctive ways to the MCS (Chenhall, 2003; Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2012).  Thus an important factor that contributes to the effectiveness of 
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the MCS is whether the employees perceive it as culturally appropriate (Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2012, p691).  The most commonly cited taxonomies of culture were 
developed by Hofstede (1984) who proposed cultural values of power distance, 
individualism vs. collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. femininity and 
finally, from Hofstede and Bond (1988), Confucian dynamism.  Personnel mobility may 
also determine aspects of the MCS.  For example, where personnel mobility is low, 
long-term incentive plans may not be required to motivate managers to think long-term 
and to stay with the company (for an agency perspective, see Dikolli, 2001; Dutta and 
Reichelstein, 2003).  Personnel mobility may contain a cultural dimension, for example 
employees in the United States may transfer between organisations more readily that 
than they would in say South Korea, where employees may remain with one employer 
for their entire working lives.  The cultural characteristics identified have been used to 
conduct comparative studies of MCSs in different countries with the proposition that 
national culture is associated with the design of the MCS.  A finer division of culture 
beyond the national level is made by applying the variable to the organisational or even 
business unit level, where the particular culture in place is associated with success or 
failure of a technique (for example Malmi, 1997 on ABC; and Baird et al., 2004 on 
activity management practices).  National, organisational and business unit cultural 
factors will be examined in this study. 
 
Technology 
 
Technology refers to the task structure of an organisation (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999, 
p359).  A major part of technology concerns production techniques (for example, the 
use of batch, mass and process production to turn inputs into outputs (Otley, 1980).  
Probably the earliest and most famous research on this aspect of technology was 
conducted by Woodward (1965).  Although the initial aim of her research was to 
confirm the extant management theory that there was one optimal organisational 
structure for all firms, her empirical evidence led to the opposite conclusion.  She found 
that there was a link between technology, structure and performance, implying that a 
given technology calls for a particular structure.   
 
Technology can also include interdependence between units producing the product or 
service, hardware, materials, people, software and knowledge (Chenhall, 2003, p139).  
These other aspects of technology have been examined within studies of the MCS.  For 
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example, Anderson considered several technological factors influencing ABC 
introduction (complexity experienced by users, compatibility with existing structures 
and systems, technical improvement relative to existing practices) as well as task 
characteristics (task uncertainty, task variety, worker autonomy and responsibility), 
(Anderson, 1995).  Alternatively, one particular aspect of technology may be a 
contingent variable.
44
  The general proposition is that technologies characterised by 
standardised and automated processes will give rise to formal controls.  The 
technological factors discussed above will be examined in this study. 
 
Structure 
 
Structure is the established set of relationships, with ordered and regularly occurring 
activities (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999, p355).  Structure includes the organisational 
hierarchy and delegation of authority.  Important aspects of structure are the 
establishment of decision rights (responsibility centres and action controls), the 
communication across groups and the coordination of activities, referred to by 
Lawrence and Lorsch as ‘differentiation and integration’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).   
In the literature, structure has been viewed as an ‘intervening’ variable, modifying the 
effect of the contingent factors upon performance, given the organisational context 
(Fincham and Rhodes, 1999, p358).  Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) suggested that the 
structure and activity of complex organisations is subject to the influence of a number 
of contextual variables.  For example, structure is dependent on technology (Woodward, 
1965; discussed above).  Structure is dynamic and needs to adapt to any changes in 
contingent variables.  Structure has also been viewed as a contingent variable in its own 
right (for example, Burns and Stalker, 1961; Damanpour, 1991; Gosselin, 1997 and 
further examples in Chenhall, 2003). 
 
There are many propositions relating to the MCS and organisation structure, depending 
on the particular aspects of the MCS being examined.
45
  With regard to the adoption and 
diffusion of an innovation, the mechanistic/organic organisational structure proposed by 
Burns and Stalker (1961) has been used to examine firms that adopt and implement 
ABC, with mechanistic structures (where there is a greater emphasis on formal systems, 
                                                 
44
 For a summary, see Chenhall (2003). For an example of a study focussing on one aspect of technology, 
see Woods (2009) who considered information technology as a contingency variable. 
45
 For a review of these studies, see Chapman (1997); Chenhall (2003).   
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rules and procedures) more likely to be associated with ABC implementation and 
adoption than organic structures (where there are more informal systems in place), 
(Gosselin, 1997).   
 
Size 
 
Size is usually measured as the number of employees in the organisation, although 
alternatives exist such as profits, sales volume, assets and share valuation (Chenhall, 
2003, p149).  Early studies have found that large organisations tend to use more formal 
control systems (Merchant (1981); Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975).  More recent studies 
have concluded that larger firms have more resources and so are more likely to adopt 
new techniques (for example Baird et al., 2004 on activity analysis; and Woods, 2009 
on risk management techniques).  However, there are not many examples of evidence 
on size as a contingent factor as it is not often included as an explicit contingency 
variable but rather considered to be a consequence of other variables such as strategy 
and structure.  For example, larger firms may be more likely to adopt the ‘M’ or matrix 
form of organisational structure and they may be more likely to pursue a multinational 
business strategy.  Furthermore, contingency studies have tended to concentrate on large 
firms without considering size variation within larger firms (Chenhall, 2003, p148).   
 
5.2.2 Employing the Contingency Framework 
 
Chapman (1997) noted that contingency theory studies have tended to be large-scale, 
cross sectional postal questionnaires that examined a limited number of variables 
(Chapman, 1997, p189).  Similarly, Fisher (1995) highlighted the focus on a limited 
number of variables.  In his categorization of contingency studies by complexity, he 
identified four levels of contingent control analysis: 
 
Level 1: One contingent factor correlates with a control system mechanism 
Level 2: The joint effect of one contingent factor and a control system mechanism on 
outcome variable/s 
Level 3: The joint linkage of multiple control mechanisms, one contingent factor and 
outcome variable/s 
Level 4: The joint linkage of multiple control mechanisms, multiple contingent factors 
and outcome variable/s 
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Fisher noted that most of the studies tend to be at level 1 and he stated that “much of the 
work on contingency theory has examined one contingent variable and one control 
system attribute.  This singular approach makes research tractable, but causes difficulty 
in integrating results into a coherent framework.  The relationships and causality among 
contingent variables are unknown.” (Fisher, 1995, p45).  He called for causality analysis 
and stated that this implies a time-series approach rather than a cross-sectional 
approach.  Fisher also explained the fact that the ultimate goal should be to examine 
multiple contingent factors simultaneously, with new contingent factors identified and 
interactions explored.   
 
This study incorporates Fisher’s recommendations by adopting a longitudinal analysis 
of multiple contingent factors in relation to EVA.  Since EVA can be used as a 
performance management system (not simply as one aspect of the system) and since it 
is also an outcome variable for the firms, this study could be classed as Level 4 in 
Fisher’s categorisation.  The micro-study methodology with semi-structured interviews 
means that the scope of the study is not restricted to a set of particular factors identified 
in advance from the literature by the researchers.   
 
5.3 Developing the Research Propositions 
 
Longitudinal analysis is a means of addressing the problem of maximising internal 
validity, where a match is sought between trends predicted by theoretical propositions 
and those observed in the empirical data (Yin, 1989, as cited in Brownell, 1995).  
Ideally the focus should be not only on the sequencing of key evidential pieces but also 
on the varying lapse of time separating them (Brownell, 1995, p64).  In this study the 
life cycle sequence is predicted (implementation, evolution and decline) but the exact 
interval of time between each phase cannot be predicted.   This life cycle sequence is 
now discussed and the propositions for each phase are developed in the context of 
contingency theory.   
 
5.3.1 Implementation of the EVA system 
 
Central to the context specific analysis of the institution of EVA is an understanding of 
the origins of the system.  EVA is defined at the overall firm level as the income earned 
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after the deduction of a charge on the capital required to generate that income.  The 
measure of EVA represents a return to all capital providers, not just shareholders.  The 
basic concept is well established in the management accounting literature as residual 
income (McLaren, 2004, p6 for EVA; and Solomons, 1965, for residual income).   
In the Stern Stewart measure of EVA, accounting numbers are used as a starting point, 
with adjustments made to make the accounting numbers more economically 
meaningful.
46
  It has already been noted in section 1.3 that the number of possible 
adjustments is the range of 120-160, with around 10-15 applicable to a particular 
company.  Therefore a potential advantage of EVA on the measurement side was that it 
could be free of accounting rules and regulations under which financial reporting must 
operate.  Companies can set their own ‘rules’ for the measurement and ‘undo’ 
accounting distortions.  In a large organisation, international and regional differences in 
financial reporting regulations would not matter, if firms adopted the EVA measure for 
use within the organisation.
47
   
 
Stern Stewart sold their EVA concept as a complete financial management system to 
meet the overall objective of shareholder value creation.  It can be used for planning, 
decision-making, control and the determination of rewards, (Stewart, 1991, p119).  In 
other words, EVA could form the core of the MCS for a firm, providing information for 
management and aligning incentives through the reward mechanism.  A major selling-
point was that the EVA was an integrated system that would eliminate conflicts and 
confusion that arise with traditional methods, since all business issues could be couched 
in the context of EVA (Ehrbar, 1998, p134).  Furthermore, it was argued that EVA 
could be mapped through the organisation to business units, so that individual EVA 
results added back to yield the overall firm EVA.  This was seen as a means of 
achieving vertical linkages or goal congruence within the decentralised organisation.  
Horizontal linkages between business units could be achieved also, through 
coordination and communication using the single measure.  Inter-temporal integration 
could be achieved through the use of forward-looking EVA for planning and investment 
decision making and actual EVA results for performance measurement (Young and 
O’Byrne, 2001, ch3).  Finally, managerial and shareholder objectives could be aligned 
                                                 
46
 Adjustments include for example the adding back to operating profit of expensed research and 
development costs, leasing costs and severance costs; with these items included in capital and written 
down over a specified number of years. 
47
 Of course, currency differences may still be an issue with EVA. 
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through the reward mechanism, with remuneration based on both business-unit and firm 
level performance.  In other words, it has been argued that the EVA system has the 
potential to provide a number of benefits in terms of information and incentives.   
When EVA first became popular, it was described in the literature as an innovation in 
accounting (for example, Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005; Worthing and West, 2001).  
However, many definitions of innovation exist.  A system or technique or activity can 
be regarded as an innovation if it is new to the company adopting it (for example, 
Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; McCabe, 2002; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Zaltman 
et al., 1973; Zbaracki, 1998).  Firms innovate when they are successful and so they have 
slack resources, or when they are unsuccessful and are looking for a new solution to a 
problem that currently faces the organisation, (Cyert and March, 1992).  A more 
restrictive definition of innovation is provided by Birkinshaw et al. (2008) who state 
that innovation must be “new to the state of the art” (Birkinshaw et al, 2008, p829).  
The former definition of innovation will be adopted in this study, as this is the definition 
that tends to have been adopted in the accounting literature (for example, Bjørnenak, 
1997; Daniel et al., 2008; Gosselin, 1997) and it is consistent with the descriptions of 
EVA noted above.   
 
Complementing the consideration of an innovation is a consideration of the diffusion or 
translation of the implementation of the system across firms.
48
  For example, Bjørnenak 
looked at the diffusion of ABC in Norway, describing expansion diffusion as contagious 
(spread is smooth and continuous through communication networks) or hierarchical 
(there is a trickle down from large to small firms), (Bjørnenak, 1997, p7).  Diffusion 
was depicted as an ‘S curve’ where the number of adopters rises quickly and then 
reaches a plateau as saturation point is reached.  In other words, firms should adopt the 
technique within a relatively short space of time.  Therefore in this study, it is predicted 
that, at the time of implementation, EVA was something new for the firms; it was an 
innovation.  Furthermore, since the firms were known to have employed Stern Stewart 
to assist with the implementation, it is predicted that the firms were convinced that EVA 
was the best available measure and the decision to implement EVA would be made on 
the basis of the advertised selling points.  In particular, the EVA champion within each 
organisation must have believed (and convinced others) that the EVA MCS was a good 
fit for their firm.  This fit could be in terms of one or more of the contingency variables 
                                                 
48
 It was estimated that there were over 300 users of EVA by the 1990s (Lynn, 1995). 
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relating to the firm: environment, corporate and business strategy, culture, technology, 
structure and/or size.  This leads to the first research proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  The motivations for the implementation of the innovative EVA 
system concern the perceived benefits in terms of information and incentives that 
the system could provide and the fit within the firms to one or more of the 
contingency variables. 
 
5.3.2 Evolution 
 
After a period of time using EVA within the firms, it is anticipated that the system will 
evolve.  This evolution is natural for any system.  Whilst the exact path in time is not 
predicted, a sequence of evolution can be predicted ex ante. 
 
Reasons that necessitate evolutionary change in the system include technological issues 
with the measure itself, due to the information provided and/or the incentives created.  
Since Stern Stewart specifies that EVA is context driven, there is no ‘right’ way to 
measure EVA for all firms, or for any single firm over time as circumstances change.  It 
is apparent that subjectivity in the information from the EVA system could be a 
potential problem.  Furthermore, there are no standards for EVA preparation and within 
each firm a decision must be taken as to the appropriate adjustments.  This subjectivity 
could cause problems both within and outside of the firm, if the measure cannot be 
defended.  Indeed, subjectivity has been cited as a drawback in performance evaluation 
(Ittner et al., 2003; Prendergast and Topel, 1996).   
 
Once there is understanding and acceptance of the measure, then managers will respond 
to the incentives created.  With the link to rewards, it is well understood that the EVA 
system has the potential for strong incentives if remuneration and bonuses are pushed to 
the business unit level (McLaren, 2004).  Revision may be required if goal 
incongruence occurs.   
 
Potential issues with the EVA system are known and have been documented by Stern 
Stewart representatives themselves (for example Ehrbar, 1998; Stewart, 1991 and 1994; 
Young and O’Byrne, 2001).  These issues include for example the problem with dealing 
with growth options (where managers who invest now for uncertain growth in the future 
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find their EVA result depressed by the investment costs and so have little incentive to 
invest) and the problem with the short-run focus of the measure (where goal 
incongruence is created if managers take decisions to improve their annual EVA result 
and these decisions are not in the shareholders’ best interests).  To solve these issues, 
refinements to the measure have been suggested by EVA proponents.  For example, it is 
argued that an incentive to invest can be provided by ‘keeping capital off the books’ for 
a period of time (so it doesn’t form part of the capital charge) and bonus banks and 
share options may be advocated in order to give managers the incentive to adopt a 
longer-term view (Stewart, 1991).   
 
Since the EVA measure is specific to each organisation, the exact lapse of time in the 
sequence from implementation to evolution cannot be predicted.   However, it can be 
predicted that there will be an elapse of time.  Firms must implement and work with the 
EVA system in order to understand its consequences.  Over time, managers will learn as 
they gain experience and understand its impact.  Only then can possible improvements 
to the system be considered.  Therefore a new contingency variable is proposed to 
encapsulate the evolution over time, termed ‘dynamic interaction.’  Dynamic interaction 
reflects the fact that, as time passes, managers may need to contemplate adaptation of 
the system in response to changes in any one or more contingency variables.  This 
variable would not be detected in a cross-sectional study at one point in time.   
 
Proposition 2: Dynamic interaction will lead to evolution in the EVA MCS as 
managers learn whether there are issues over the information provided and the 
incentives created, or whether there have been changes in one or more of the 
contingency variables necessitating a change in the system. 
 
5.3.3 Decline 
 
It is known that each of the micro-study firms employed the EVA MCS for a significant 
period of time.  EVA was not a fad or fashion within the firms, as it continued to form 
the MCS for ten-fifteen years before its eventual decline.   This study provides the 
opportunity to examine the reasons for this decline.  Given the fact that the firms 
employed the EVA MCS for such a long time and that its use did decline, it is predicted 
that there must have been a ‘shock’ or abrupt change in one or more of the contingency 
variables leading to a temporary or permanent change.  This shock could mean that the 
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institution of EVA was no longer appropriate, either due to the information provided by 
the EVA system or to the incentives that it created. 
 
Proposition 3: A temporary or permanent shock in one or more contingency 
variables could mean that the EVA MCS is no longer appropriate, in terms of 
information and/or incentives, leading to its removal by the firms. 
 
The model of technique decline provides a contribution to the literature on management 
accounting techniques, which tend to concentrate on implementation.  For example, in 
his S-curve model of the diffusion of the ABC innovation, Bjørnenak illustrated no drop 
in the diffusion curve, thus implying that there is never a decline in the number of 
adopters (Bjørnenak, 1997).  Similarly, Chanegrih (2008) and Sulaiman and Mitchell 
(2005) could find no evidence in the reduction of management accounting techniques in 
their surveys.
49
   
 
5.4 Research Methods and Empirical Evidence 
 
5.4.1 Research Methods 
 
Evidence was obtained from questionnaires issued to company staff in 1999 (please see 
Appendix A) and 21 semi-structured interviews conducted in February 2001 and 
February 2011.
50
  The interview evidence was triangulated by documents that were 
referred to and discussed in the interviews, including internal corporate documents and 
documents from advisors to the companies.  Such a chain of evidence serves to enhance 
calibration and construct validity (Brownell, 1995, p65).  The 2011 interviews covered 
the time period since the 2001 visit and so examined the factors driving both the 
evolution and the decline in the measure.  For both the 2001 and 2011 interviews, the 
number and selection of interviewees was at the discretion of the lead person in each 
firm at the time, who agreed to take part on the understanding that interviewees would 
remain anonymous.  Within both Companies X and Y one of the respondents was 
                                                 
49
 Reduction or abandonment has been documented as part of a life cycle in the management fashion 
literature (for example, Abrahamson, 1996; Carson et al., 1999).  The usual way that evidence is gathered 
is via bibliometric counts (for examples, see Daniel et al., 2008). However, management fashions or fads 
by their definition are short-lived and may not be fully embedded in an organisation.  For evidence on the 
abandonment of the balanced scorecard as a performance measure in a retail bank, see Ittner et al., (2003). 
50
 Questionnaires were originally sent to a number of EVA users.  The three companies in this study were 
selected for follow-up interviews, based on the extent of EVA use in 2000.  
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interviewed in 2001 and again in 2011, thus ensuring continuity over time.  Summary 
information on the positions held by the respondents is presented in table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary information on respondents 
 2001 2011 
Company X 6 interviews 
Human Resource Manager (EVA 
owner) 
Manager, Strategy and Architecture 
Manager, Financial Management 
Group Controller 
Financial Management Advisor 
Corporate Finance Team member 
1 interview 
Human Resource Manager (same 
person as 2001) 
EVA abandoned so additional 
interviews not possible since no other 
staff members had experience of EVA 
Company Y 4 interviews 
Group Manager, Human Resources 
 
Group Manager, Finance (EVA owner) 
 
Group Manager, Technology and 
Support 
Business Unit Manager 
 
4 interviews 
Group Manager, Human Resources 
(same person as 2001) 
Chief Financial Officer 
 
Ex Chief Financial Officer 
 
Financial Controller 
Company Z 3 interviews 
Chief Executive 
 
Manager, Corporate Finance, EVA and 
Investment Analysis (EVA owner) 
 
General Manager, Human Resources 
3 interviews 
Chief Financial Officer 
 
Group Planning Manager 
 
 
Group Corporate Finance Manager 
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5.4.2 Background Information on the Companies 
Summary information on the companies is provided in table 5.2.  This information is 
designed to provide factual details on the business, strategy, structure, size and 
technology of the firms.  It is not designed to be so specific that it enables the 
companies to be identified. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary information on the case companies 
 Company X Company Y Company Z 
Type of Company Listed SOE SOE 
Type of Business Network service provider Network service provider Network service provider 
Strategy 
 Corporate 
strategy 
 Business 
Strategy 
 
Related diversification 
into international markets 
Product differentiation. 
Possible confrontation  
 
 
Related diversification into 
international markets 
Cost minimisation 
 
Related diversification 
into international markets 
Product differentiation 
 
Environment 
 Business 
Cycle 
 Competition 
 
 Innovation 
 
 Regulation 
 
 
 
2001: ‘Good’ 
2011: Recession 
Competition in some 
aspects of the business 
Innovation in products and 
services 
2001: ‘Light touch 
regulation’ 
2011: Regulated by 
Regulatory Commissioner 
 
2001: ‘Good’ 
2011: Recession 
Competition in some 
aspects of the business 
Some innovation in 
service delivery 
Regulation through SOE 
Act and Deed of 
Understanding 
 
2001: ‘Good’ 
2011: Recession 
Competition in some 
aspects of the business 
Innovation in products 
and services 
Regulation through SOE 
Act and Deed of 
Understanding 
Culture 
 National 
 Organisational 
 
New Zealand 
High personnel mobility 
 
 
New Zealand 
Low personnel mobility 
 
New Zealand 
High Personnel mobility 
 
Technology Rapidly changing 
technology to deliver the 
service 
Rapidly changing 
technology to deliver the 
service 
Rapidly changing 
technology to deliver the 
service 
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Structure Decentralized functional 
structure with  
interdependent business 
units 
Mechanistic 
Decentralized functional 
structure with  
interdependent business 
units 
Mechanistic 
Decentralized functional 
structure with  
interdependent business 
units 
Mechanistic 
Size 
 Number of 
employees 
 
 
 Operating 
Revenue 
 
 Operating 
Profit 
 
2000: 6500 FTE 
employees 
2010: 9000 FTE 
employees 
2000: NZ$4000 million 
2010: NZ$5000 million 
 
2000: NZ$1400 million 
2010: NZ$-4500 million 
 
2000: 650 FTE employees 
 
2010: 750 FTE employees 
 
2000: NZ$100 million 
2010: NZ$145 million 
 
2000: NZ$15 million 
2010: NZ$5 million 
 
2000: 7500 employees 
(total) 
2010: 11000 employees 
(total) 
2000: NZ$900 million 
2010: NZ$1200 million 
 
2000: NZ$50 million 
2010: NZ$24 million 
Statistical information presented in the table is derived from the relevant annual report and accounts. 
 
Descriptive information given in table 5.2 covers the questionnaire and interview time 
periods.  The business cycle for 2001 is described as ‘good’ for all companies.  This is a 
general classification recognising the fact that it was not a ‘boom’ time for the firms 
(that came a little later, in the mid 2000s).  The year 2011 was characterized as a period 
of recession by respondents in each company.  Between the two interview time periods, 
the regulatory environment changed for Company X (for further details, please see 
chapter 2).  At the time of the questionnaires and the 2001 interviews, regulation was 
‘light touch’, with no appointed regulator.  Disputes, if they arose, were settled through 
the courts.  By 2011, the company was regulated by a Government appointed 
Regulatory Commissioner.    Regulation for Companies Y and Z is through the SOE 
Act and the Deed of Understanding, together with the publication of targets in a 
Statement of Corporate Intent.
51
  From the information provided it is apparent that there 
are many similarities between the companies, including the type of business (at a very 
general level), competitive environment, innovation, corporate strategy, technology and 
structure.  The firms all have a mechanistic structure, with an emphasis on formal 
controls.  This may make them more open to new techniques (for example the 
                                                 
51
 The Deed of Understanding sets out certain actions that the company may or may not take.  The 
Statement of Corporate Intent is published by the companies and provides annual targets based on 
accounting information.  Results are tabled annually in Parliament.  Please see Chapter 2. 
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association between mechanistic structure and ABC adoption, as documented by 
Gosselin, 1997).  The business strategy and organisational culture of Company Y differs 
from Companies X and Z.  In terms of size, Company X is the largest, then Company Z 
(which has many part-time employees) with Company Y being the smallest according 
to the size variables.  Overall, Company Y would have the most stable environment and 
the least amount of competition.  The environment faced by Company X is more 
turbulent, in terms of competition and innovation, than that faced by Companies Y and 
Z.  As such, this company should be most likely to characterised as adopting a 
confrontation strategy.  However, it can also be characterised as adopting a 
differentiation strategy and it does not adopt the lean, flat structure postulated by Adler 
(Adler, 2011).  Therefore it appears that the notions of differentiation and confrontation 
may not be as distinct as he suggests.  
 
5.4.3 Analysis of the Evidence 
 
Analysis of the empirical evidence is centred on the three stages: implementation, 
evolution and decline.  To aid in the interpretation of this evidence, summary 
information on the EVA life cycle for the companies is presented in table 5.3.   
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Table 5.3 Life cycle of EVA 
 Implementation Evolution Decline 
Company X 1995: Full implementation 
to business unit level using 
Stern Stewart Consultants 
1997: All EVA adjustments 
removed 
2000:  EVA pulled back to 
corporate level, no 
remuneration based on 
business unit EVA 
2007: EVA formally 
abandoned as a financial 
metric, decline in use prior 
to this date 
Company Y 1996: Full implementation 
to business unit level using 
Stern Stewart Consultants 
2000: Adjustments reduced 
Mid 2000s: EVA pulled 
back to corporate level, no 
business unit balance sheets 
constructed, no 
remuneration based on 
business unit EVA 
2011: EVA ‘dormant’ for 
remuneration, not used for 
business cases but still 
calculated at ‘high level’ 
Company Z 1998: Full implementation 
to business unit level using 
Stern Stewart Consultants 
2001: Adjustments reduced 
Mid 2000s: EVA pulled 
back to corporate level, no 
business unit balance sheets 
constructed, no business 
unit remuneration  
2011: No EVA for 
performance measurement, 
still used for project 
investment 
 
 
Implementation 
 
Company X, the largest and only listed company was the first of the three in the micro-
study to implement EVA, followed by Company Y (the smallest company) and then 
Company Z (the middle-sized company).  At the time of implementation, the three firms 
all chose EVA over other commercially available products.
52
  Each of the three firms 
implemented EVA as the complete MCS, using Stern Stewart and Company 
Consultants.  Implementation involved a phased approach, with initial calculation and 
measurement at the corporate level, followed by a mapping to EVA calculation and use 
                                                 
52
 These products are described as commercially available as they were promoted by various groups of 
consultants.  Examples include economic profit, value based management and cash flow return on 
investment.  There was no attempt in this research to assess the relative merits of the competing products.   
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at the business unit level.  In each of the companies, EVA was used for planning, 
decision-making, control, performance monitoring and remuneration determination.  
Within each of the firms, the implementation of EVA as the MCS was a major 
investment in terms of time and money.  The magnitude of this investment was noted by 
the Human Resource Manager in Company X: 
 
“When we started EVA we actually started on a pretty full-on path.  We had 
Stern Stewart Consulting, we spent quite a lot of money with them, and we had I 
think a pretty full-on implementation, particularly in terms of our incentive 
model… The amount of work we did on EVA has never been repeated with 
another kind of tool or methodology.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X, 
2011) 
 
The original motivations for EVA implementation, as expressed in the questionnaires 
and confirmed in the 2001 interviews, are summarised in table 5.4 below.  The tick 
mark indicates that the motivation was explicitly cited by one or more respondents.  The 
number 1 indicates the primary motivation (or, for Company Z, the joint most important 
motivation), as indicated in the questionnaires and interviews.   
 
Table 5.4 Motivations for EVA implementation 
 Company 
X 
Company 
Y 
Company 
Z 
Information Provided    
1. EVA provides a benchmark for targets and for measuring 
performance 
   
2. EVA can be used for setting prices  1  
Incentives Created    
3. EVA correlates with shareholder value 1   
4. EVA leads managers to focus on the cost of capital    
5. EVA can be used to align incentives     
The ‘Fit’ of EVA to the business    
6 Value Based Reporting Protocol   1= 
7. Board member with previous experience of EVA   1= 
8. EVA is the ‘right’ measure for the business   1= 
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Motivations 1-5 relate to the information provided and incentives created by the EVA 
system.  Each of these reasons cited for EVA implementation is a feature of the EVA 
system, as cited by Stern Stewart.  These motivations can be classified as strategy 
variables, as they all relate to the strategic direction of the company.  Thus, EVA as a 
system was deemed to align with corporate and business strategy.  These reasons for 
implementation were reinforced by several respondents in the interviews, for example: 
 
“It was a good proxy to market value … the Stern Stewart research shows.  The 
other aspect with our business in particular is that the EVA mechanism takes 
into account the cost of capital.” (Group Manager, Strategy and Architecture, 
Company X, 2001) 
 
”In the absence of a share price, EVA provides a benchmark against which to 
measure performance.” (Manager, Corporate Finance, EVA and Investment 
Analysis, Company Z, 2001) 
 
Within Company Y, the primary motivation for EVA was that it was seen as a way of 
establishing “a fair price that customers were comfortable with in the monopoly product 
marketplace.” (Group Manager, Finance, Company Y, 2001).   In other words, 
shareholder value wasn’t the main objective for Company Y.  Rather, a sharing of 
benefits between the customers and the shareholder was deemed to be of primary 
importance.  In other words, it was a characteristic of the market environment, the 
absence of competition, which drove the introduction.   
 
Motivation 6 relates to the Value Based Reporting Protocol, a document published in 
1995 by a panel within New Zealand which included representatives from academia, the 
government and SOEs.  This Protocol recommended that SOEs should provide EVA 
information on an annual basis (for further information, please see chapter 2).   
 
The Chief Financial Officer of Company Z reflected: 
 
“The Government Crown Agency that looked after the SOE portfolios was very 
keen to see EVA standardised across SOE portfolios, but, as it tried to do so, it 
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found some difficulties in consistency and comparability… They found that, 
across quite different organisations, they couldn’t arrive at an agreed standard 
set of adjustments.” (Chief Financial Officer, Company Z, 2011) 
 
The inability to agree on standards meant that Protocol did not become mandatory and 
so did not place direct external demands on SOE companies.  However, it did influence 
the behaviour of New Zealand SOEs, with many firms (including Company Z) 
introducing EVA as a result of its publication.  For further information, please see 
chapter 2 for details on the Protocol.  Although the Protocol concerned reporting at the 
corporate level, the two SOEs in this micro-study chose to extend its application to 
MCS and to the business unit level.  This is evidence for the environment, in particular 
the regulatory environment, as a factor that was influential in all three companies at 
the implementation stage. 
 
Motivation 7, cited by Company Z, relates to technology, in particular the people that 
are employed in the firm.  Motivation 8, also cited by Company Z, could be classified as 
a strategic or a cultural factor.  These motivations were further explained by the Chief 
Executive: 
 
“One of our directors has quite a lot of experience of EVA.  As we were 
beginning to think about the right sort of measures for the business at that time, 
that was the time when EVA debates were coming to the fore and so from a 
general view of the Board, EVA captured that information.”  (Chief Executive, 
Company Z, 2001) 
 
Overall, the evidence supports Proposition 1.  The Stern Stewart justifications for the 
EVA system were valid reasons for its introduction within the firms.  Furthermore, 
contingency factors were important for EVA implementation, as follows: 
 Strategy, in particular the fit with corporate objectives: important for all 
companies 
 The environment, in particular the regulatory environment for Companies Y and 
Z (the SOEs) and the absence of competition for Company Y 
 Technology, in particular people in the organisation for Company Z 
 Cultural fit for Company Z 
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A different mix of contingencies was therefore apparent within each firm with strategy 
the only common factor cited by respondents in all three firms.  The differing strategies 
of Company Y (cost minimization) to Companies X and Z (product differentiation) did 
not make a difference regarding the perceived suitability of EVA to the businesses at the 
time of implementation.  Similarly the notion of confrontation strategy for Company X 
versus a non-confrontation strategy for the two SOEs did not lead to a difference in the 
perceived suitability of EVA.  Thus EVA was an innovation that complemented 
different strategies.  The regulatory environment, in particular a proposed regulatory 
requirement, was a factor for both the SOEs.  Size was not a factor for implementation – 
EVA was implemented as the full MCS for all three firms.  In other words, the EVA 
performance management system was viewed as ‘right’ and ‘appropriate’ by the three 
firms, despite their differing strategies and size.   
 
Evolution 
 
The nature of EVA implementation at a technical level was very similar across the firms 
and at the time of the 2001 interviews, they continued to use EVA as the MCS but the 
system had undergone evolution within each organisation.  The evolution was gradual 
(over a number of years) but the pattern was similar in all three companies.  The first 
evidence of evolution, which had occurred in all of the firms by 2001, was due to the 
information that the measure provided.  Within the firms, it was found that in order to 
make EVA work, a simplification was required to reduce the number of adjustments 
from those first recommended by Stern Stewart at the time of implementation.  This 
evolution took place at approximately the same time for the micro-study firms, after 
they had learned about the impact of EVA.  Reasons for the simplification, cited by 
respondents in 2001, are presented in table 5.5 below. 
 
Table 5.5 Reasons for initial evolution: information provided by EVA 
 Company 
X 
Company 
Y 
Company 
Z 
1. Lack of understanding of EVA – outside the firm    
2. Lack of understanding of EVA – inside the firm    
3. Complexity of the measure – difficult to calculate    
4. Subjectivity of the measure     
 
147 
 
From table 5.5 it is apparent that the reasons cited for simplification were identical 
across the firms, centring on the measure itself and the information that it provided.  
There were problems created due to a failure of external and internal comprehension in 
the measure.  The lack of external comprehension was explained by respondents in 
Companies Y and Z: 
 
“One of the problems with EVA, it even happens at the Board level at times, is 
that as soon as they see something like EVA or a small EVA figure, people start 
thinking in their minds back to more conventional profit approach and say 
‘that’s too low.’  We record both but you’ll find that some of the business press 
reporters were still getting mixed up and they’ll be quoting your EVA as if it 
was a profit.” (Group Manager, Technology and Support, Company Y, 2001) 
 
 “Obviously in the annual report, profit is the only measure that’s audited, that’s 
the one that the Chief Executive is managed to.  While we may use EVA, our 
shareholders may not care for it to the same extent.  Certainly the public looking 
at us may not know or understand so we’ve still got to manage accounting profit 
so that's a challenge that all EVA companies will have.  We know that EVA is 
important but when we go to the market, it’s ‘what’s your profit?’” (Manager, 
Corporate Finance, EVA and Investment Analysis, Company Z, 2001) 
 
Evolution as a result of problems with external comprehension is classified as an 
environmental reason for simplification; in particular it is an aspect of Government and 
regulation as it reflects the fact that outsiders understood results that were based on 
existing GAAP regulation rather than EVA, which is not subject to accounting 
standards.  In contrast, the lack of internal validity represents a technological reason for 
the evolution.  Problems created by the lack of external and internal comprehension are 
consistent across all three companies.  The complexity of the calculation of EVA was a 
common reason for simplification.  For example, the Human Resources Manager of 
Company X explained: 
 
“As we have gone along in the last five or more years, we have tinkered and 
tinkered with the EVA calculation.  We had some members of our Board who 
actually didn’t like EVA and repeatedly would raise issues with this piece or that 
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piece of it.  In order to keep it, we would say, perhaps we could change it like 
this or change it like that.  One of the major problems was they couldn’t 
understand it... We looked at it and actually decided ourselves that none of the 
adjustments themselves made enough impact to make it worth the complexity 
that they added on.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X, 2001) 
 
Similarly, a manager in Company Z commented on the complexity of the measure and 
the desire for simplification: 
 
“After two years, we’ve concluded that by having ten adjustments, that’s too 
many. I’ve talked to many organisations, the major corporates, and all of them 
who have introduced EVA have gone more complex than us on introduction and 
have gone vastly simplified... It’s too complicated. People get bogged down in 
the cost of capital, their capital allocation; there are just too many issues.” 
(Manager, Corporate Finance, EVA and Investment Analysis, Company Z, 
2001) 
 
This view was reinforced by the Chief Executive, who also mentioned the subjectivity 
of EVA and the lack of EVA standards, which caused problems internally: 
 
“There’s the heart of the problem.  We’ve never let go of traditional accounting 
measures.  Traditional accounting measures are driven by accounting standards.  
EVA doesn’t have those.  So we are making somewhat arbitrary choices with 
EVA.  Managers really can’t get to grips with it... Managers think ‘oh well, 
there’s some juggling; I don’t quite understand what it means.’  So they stop 
paying any attention to it.” (Chief Executive, Company Z, 2001) 
 
The perception that the measure is subjective, involves arbitrary choices, and is without 
the underlying support of accounting standards, means that every step of the EVA 
calculation can be contested.  If too strong a theoretical approach is adopted to the 
measurement, this leads to too many adjustments and exceptions.  Overall, the whole 
measure can be perceived as a ‘black box’ by managers and therefore ignored.  
However, despite the problems over complexity, subjectivity and understanding, there 
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was a desire to keep EVA within each of the firms.  In other words, the EVA system 
was modified but not abandoned as managers learned of the problems that were created.  
The firms worked to try to alleviate the issues with EVA to ensure understanding and 
acceptance. 
 
After the initial evolution stage had taken place, a further evolutionary stage followed, 
in respect of the mapping of EVA within the organisations.  In all three firms, initially 
EVA was pushed down to the business unit level, business unit managers had their own 
balance sheets and remuneration was based on their unit’s EVA (together with a 
corporate EVA element).  By the time of the interviews in 2001, EVA in Company X 
had been ‘pulled back’ to the corporate level, so business unit balance sheets were no 
longer constructed and remuneration was not based on business unit performance.  
Evolution in Companies Y and Z followed the same pattern, but this did not take place 
until the mid 2000s, so evidence for this was not forthcoming until the 2011 interviews.  
However, despite the fact that secondary evolution took place at different times, the 
underlying motivations were the same.  These reasons are presented in table 5.6 below. 
 
Table 5.6 Reasons for the secondary evolution in EVA: Incentives created by EVA 
 Company 
X 
Company 
Y 
Company 
Z 
1. Incentives not aligned, resulting in goal incongruence    
2. Difficulty in measurement    
3. Incompatibility of incentives with national and 
organisational culture 
   
 
 
Secondary evolution was a result of the incentives created by the EVA system.  In all 
three companies, once the measure was accepted and understood, the use of EVA at the 
business unit created adverse incentives, with managers responding to these incentives 
and maximising their EVA result.  With the firms pursuing a strategy of related 
diversification where communication and co-ordination is important, this created 
tensions between business units and had the potential to destroy company value.   For 
example, in Company X: 
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“Regardless of EVA incentives for the company, line managers were more 
concerned with EVAs for their own units... in order to have business unit results 
you have to have a transfer pricing mechanism.  Basically they fought over it 
constantly, it was a major distraction.” (Manager, Strategy and Architecture, 
Company X, 2001)   
 
“What it was causing was a lot of divide between the business units.  They spent 
a lot of their time fighting internally, that’s what their EVA was driven off.  In 
the end the Chief Executive said ‘no, I don’t want this to continue, I want much 
more collaborative relationships between my executives and that should flow all 
the way down.  Therefore we’ll have one EVA for the company.’” (Group 
Controller, Company X, 2001) 
 
The message was the same in Companies Y and Z, with the following quotes being 
typical of respondents’ views: 
 
“It’s driven the wrong behaviour.  A backlog of investment now means that 
we’re not going to get a bonus payment for five years and I don’t think that 
works.” (Chief Financial Officer, Company Y, 2011) 
 
“That’s probably the birth of the doom of EVA in (Company Z); actually linking 
EVA down to individual strategic business units because then you have 
arguments…  Individual business units ended up competing with each other in 
the market, for suboptimal group outcomes.” (Chief Financial Officer, Company 
Z, 2011) 
 
“We’re going away from having little silos running their own thing and having 
duplication of effort and wasted effort arguing about transfer pricing between 
units and arguing over whose customer belongs to who…  We’re now bringing 
all these businesses together that were previously run under their own 
management structures to have basically super-business units that are 
supposedly going to work a lot better together.” (Group Planning Manager, 
Company Z, 2011) 
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The incentive impact was therefore a result of the corporate strategy (related 
diversification) and the structure of the organisations (decentralised, functional 
structure with interdependent business units organised as investment centres).  The 
strategy and structure meant that business unit managers could take decisions (for 
example over investments and transfer pricing arrangements) that were in their own 
interests, to the detriment of other business unit and overall company value.  The 
integrated nature of the business units meant that transfer pricing was important, leading 
to in-fighting.  In other words, contrary to Stern Stewart’s assertions, the firms learned 
that EVA at the business unit level impeded vertical and horizontal integration as it 
created goal incongruence and damaged co-ordination and communication between 
business units.  This was also a feature in all of the firms, regardless of their business 
strategy.  In Company Z, as well as leading to an evolutionary change in EVA, the 
behavioural impacts also led to a change in business structure, with business units 
grouped into ‘super-business units.’  This is evidence for the MCS feeding back to 
impact on a contingency variable. 
 
As well as the issues created by the measure itself, at the same time within the firms, 
structure had changed as a result of changes in both technology and the environment.  
The restructuring made EVA difficult to calculate at the business unit level, leading to 
problems with EVA measurement, targets and remuneration.  The following quote is 
typical of respondents’ views: 
 
 “Over the years we’ve had a lot of trouble with business units.  One of the 
things we never really realised and have never really grasped is that we’ve been 
slicing and dicing our business units.  When this first scheme started we had a 
business unit that then got split about three ways but it wasn’t a clean split.  The 
next year following the split we had no history for the EVA based on growth.  
So there was about 8 months and then these people just said we can’t do it.” 
(Human Resource Manager, Company X, 2001) 
 
The above quote illustrates the fact that within the firm, it took time for managers to 
understand that changes in structure impacted on EVA and to learn that they needed to 
pull the calculation back up to the corporate level.  As well as the level of EVA 
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calculation, within Company X the EVA incentive scheme evolved away from the Stern 
Stewart recommended bonus scheme for business managers, with no caps and floors.  
This was a cultural reason for evolution, reflecting both national and organisation 
culture, meaning that the sharp incentives created did not fit: 
 
“One of the reasons we got rid of negative multipliers was the impact on 
recruitment and retention.  If you’ve got so far as your bonus bank was negative, 
you could see that you needed two good years to get any money out of it.  We 
could see that that was never going to be any good.  You can’t recruit people in 
that situation.  You can’t retain people in that situation...  We decided culturally 
that in (Company X) and we believe in New Zealand that isn’t sustainable.  
People really struggle with it.  This is very aggressive, this is all ‘perform or get 
out’ – it’s an American culture.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X, 
2001)   
 
Overall, the relevant contingency factors which drove EVA evolution in the three firms 
were: 
 
 Environment – in particular Government and regulation (for initial evolution) and 
innovation (for secondary evolution) for all three firms 
 Technology – including the EVA measure itself and also technological advances 
(for initial and secondary evolution). 
 Corporate Strategy (for secondary evolution) – the strategy of related diversification 
meant that communication and co-ordination was important.  The incentives created 
by the EVA MCS inhibited this. 
 Structure (for secondary evolution) – both in terms of the behavioural impact 
created by the interdependent decentralised structures and the impact of 
environmental and technological variables, leading to changes in structure.  In one 
company there is evidence that the EVA MCS fed back to influence structure. 
 Culture – national and organisational (for secondary evolution). 
 
Whilst the motivations for the evolutionary process may have been capable of 
prediction in advance, the exact time sequence could not have been predicted.  Within 
the firms, EVA users may have been aware of the process (for example one company 
knew that other firms had simplified the measure of EVA).  However, they had to learn 
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for themselves how to adapt the system to fit their organisation.  This could only take 
place after they had gained experience of the information provided and the incentives 
created by EVA.  Therefore, the proposed contingency variable of dynamic interaction 
is important in the evolution of the EVA MCS system after initial implementation.  
Overall, Proposition 2, which states that dynamic interaction will lead to evolution in 
the EVA MCS as managers learn whether there are issues over the information provided 
and the incentives created, or whether there have been changes in one or more of the 
contingency variables, is accepted.   
 
Decline of EVA 
 
By 2011, EVA was no longer the MCS for the firms.  Company X had abandoned EVA 
in 2006-2007 and Companies Y and Z in the late 2000s.  Whilst there was no EVA 
legacy in Company X, Companies Y and Z still made some use of EVA in 2011, with 
Company Y calculating EVA ‘at a high level’ for pricing decisions and Company Z 
using EVA for some business cases, alongside other measures.   The contingencies for 
EVA decline were explored by the researcher in the 2011 interviews.  These 
contingencies are presented in table 5.7 below. 
 
Table 5.7 Reasons for decline in EVA use 
 Company 
X 
Company 
Y 
Company 
Z 
Information     
1. Volatility in the EVA result    
2. Confidence in the EVA targets    
Changes in Contingency Variables    
3. Change in personnel - lack of EVA champion    
4. Introduction of international reporting standards    
5. Recession    
6. EVA no longer fits business strategy    
Incompatibility    
7. Incompatibility with organisational culture    
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From table 5.7 it is apparent that the respondents cited differing but overlapping reasons 
for the decline in EVA in their firms.  Within Company X, the Human Resource 
Manager interviewed in 2011 had been the EVA owner in 2001.  This respondent had 
an excellent understanding of EVA in the company and was clear about the reasons for 
its decline and the fact that there was no legacy of EVA within the organisation: 
 
“EVA was a concept that ideally allowed you to external benchmark your 
targets… but it was volatile.  And the first thing we probably started to unravel 
was that volatility and also confidence with the target setting which allowed us 
to feel comfortable with that kind of range of outcomes… so at this point in time 
we still continued to call it EVA we started to unpick, particularly if you take the 
Stern Stewart model of EVA as opposed to just the measure, we started to 
unpick pieces of it… The way I recall it was kind of like a gentle dismantling.” 
(Human Resource Manager, Company X, 2011) 
 
As has been discussed above, the ‘gentle dismantling’ of the EVA MCS started with the 
removal of adjustments and of the business unit calculation of EVA.  Shortly after the 
2001 interviews, further evolution took place, with the bonus bank feature removed 
from the remuneration scheme.  The Human Resource Manager explained that the bank 
had “an American view of bonuses” which did not fit the cultural values of New 
Zealand or of Company X.  The perception was that New Zealanders were more used to 
being managed to targets and if the target is met then the remuneration is paid.  If EVA 
is seen as volatile, then setting and meeting targets is problematic.  At a meeting in the 
2006-2007 financial year, the Board formally decided to remove EVA for target setting, 
stating that it would be replaced with the “more widely understood EBIT as the 
financial metric” (Board meeting minutes).  The Human Resource Manager confirmed: 
 
“When we finally stopped using EVA, it wasn’t that we had massively rejected 
it at that point in time.  There was just a view that it would be easier to focus 
people on EBITDA.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X, 2011) 
 
The importance of an ‘EVA champion’ or ‘owner’ was also emphasised: 
 
“If you want something like this, you really need a strong advocate and you need 
to keep working on it… We kind of just drifted to what most people would do.  
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Whereas EVA was a decision to do something quite different, certainly initially 
it was an enormous investment… I guess it’s probably a CFO to be honest who 
has to believe in it and continue to drive it.” (Human Resource Manager, 
Company X, 2011) 
 
To summarise, within Company X, EVA ‘waned’ over time as the company gradually 
evolved away from the institution.  Finally, the system was formally abandoned by the 
Board in the 2006-07 year.  The reasons for the decline were predominantly technology 
reasons (personnel and the measure itself) but incompatibility with the New Zealand 
culture was also a factor –in terms of the conflict between the American and New 
Zealand view of bonuses and the volatility in the range of targets that EVA produced.   
 
In contrast to Company X, Companies Y and Z continued with EVA for several more 
years.   Evolution in Company Z followed the same pattern as Company X, with the 
next stage in the evolutionary process being the dilution of EVA for remuneration: 
 
“The range of possible incentive results was quite massive and at the time our 
EVA and profit was actually quite modest so that bonuses as a percentage of 
total profit was actually quite a high percentage.  For every dollar of profit 
earned we were paying out some massive percentage of that as incentives, so it 
was just like a media disaster waiting to happen, if someone was clever enough 
to ask the right question.” (Group Planning Manager, Company Z, 2011) 
 
Despite the actual results being different, the reason for the dilution of EVA for 
remuneration is the same as that given by the respondent in Company X: EVA bonuses 
did not fit the national culture.  In Company Z, it was a clash of the EVA outcomes 
with the people outside of the organisation, in contrast to Company X where the conflict 
was with employees inside the organisation.   
 
The final life cycle phase for Companies Y and Z was the decline of EVA to its present 
state.  For both companies, a key driver for the dilution in EVA was the introduction of 
international reporting standards (IFRS), which became mandatory in New Zealand 
from 1
st
 July 2007.  This represented a change in the regulatory environment for the 
firms.  It wasn’t that the environment was uncertain, but rather it shifted as a result of 
the new regime.  Respondents in both companies cited the amount of time that was 
156 
 
required to devote to IFRS as being a major reason for the decline in EVA.  In addition, 
the CFO in Company Y wanted to ensure that staff were fully au fait with IFRS: 
 
“EVA was really useful.  But I think as IFRS came in from an accounting point 
of view it became trickier to reconcile the two systems, especially as the 
standards for IFRS were in motion.  A lot of energy and attention was going in 
to the new accounting standards and the new way of thinking… I moved from 
having an EVA based accounting system to a GAAP based accounting system… 
mainly because in terms of staffing, I didn’t want the (Company Y) accounting 
staff to be behind the ball in terms of IFRS competence.” (Ex-CFO, Company 
Y, 2011) 
 
“IFRS was certainly the initial driver… There’s obviously been a lot larger 
focus on the IFRS standards…  With New Zealand IFRS there are clear 
standards which map out how you’re supposed to do your reporting. Under EVA 
it is not as clear in terms of the rules and there are grey areas… It creates a bit of 
complexity in the accounting function which, when you’re getting down to the 
nitty-gritty, it’s nice to get rid of those things.” (Financial Controller, Company 
Y, 2011) 
 
The extra work required with IFRS together with the lack of standards for EVA was 
mentioned by respondents in Company Z also, for example: 
 
“The other thing that IFRS did was that it increased the workload on finance 
teams, so they didn’t have the luxury of mucking around with something that 
they didn’t actually have to do… They were all hands to the pump, doing the 
IAS39 hedge effectiveness testing and this, that and the other.” (CFO, Company 
Z) 
 
“EVA was always viewed as being effectively a management accounting view 
of the world because there are no standards… The push to standardisation meant 
that EVA, which was inherently subjective and probably open to a bit of 
interpretation, sort of seemed to be swimming against the tide.” (CFO, Company 
Z, 2011) 
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In other words financial accounting, which became more heavily regulated with the 
introduction of IFRS reporting requirements, led to a crowding out of the management 
accounting measure when resources were constrained.  This is an environmental 
variable, relating in particular to Government and regulation.   
 
A further environmental variable for Companies Y and Z was the recession phase of the 
business cycle, which started in the beginning of 2008.
53
  The impact of the recession 
was that there was a lot of uncertainty created and capital markets were not liquid; there 
was a squeeze on new capital and a pressure on existing financing arrangements, 
leading to a focus on cash.  The EVA model was not appropriate in the economic crisis, 
both in terms of the incentives created and the information provided.  Firstly, in a credit 
crunch, there is value to holding liquid resources.  Cyert and March stated that “slack is 
a cushion when the environment becomes less favourable” (Cyert and March, 1992, 
p43).
54
  The value provided by this cushion is not captured in EVA.  In fact, holding 
surplus liquidity would run counter to the EVA principles, where there is an incentive to 
try to reduce the capital charge.  This was explained by the CFO of Company Y: 
 
“There’s a willingness to have perhaps a more flexible balance sheet structure 
and perhaps some capital availability… You’re only doing that for flexibility in 
uncertain times; otherwise you wouldn’t be running that surplus liquidity 
position.  Therefore your EVA would be lower.” (CFO, Company Y, 2011) 
 
Secondly, the EVA system did not provide the firm with information to assess how 
close the business may be operating in respect of the restrictions of debt covenants, 
something which is very important in a recession: 
 
“EVA would not potentially disclose some of the other financial parameters that 
we needed to be conscious of when we were thinking about those covenants… 
We needed to be thinking more about conventional accounts.”  (Group Manager, 
Human Resources, Company Y, 2011) 
 
Holding liquid resources is valuable when credit markets are squeezed; this runs counter 
to the EVA philosophy.   
                                                 
53
 Source: The Treasury, Monthly Economic Indicators January 2010. 
54
 Slack resources are defined as total resources less necessary payments.   
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Finally, EVA may not be a useful motivational tool in a recession, when results are 
depressed.  A string of poor results can be seen as unacceptable:  
 
 “I think we achieved about six years in a row of EVA growth which is actually 
quite hard to do for most businesses but since then we’ve had a peak point and 
then it’s tanked through this recession thing.  So maybe that’s the other thing in 
the last couple of years that is showing and communicating to staff that it’s 
negative 20 million dollars or whatever… I think they always thought it was a 
bit more acceptable when you could show the growth going up.” (Group 
Planning Manager, Company Z, 2011) 
 
Respondents in Companies Y and Z provided evidence on the fact that it was the 
collective impact of IFRS and the recession that led to the decline in EVA.  For 
example: 
 
“It was all timing; if we’d had those IFRS standards coming in at a time we were 
making good EVA, you may well have found that we would still do all the 
communications that we used to do, quarterly, around how we were going and 
the sharing in success because we could hold it out there as a tantalising thing.  
But when you’re not making money and all you’re doing is reducing costs, it’s 
very tough.” (Manager, Human Resources, Company Y, 2011) 
 
As well as the collective impact of IFRS and the recession impacting on EVA, the 
Human Resource Manager emphasised the fact that EVA was an appropriate system 
when the business cycle was more favourable: 
 
“If you’d been here five years ago, I would have been saying to you, gosh, we’re 
in clover, this stuff really works.” (Human Resource Manager, Company Y, 
2011) 
 
Within Companies Y and Z, the recession led to a change in strategic focus.  
Respondents in both companies cited the recession as leading to a revised business 
strategy where growth opportunities were the focus.  There was also a need to focus on 
cash.  EVA was regarded as an unsuitable measure in this situation, for example: 
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“We had a lot of difficulty, particularly with the growth side of our business and 
you tend to have to go back to more of your traditional cash flow modelling, 
because that becomes more critical… So I think it’s not a good judge of how 
well a business is doing in a growth phase and so we felt that’s one of the main 
reasons we’ve probably moved back, from a management point of view, to using 
GAAP… We’re now looking more towards NPV, payback, cash flow profiles, 
that sort of thing – cash burn.” (Financial Controller, Company Y, 2011) 
 
“The financial crisis and the recession have driven businesses to focus on 
streamlining their processes, simplifying their businesses and so focusing on 
other things… you’re not going to embed an EVA way of thinking about the 
world… When you’re in a growth business, especially in a rapidly moving 
industry, your expectations about how that’s going to pan out say over three 
years, are vastly different from actually what happens in the market.  Often you 
write the business cases for rapid growth businesses, with a set of assumptions 
that are widely different from what happens.  The issue that then confronts the 
business is to say ‘well look, you know we’ve got this EVA result that’s widely 
different from what we thought, what does that mean?  Do we abandon the 
strategy; do we tweak it, or what’s happening?’  And in the growth business 
you’re sort of guided more by the long term outcome, and what you’re trying to 
do in the market, and where you are going to get to, than you are about what the 
result looks like right now.” (CFO, Company Z, 2011) 
 
The latter quote contains two interesting points.  First of all, there was a need to change 
strategy in the recession.  Secondly, the industry was rapidly changing, due to 
technological advances and changes in the environment (For Company Z, these changes 
was due to innovation).  Together these factors led to a focus on growth opportunities 
and the need to concentrate on the whole life cycle of the investment.  Cash modelling 
became more important.  The annual EVA result wasn’t of consequence and the 
information provided by the annual EVA result didn’t help the company to assess 
whether it was on the right path. 
 
Finally, the point raised by the Human Resources Manager in Company X, regarding 
the importance of the CFO’s support in order for EVA to continue, was mentioned in 
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Company Y as a reason for its decline and replacement with the balanced scorecard for 
performance measurement.  This is a technological reason: 
 
“The new CFO wants to adopt a far more balanced scorecard approach that says 
there’s a pool of money and then that gets adjusted by whatever, how you go on 
your other objectives.” (Manager, Human Resources, Company Y, 2011) 
 
“I’m more of a believer in holistic measures, not divide measures… It (EVA) 
hides a multitude of sins because it tries to capture too many things in a single 
one thing… The all encompassing measure just hid a hundred and one things.” 
(CFO, Company Y, 2011) 
 
The latter quote is interesting since one of the original selling points for EVA was that it 
encapsulated performance in a single measure.  This advantage was seen as a 
disadvantage for EVA by the CFO of Company Y.  Furthermore, prior to the decline of 
EVA within this company, the frequency of the reporting of the EVA numbers had been 
changed from monthly to quarterly reporting.  This sent out a signal that perhaps EVA 
was not so important.   
 
In conclusion, the contingencies for decline in EVA concerned: 
 
 Technology in all three companies, in particular the appropriateness of the measure 
in a recessionary environment, technological advances, the lack of an EVA 
champion and the lack of support by the CFO. 
 Culture in two of the companies, in particular the clash between what is acceptable 
in the New Zealand culture versus the American model of EVA. 
 Environment, in particular government and regulation (for the SOEs), the business 
cycle (for the SOEs) and innovation in the market (one company).  The introduction 
of IFRS and the recession were two variables that had a collective impact on EVA.   
 Strategy, in particular the lack of fit between EVA and the new business strategy 
that was caused by the recessionary environment (the SOEs). 
 
There was no evidence that firm size or structure were variables that drove the decline 
of EVA within the case organisations.  Overall, Proposition 3 is accepted for the two 
SOEs as there was a shock to the environment (IFRS and the recession) that led to the 
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decline of EVA.  Proposition 3 is refuted for Company X; there was no shock that led to 
the decline in EVA.   
 
EVA legacy in the firms 
 
Finally, summary quotes are presented, outlining the EVA position in the firms at the 
time of the 2011 interviews.  In Company X, personnel mobility has meant that there is 
no legacy of EVA within the organisation: 
 
“And now, if you talked about EVA, people wouldn’t know what you are talking 
about.  It doesn’t live in our parlances… Most people would not even know 
what it stood for.” (Human Resource Manager, Company X, 2011) 
 
Companies Y and Z both retain some legacy of EVA, but it differs: 
 
“There’s an element that’s very relevant in EVA.  You’ve got to take the best 
relevant parts out and then look at the weaknesses and say ‘that didn’t drive 
holistic behaviour often.’  But to cover your cost of capital absolutely is a 
relevant concept.” (CFO, Company Y, 2011) 
 
“We haven’t abandoned EVA all together.  I mean we still think that there’s 
value in there and over the long term you should be generating positive EVA…  
So we’re still using it from a capital investment project perspective but we’re not 
using it from a performance measurement perspective year on year.” (CFO, 
Company Z, 2011) 
 
The decision to move away from EVA wasn’t viewed as positive by all respondents.  
For example, in Company Z, one respondent regretted the loss of the advanced warning 
signal that EVA could provide: 
 
“My personal opinion is that it’s definitely a useful measure to keep because it 
actually gives some very good warning signals that are coming to fruition over 
the last couple of years.  We’ve had some major business units having serious 
decline, and there may be a stable EBIT for one of them that I can think of – 
flat-line EBIT - but EVA has been tanking big-time because it’s getting more 
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and more capital put into it… I would hate to see it (EVA) lost from doing that 
role there (planning), because you could signal parts of the business we need to 
be challenging or to make fundamental changes.” (Group Planning Manager, 
Company Z, 2011). 
 
Summary of the Evidence 
 
Overall, the evidence matched the predicted time-series trend in the EVA life cycle 
(implementation, evolution and decline).  Proposition 1 (relating to implementation) and 
Proposition 2 (evolution) was accepted for the three firms.  However, differing 
explanations for decline meant that Proposition 3 was rejected for one firm and accepted 
for two firms.  In other words, the outcome for Proposition 3 was contingent on the 
firms.  The micro-study methodology has enabled the different explanations to be 
discovered.  This is an added dimension that would not be detected in a large-scale 
statistical study that focussed on the average outcome. 
 
In terms of Fisher’s categorisation of contingency studies (Fisher, 1995), the study is 
Level 4, as the analysis has focussed on the impact of several contingent variables on 
EVA (the MCS and the outcome variable).  The dynamic perspective provided an 
opportunity to explore the relevant variables, how and why these variables change over 
time, and their interactions with each other and with the EVA system.  From the 
evidence presented a summary of the relevant contingency variables at each stage of the 
EVA evolutionary process can be developed.  This information is presented in table 5.8 
below.  From the evidence, a model depicting the relevant factors and their 
interdependencies is derived.  This is presented in figure 5.1. 
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Table 5.8 Relevant contingency variables at each stage of the EVA life cycle 
 Company X Company Y Company Z 
 I E D I E D I E D 
Strategy: 
Corporate Strategy 
Business Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environment: 
Business Cycle 
Innovation 
(Lack of) Competition 
Government and regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culture: 
National 
Organisational 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structure          
Technology: 
Personnel 
EVA measure itself 
Technological advances 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamic Interaction          
I = Implementation, E = Evolution, D = Decline, the three phases in the EVA life cycle 
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Figure 5.1 Model illustrating the relevant contingency variables and their 
interactions 
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5.5 Discussion of Results 
 
At the implementation phase there is some evidence of hierarchical diffusion (as 
described by Bjørnenek, 1997).  However, this diffusion did not follow through exactly 
in the manner that would have been predicted by Bjørnenek, as the smallest firm was 
the second to introduce EVA.   With the study focusing on three companies, it is 
difficult to say whether the diffusion of EVA was contagious (smooth and continuous).  
A much larger study of EVA companies would have been required to make this 
assessment.  Similarly, the study could not detect any impact of the size variable as the 
firms were all large organisations in the context of the New Zealand environment.   
 
EVA was a new technique in the firms and as such, could be described as an innovation.  
The motives for EVA introduction were not a result of ‘fad’ or ‘fashion’.  The 
introduction of EVA represented a significant investment and a radical change for the 
firms – it was fully implemented as the MCS and it was used successfully within the 
organisations for over ten years.  This conflicts with Sulaiman and Mitchell, who 
suggested that changes involving new techniques are susceptible to loose-coupling and 
relatively low success ratings and that successful change is of a modificatory type 
(Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005, p434).  For one firm, the introduction of the EVA 
innovation solved a problem that was facing the organisation, concerning the sharing of 
value added between customers, employees and the shareholder.  This motivation is 
similar to that cited by Cyert and March (1992).  However, this firm was a successful 
firm that needed to solve a problem.  In other words, the dichotomy of innovation cited 
by Cyert and March of innovation by successful firms (with slack resources) or 
unsuccessful firms (with a problem to solve) is not mutually exclusive.   
 
Initial evolution, the simplification of the measure due to perceived lack of internal and 
external validity, is perhaps not surprising, as it is easier to challenge a management 
accounting model that has no associated standards, than it is to question financial 
accounting results which are based on accepted standards (Ezzamel and Willmott, 
1998).  The potential advantage of the measure of EVA, that it is free of accounting 
rules and regulations and so can be specified individually for each firm, is in fact a 
disadvantage as there is no objective support for the calculation.  
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Variables driving secondary evolution were consistent across the firms.  For example, 
culture was important where the ‘American view’ of bonuses was deemed unsuitable in 
the New Zealand culture.  This is evidence of the MCS losing effectiveness if it is 
deemed to be culturally inappropriate (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012).  Strategy 
was also an important variable, but the impact of and problems with EVA were the 
same, regardless of differing business strategies.  It didn’t matter whether the firm was 
characterised as a cost leader (Company Y), a differentiator (Companies X and Z) or 
characterised as pursuing a confrontation strategy (Company X), the fully implemented 
EVA system created the same adverse incentives that drove the motivation for 
secondary evolution. 
 
Dynamic interaction provided to be an important variable at the evolution stage; an 
understanding of the issues over information and incentives created by EVA had to be 
learned over a period of time.  Also, firms had to learn of the impact of the changing 
environment and technology on the EVA MCS. Dynamic interaction is similar to a 
feedback mechanism and it is a variable that would not be detected in the traditional 
cross-sectional application of contingency theory.  It is important to note that the impact 
of managers is not about psychodynamics (where managers want to ‘make their mark’ 
or further their careers by adopting innovations, as described by Sturdy, 2004) or 
managerial power or competition (see for example Ezzamel and Burns, 2005; Malmi, 
1997).   
 
The final life cycle phase was the demise of EVA in one firm and the decline in the 
other firms.  Although a stable variable, national culture was an important factor for 
abandonment – EVA was regarded as an American view of the world that did not fit 
with the New Zealand perspective.  Although the firms had addressed the perceived 
cultural clash at the evolutionary stage by pulling the measure back to the corporate 
level, the clash still remained.  Interestingly, according to Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, New Zealand is very similar to the USA with respect to masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.  However, the cultures differ regarding 
individualism (the extent to which individuals look after themselves and their 
immediate family) with New Zealand having a lower score than the USA (which has the 
highest score); and power distance (the extent to which the less powerful accept that 
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power is distributed unequally) with New Zealand having a lower score than the USA.
55
  
In other words, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions suggest that the New Zealand culture is 
less individualistic and has a lower power distance.  This is supported by the evidence 
from respondents in the micro-study companies, where the EVA system was seen to 
conflict with national and organisational culture.  Although the EVA MCS created 
conflicting incentives at the business unit level, there was no evidence in this study of 
business units having a separate culture to that of the overall firm.   
 
The larger company abandoned EVA before the two SOEs.  For this company, there 
seemed to be a Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ with the well established financial 
accounting based measures prevailing.  The major cause of the decline in EVA for the 
two SOEs was a change in factors relating to a contingency variable.  The two separate 
shocks to the environment in close succession impacted on the EVA MCS and on other 
contingency variables.  This has been described in biology as ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
where evolution occurs in bursts as a result of rapid events (Eldredge and Gould, 1972).  
In this study, the rapid events were the shocks of the introduction of IFRS and the 
recession.  These events also drove a change in business strategy within the two 
organisations still using EVA.  For both firms, there was a shift to a focus on new 
growth opportunities, investment now for (uncertain) cash flows in the future.  This new 
strategy was not compatible with EVA so the system needed to change.  Since the EVA 
model does not easily accommodate growth options, adjustments may be necessary to 
provide the incentive to invest
56
.  Just as compatibility with strategy was an important 
factor for EVA implementation, incompatibility with strategy was a factor for the 
decline of EVA.  This confirms the view that the MCS must fit corporate strategy and if 
strategy changes, the MCS must also change (Brignall, 1997; Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2012).   
 
The evidence demonstrated that contingency factors relating to the environment, 
(regulation and the business cycle) acted collectively to impact upon the EVA MCS and 
contingency variable of strategy.  The introduction of IFRS meant a huge increase in the 
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The scores for New Zealand and the USA respectively are Power Distance: 22, 40; Individualism: 79, 
91; Masculinity: 58, 62; Uncertainty Avoidance: 49, 46; and Long-term Orientation: 30, 29. Source: 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php?culture1=63&culture2=95 
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 Stern Stewart states that incentives to invest can be provided through the creation of a suspense account 
to keep capital from such investments ‘off the books’ until the cash flows materialise (see for example 
Ehrbar, (1998, p170) and Young and O’Byrne (2001, p94).  However, these adjustments add further 
subjectivity to the measure. 
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amount of compliance work.  The recessionary environment led to a change in strategy 
and a focus on cash and cash burn.  There was value to holding liquid resources, which 
is the antithesis of the EVA philosophy.  This evidence from the respondents is borne 
out in the cash balance information in the annual reports and accounts.  A comparison 
of the average cash balances for the three companies for the years 1998-2000 and 2008-
2010 demonstrates that the balances had increased substantially by the end of the 
decade, compared to in the early years of EVA.  This information is presented in table 
5.9 below. 
 
Table 5.9 Average cash balances for the years 1998-2000 and 2008-2010 (NZ$000) 
 
  Airways Post  Telecom 
1998-2000 2416 15953 41000 
2008-2010 3726 107351 466667 
Change 54% 573% 1038% 
Source: Annual report and accounts: Statement of Cash Flows 
 
Overall, the incentives to hold cash as well as the need to focus on financial accounting 
numbers (for tracking performance against debt covenant requirements) meant that 
EVA was not an appropriate measure in the recession.  However, if either the 
introduction of IFRS or the recession had not occurred, perhaps EVA would not have 
declined.  For example, the absence of IFRS would have meant that the firms did not 
have as much compliance work to do, so perhaps could have spared the time for staff to 
continue with EVA.  The absence of a recession would have meant that credit was not 
squeezed, meaning that a focus on cash and financial accounting numbers were not so 
important; and EVA may have still provided the right incentives.  It remains to be seen 
whether an improvement in the business cycle will lead to a renewed focus on EVA. 
 
The evidence demonstrated that when the environment changed, it was financial 
accounting that took priority and provided the appropriate information.  This is in direct 
contrast to the assertions of Abdeen and Haight who state that rapid and complex 
changes in the environment mean that companies need sophisticated measures of 
performance.  They state that traditional metrics (based on financial accounting) are 
inadequate and ‘first class measures’ (of which EVA is cited as an example) are more 
appropriate (Abdeen and Haight, 2002).  The focus on financial accounting provides 
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some support for the assertion by Cyert and March that the tighter the budgets, the more 
expenditure will be controlled by essentially conservative rules (Cyert and March, 1992, 
p189). 
 
The evidence on decline of EVA suggests that there was a reduction in a management 
accounting system.  This runs counter to the suggestion by Sulaiman and Mitchell who 
state that there is “a ratchet-like mechanism in operation, which preserves the 
management accounting system from reduction” (Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005, p434).  
The micro-study demonstrates that there was a decline in the measure.    However, as of 
February 2011, the regulators of the SOEs were considering a requirement for the SOEs 
to submit EVA results on an annual basis.
57
  If this regulatory requirement is 
introduced, it could potentially increase the importance of EVA.   
 
The changing nature of contingency variables, their interdependencies and collective 
impact provides a powerful result that demonstrates that the design of contingency 
research is important.  The longitudinal approach provided an opportunity to investigate 
the changing influence, something that could not be discovered from the traditional 
cross-sectional approach to contingency studies.  The micro-study involving 
questionnaires and in-depth interviews in the companies facilitated the detection of a 
number of relevant variables and their interdependencies.  This suggests that results 
from studies where the impact of only one contingency variable is examined (classified 
as levels 1-3 in the Fisher categorisation (Fisher, 1995)) may lack meaning since the 
collective impact of and causality between variables cannot be detected.  Statistical 
studies based on quantitative data or survey questions may be particularly vulnerable as 
it may be impossible to detect relationships.   
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the implementation of and experience with the EVA 
innovation in three New Zealand companies (one listed company and two state-owned 
enterprises) over a period of fifteen years.  The objective was to build explanations for 
EVA implementation, evolution and decline, using a dynamic contingency theory 
perspective.  The longitudinal trend was predicted and a match sought between 
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 The source of this statement is a meeting held between the researchers and representatives from The 
New Zealand Treasury in February 2011. 
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propositions for each phase of the cycle and the empirical observations.  The findings 
are limited by the number of companies and by the specific context examined.  
Nevertheless, this study provides four main contributions to the literature on 
contingency theory.  First of all, the dynamic, longer-term perspective is itself a 
contribution since extant contingency theory studies tend to be cross-sectional, 
focussing on a relatively short period of time. 
 
The extension to a longer-term focus facilitated the second contribution, the 
identification of the relevant variables that were influential at each stage of the EVA life 
cycle.  The micro-study approach facilitated an understanding of the changing influence 
of the contingency variables over time.  Evidence from each phase led to the 
development of a contingency model that illustrated the relevant variables and their 
interactive nature.  Since the study was not restricted to a set number of pre-specified 
variables, the possibility of the omission of relevant variables was reduced.  
Furthermore, as well as acting individually, there was evidence of both a causal link 
between variables and contingency variables acting collectively to influence the EVA 
MCS.  The collective impact and the causality observed mean that contingency 
variables should not be viewed as independent variables acting in isolation.  Changes in 
and interactions between contingency variables would not be detected in a cross-
sectional study that examines empirical data at a point in time.   
 
A third contribution is the suggestion of the need to consider a new contingency 
variable, termed dynamic interaction.  Dynamic interaction reflects the learning and 
experience gained from working with the EVA system.  It occurs as a result of the 
passage of time and as such its impact would not be detected in a cross-sectional study.  
For the case companies, dynamic interaction led to evolution in the system as managers 
learned of the problems that EVA created.   
 
Finally, the model of technique decline is itself a contribution.  At this stage it was a 
shock to the environment that led to a complete decline in the EVA system.  For the two 
companies still employing EVA at this time, the environmental factors of the 
introduction of IFRS and the recession acted collectively.  If either the introduction of 
IFRS or the recession had not occurred, perhaps EVA would not have declined.   
The study has also provided evidence on the EVA system itself.  For the three 
companies, EVA was an innovation and not simply a ‘fad.’  EVA was employed for 
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between ten to fifteen years in each firm as a central component of the management 
accounting system.  However, during this time there were problems created by its lack 
of internal and external validity.  The fact that the measure of EVA was sold by its 
promoters as being specific to each company (in terms of the adjustments made) and the 
lack of standards meant that EVA was viewed as subjective and complex, leading to a 
lack of understanding both inside and outside of the firm.  This in turn created a need to 
evolve the measure to simplify it and to bring it closer to financial accounting results.  
The EVA system also created adverse incentives.  When EVA was introduced, a 
cultural fit was assumed.  Although national and organisational culture did not change 
over the time of this study, a clash of EVA with culture was an apparent driver for 
evolution in all three companies and for decline in one company.   It took time for 
managers to discover that the American style system of EVA, with its sharp incentives, 
did not suit the New Zealand culture.  This is another example of dynamic interaction at 
play.  Finally, when the two shocks of the introduction of IFRS and the recession hit the 
two firms still employing EVA, it was the financial accounting system that dominated 
the management accounting system, driving out EVA.  Furthermore, EVA was found to 
be an inappropriate system in a recession, where there was a focus on growth options 
and a desire to hold cash in illiquid markets.  Both of these aspects are not easily 
accommodated in the EVA system.  Overall, there were issues with both the 
information provided and the incentives created.   
 
The evidence demonstrated that firms do abandon management accounting techniques 
and for these companies, there was no ratchet-like mechanism that prevented a decline 
in the system.  Overall, for the micro-study firms, there is no legacy of EVA in the 
listed company, and very little legacy in the two SOEs.  However, a possible new 
regulatory requirement to submit EVA results to The New Zealand Treasury could 
create a renewed focus on EVA in the SOEs.    
 
The research conducted in this study was explanatory in nature.  There was no attempt 
to provide general results that would be applicable to all firms.  Notwithstanding this 
fact, the model presented could be used to investigate different management accounting 
techniques using a dynamic perspective.  This would enable an examination of the 
changing impact of the relevant variables, their causation and the role of dynamic 
interaction.   The micro-study evidence enabled the discovery of different explanations 
for the decline in EVA.  Further studies could seek to confirm these explanations or find 
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new explanations.  An analysis of the impact of the recession and the introduction of 
IFRS on the management accounting function would be a relevant area of investigation, 
to determine whether financial accounting does indeed drive out management 
accounting.  The study could be extended to other EVA users and other state owned 
companies internationally to determine whether and how EVA is still being used and 
the variables that are relevant for its success.  Finally, the impact of any regulatory 
requirements to publish EVA results imposed on state owned enterprises could be 
examined, to see if this is a relevant contingency variable for the continued use of EVA 
in these organisations.   
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 Chapter 6.  Conclusions  
  
The overall objective of the PhD has been to conduct a dynamic, longitudinal evidence-
based investigation of whether EVA can create value in three New Zealand companies: 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand (state-owned enterprise or SOE), New Zealand 
Post (SOE) and Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (listed company).  Over the time 
period studied (1998-2010), the three companies together comprised a significant 
portion of the New Zealand economy, with operating revenue averaging at 12.1% of 
retail sales and 4.4% of GDP.  It follows that if the use of EVA could lead to value 
creation then this would have significant impact on the New Zealand economy.    
 
Within each firm, EVA was fully implemented with the help of Stern Stewart and used 
as a central component of the management control system for a period of ten to fifteen 
years.  Although viewed as a new management accounting technique when it first 
appeared on the scene, the implementation of EVA was not a result of a fad or fashion 
for these firms.  It was viewed as an efficient choice and, as such, EVA was not a short-
lived phenomenon within any of the organisations.  The decision to introduce EVA 
properly and implement it as the full management control system required a significant 
investment.  The investment was not only in terms of time and money at the 
implementation stage, but was on-going through the life cycle of EVA as managers 
responded to the information and incentives created and worked to evolve the system.  
In the listed company, this significance was evident in a comment by the Human 
Resource Manager who commented in 2011 that the scale of the investment in EVA 
was such that “the likes of which have never been repeated.”   
 
The study involved research that covered the entire life cycle of EVA for these firms.  
All of them made extensive use of EVA but eventually abandoned it.  Thus, a holistic 
perspective of EVA was provided, from implementation, through evolution, to its 
eventual decline.  The case study method enabled a detailed investigation of EVA, its 
origins and influences and how it persisted and changed over time.   The variety of 
respondents from each organisation provided detailed evidence on the experiences of 
EVA, revealing linkages and widening the study beyond a management accounting 
perspective.  This sort of evidence is not available from studies that investigate EVA at 
the corporate level.   
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The three companies were key EVA users in New Zealand, with the two SOEs also 
publishing EVA results in their annual reports and accounts.  Airways went beyond the 
publication of the actual result and also provided detailed information on the 
calculation, including the value of NOPAT, capital and the estimation of the cost of 
capital.  The analysis of this information, together with information on the companies 
and their business strategies enabled the consideration of some findings from the 
literature.  First of all, the finding that EVA is more suited to defender firms (who 
compete through cost minimisation) than prospector firms who compete through 
differentiation), Lovata and Costigan (2002).  Whilst this hypothesis could not be 
explicitly tested, it can be said that two of the case companies could be described as 
prospector firms and they continued to use EVA as their MCS for over ten years.  The 
finding that EVA is suited to capital intensive firms (Kleiman, 1999, Riceman et al., 
2002) was supported, since each of the firms operates in a capital intensive industry.  
Thirdly, the finding that EVA may be less effective for firms in the service area 
(Riceman et al., 2002) could not be supported as all three firms operate in the service 
sector.  An examination of the published EVA results for the SOEs led to the rejection 
of the hypothesis of Lougee et al. (2006) that firms implement EVA to pick the “low 
hanging fruit.”  This hypothesis was tested (and rejected) using the actual (correct) EVA 
results published by the firms, so did not rely on artificially constructed data.   
 
In the analysis of the case study evidence, three major research questions were 
addressed: 
1. Does the implementation and use of EVA lead to the discovery of value within 
the organisation? 
2. Can EVA be interpreted as a management model to meet corporate objectives? 
3. What were the key factors driving implementation, use and decline of EVA? 
 
The first research question covered the implementation and evolution of EVA within 
the firms, whilst the second focused on the continued use of EVA.  The third question 
examined each phase of the EVA life cycle.   
 
The analysis of the evidence was guided by three different theoretical frameworks taken 
from three different disciplines: the discovery process (economics), management model 
(management) and contingency theory (accounting).  The objective in using the 
different frameworks was to provide alternative perspectives on the practical application 
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of the EVA technique and a new application of the frameworks.  The theoretical 
underpinning of the investigation (together with the testing of empirical findings) was 
undertaken in order to respond to criticisms by Zimmerman (2001) that management 
accounting research lacked theory and an economics perspective should be adopted, and 
the suggestion by Luft and Shields (2002) that a variety of theories should be used.   
 
Although focussing on different aspects and different phases of the EVA life cycle, the 
central theme of each framework was the information provided and the incentives 
created by the EVA system, to address the fundamental question: can EVA create 
value?  The conclusions from each of the frameworks are now discussed and the 
research questions answered.  Following the separate conclusions, the contributions of 
the study are presented, in terms of contributions to the frameworks themselves, 
contributions of the holistic approach to the management accounting research method 
and contributions to our understanding of EVA.  Finally, implications for practitioners 
and policy makers are presented. 
 
6.1 Conclusions on EVA from the Discovery Process Framework 
 
The discovery process framework was developed in order to evaluate the 
implementation and use of the EVA innovation and to see whether it could be employed 
to discover value within the organisations.  The framework was informed chiefly by 
Nelson and Winter (1982) on routines and discovery, and Layard (2003) on incentives 
within organisations.  The Stern Stewart framework for EVA motivated the discussion 
of the key influences, complementary systems (such as the balanced scorecard) and 
inhibiting factors for the discovery of value.  A key feature of this framework was the 
recognition of the evolution in the management accounting function over time, and the 
mechanisms for those changes.   
 
The research findings demonstrated that upon introduction of the EVA system, there 
was a shift in the rules and routines within firms, reflecting the fact that EVA was 
central to the MCS.  Whilst this may represent a common starting point, from then on 
the process of evolution was path-dependent.  Evolution in the rules and routines took 
place as a result of the interaction between managers and others working with the 
system.  This evolution was different across the firms, as it depended upon the resulting 
sequencing of influencing actions. 
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The prospects for the discovery of value were recognised by the firms.  Since the firms 
were former national monopolies and they still retained some monopoly elements in 
their businesses, it was anticipated that EVA could assist with the discovery of value, 
with the system employed alongside the balanced scorecard.  However, there were 
limitations to the information provided by the system, due to the perceived complexity 
of the measure.  Furthermore, the system failed in its ability to motivate managers to 
discover the value that was known to exist in these companies.  The key to 
understanding this failure concerned incentives.  As a consequence, through a process of 
discovery of the incentive impacts, there was an evolution in the EVA system, both in 
terms of its measurement and use.  When discoveries were made that specific 
adjustments were not influential, these adjustments were abandoned.   When it was 
discovered that the application of EVA at the business unit level created rivalry leading 
to sub-optimal behaviour, EVA was taken back up the organisation.  This evolution 
could be interpreted as a transition to reduce the transaction costs of the system and it 
meant that each firm made use of a different application of EVA than the Stern Stewart 
model.  The path-dependent process of evolution in each firm suggested that the exact 
course of EVA could not be predicted in advance.  Whilst in the time period covered by 
this analysis (up until 2001), the EVA institution had not been abandoned by any of the 
firms, the way that the system was being employed meant that its prospects for value 
creation became increasingly diminished.  Therefore, the answer to the first research 
question, for each of the firms, was no, the implementation and use of EVA did not lead 
to the discovery of value within any of the organisations.  This is a powerful result: the 
applications of EVA employed in the firms could not discover value that was known to 
exist in these monopoly businesses.   
 
6.2 Conclusions on EVA from the Management Model Framework 
 
The evaluation of the evidence concerning the on-going use of EVA to meet corporate 
objectives was conducted using Birkinshaw and Goddard’s management model 
framework (Birkinshaw and Goddard, 1999) for dimensionalizing management.  This 
model was based on positive analysis and normative predictions.  The positive analysis 
comprised the synthesis of a large number of existing theoretical management models in 
a type of factor analysis.  This led to the encapsulation of the work of managers into 
four dimensions: the setting of objectives, motivating managers, co-ordinating activities 
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and decision making.  Within each dimension, polar extremes of management are 
described, ranging from ‘traditional’ (in use for generations) to ‘alternative’ (just 
beginning to be adopted).  The analysis of the Stern Stewart model of EVA revealed 
that EVA can in theory address each of the four dimensions with the Birkinshaw and 
Goddard management model, if applied in the way that Stern Stewart recommends.  The 
application corresponded to the traditional end of the spectrum for two of the 
dimensions.  Objectives should be managed with clear rather than oblique goals.  These 
can be at the overall corporate level, the business unit level, or both.  Incentives for 
managers should be based on EVA, so are clearly extrinsic rather than intrinsic (coming 
from within, such as a sense of pride in a job well done).  For the two remaining 
dimensions, it was suggested that the Stern Stewart model of EVA aligned most closely 
with the traditional end of the spectrum since it was expected that coordination of 
activities would be achieved in a formal or bureaucratic way through for example 
budgets and transfer prices, rather than in a spontaneous manner.  For decision making, 
it was suggested that EVA would lead to a hierarchical, rather than a collective wisdom 
approach.  However, it was recognised that EVA could conceivably be used for 
spontaneous decision making and collective wisdom.    The normative element of the 
management model suggested alternative forms of the model according to different 
business characteristics.  The EVA evidence suggested that the EVA system would 
correspond to most closely to the planning model of management, which Birkinshaw 
and Goddard claimed is suited to mature firms in predictable industries.  In addition, 
EVA may also align with the quest model, for established firms facing rapidly changing 
environments.   
 
The evidence demonstrated that none of the firms employed EVA to the extent that 
Stern Stewart recommended.  Furthermore, there was no uniform application of EVA 
across the firms.  This reinforces the path-dependent nature of EVA concluded from the 
discovery process framework.  Whilst the original implementation and use of EVA in 
the firms may have been more consistent with the Stern Stewart model, over time there 
was an evolution in its application.  This evolution was not directly incorporated in the 
management model, as it is a static model that does not address management change.  
While it is possible that at different points in time the ‘snapshot’ may itself be different, 
the Birkinshaw and Goddard model does not explain how change takes place. 
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An important conclusion was that although the practice observed within each firm 
diverged from the theory, this did not compromise the status of EVA as a management 
model.  EVA played a key role within each of the four dimensions for each firm, 
although it was weakest in the coordinating individuals dimension, reinforcing the 
rivalry conclusion from the discovery process framework.  The divergence between the 
Stern Stewart recommendations and practice did not alter the principles within each of 
the four dimensions.  For each of the case firms, EVA involved traditional, rather than 
alternative, principles.  Since the firms applied the EVA model differently, this 
demonstrated that there can be considerable variation within the dimensions.   It also 
showed that the EVA management model provided flexibility.  Since two of the firms 
(listed company and one of the SOEs) operated in dynamic, rapidly changing 
environments for at least part of their businesses (corresponding to the quest model), the 
evidence demonstrated that EVA was suitable as a  management model for these firms 
and not just for businesses operating in stable, predictable industries (corresponding to 
the planning model).   
 
Despite the fact that the full Stern Stewart model of EVA was not applied, the evidence 
demonstrated that each of the three firms used EVA as a management model.  Each of 
the case companies also operated with the balanced scorecard as the business model, 
which either pre-or post-dated the EVA implementation.  For the firms studied, the 
balanced scorecard as a business model complemented EVA as a management model.  
In other words, the business model and the management model intersected, with the 
balanced scorecard containing both EVA (as one of the financial measures) and 
intangible measures (that are not encapsulated directly in the EVA measure).  This was 
an attempt to promote longer term objectives alongside EVA, which can be regarded as 
a short-term measure. 
 
6.3 Conclusions on EVA from the Contingency Theory Framework 
 
This framework employed a dynamic, longitudinal approach to investigate the whole 
life cycle of EVA within the firms, with the cycle split into three distinct phases: 
implementation, evolution and decline. Drawing on the contingency theory literature for 
management accounting (for example, Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1995), empirical 
propositions were posited in order to identify the important variables for each phase.  
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The dynamic focus provided an opportunity to consider the variables, their interactions 
with each other and how they impacted on the EVA system.   
 
At the implementation phase, a constant factor across the three firms was the fit of EVA 
with strategy.  However, since the firms pursued different business strategies, (cost 
leader, differentiator, confrontation), EVA was shown to suit more than one particular 
type of strategy.  Furthermore, for the SOEs, the environment was an important variable 
for implementation, particularly the government and regulation (via the Value-Based 
Reporting Protocol, discussed in chapter 2).  In addition, for one SOE, the lack of 
competition was a factor for introduction.  EVA was seen to be a ‘fair’ way to set prices 
by all stakeholders in the firm.  For the second SOE, cultural and technical factors were 
important.   
 
Evolution was proposed to be a two-phased process, with initial evolution due to the 
information provided and secondary evolution occurring as a result of the incentives 
created.  For the three firms, the process did follow this predicted pattern, although the 
result (in terms of the measure of EVA and how it was used) was not identical.  
Furthermore, the time scale was not the same, with the listed company going through 
this process prior to the SOEs.  A key factor for evolution was a new contingency 
variable, termed dynamic interaction.  This variable was suggested to encompass the 
dynamic learning that takes place as a result of managers working with the system.  
Over time, the information and incentives created by EVA were reviewed and this was 
fed back in the form of adjustments to the system.  In addition, as well as strategy, 
technology and the environment, culture and structure were important factors for the 
evolution of EVA.  For the firms, it was necessary that the measure evolved to make it 
less complex and less subjective, and for two of the firms, to reduce the perceived clash 
of culture between what was acceptable in New Zealand and the American approach to 
incentives enshrined within the EVA system.  Regardless of the differing business 
strategies, the fully implemented EVA system failed to provide the right incentives.  
 
Since the EVA methodology was employed for an extended period of time within each 
of the three firms, it was predicted that the impetus for its demise must have been an 
external shock or change that meant that EVA was no longer viable in the companies.  
This was the case for the SOEs, where two external shocks to the environment meant 
that EVA could not be sustained.  First of all, the introduction of IFRS meant that there 
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was a shortage of accountants and staff time to devote to EVA.  Secondly, the 
recessionary environment meant that through dynamic interaction, managers learned 
that the EVA measure no longer provided the right information or the right incentives.  
These two variables acted collectively to influence the decline of EVA, as it was 
deemed to be too costly and no longer appropriate.  The new focus was on cash and 
cash burn and company strategy had changed in response to the recessionary 
environment.  The listed company had ‘drifted away’ from the EVA system over a 
period of time prior to the introduction of IFRS and the recession.  There was a ‘gentle 
dismantling’ of the construct, with formal abandonment in the 2006-07 financial year.  
The demise of EVA was largely due to a lack of support from the top, such as 
commitment by the CFO to maintain the system.   
 
6.4 Contributions of the Study 
 
The study comprises a comprehensive study of EVA in the three companies.  In 
achieving this it makes a unique contribution to the management accounting literature.  
Overall, it provides a holistic view of the EVA systems over the time period of their 
employment.  The use of the three theoretical frameworks for the interpretation of the 
evidence generates contributions in respect of both the frameworks themselves, the 
management accounting research method and the EVA measure.  These contributions 
are discussed below.  Finally, implications for practitioners and policy makers are 
discussed.   
 
6.4.1 Contributions to the Theoretical Frameworks 
 
The use of the frameworks to interpret the evidence on EVA represented an original 
application of each framework.  For the discovery framework, the consideration of both 
the key influences and inhibiting factors for the process was an important means of 
extracting the evidence concerning the implementation and evolution of EVA.  The 
model developed, which incorporated these aspects, was useful for emphasising the 
nature of EVA as a process that was path-dependent.  Differences in the key influences 
and the inhibiting factors meant that although the firms had the same starting point and 
they all went through the evolutionary process, there was path-dependency so that the 
process was not exactly the same and it did not occur at the same time.  Furthermore, 
localised knowledge could be explored, since each firm’s individual learning process 
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determined the path that was taken by the EVA system.  The analysis of EVA using the 
discovery process framework highlighted the importance of evolution, particularly as a 
result of information and incentives.  It has been noted that the original Nelson and 
Winter evolutionary theory failed to consider incentives (Grief, 2005).  The results from 
this study suggest that incentives were an important driver of the evolutionary process.  
It is proposed that incentives must be considered in a study where individuals’ actions 
form an integral part of the analysis.   
 
The application of the management model framework to EVA represented an attempt to 
forge a link between the literature bases in management and accounting, with 
management accounting contributing to the development of the management literature.  
Whilst EVA was employed as a management model for the firms, the evidence 
suggested a revision of the Birkinshaw and Goddard (2009) framework for the firms.  
The framework is static in nature, so it would benefit from extension to incorporate the 
dynamic nature of management.  The four dimensions were not independent (as they 
appear to be in the framework).  Rather, the specification of one dimension meant that 
other dimensions themselves were specified indirectly.  Furthermore, the evidence 
demonstrated that there was a hierarchy to the dimensions, with motivating individuals 
at the centre.  Just as in the discovery framework, analysis of the evidence within the 
management model framework was able to detect the key role of incentives.  The 
framework was redrawn for the case firms, to show motivating individuals as the central 
dimension, with links to the other dimensions, reflecting the interdependencies.  The 
successful application of EVA to the management model framework suggested that the 
management accounting measure of EVA could be more than a component of the 
model; it actually formed the model.  This demonstrated a revision of the potential 
significance of accounting for organisational management and a potential to close the 
gap between the two disciplines.   
 
With the contingency theory framework, the major contribution was an extension of the 
model to a longitudinal application, since most studies are cross-sectional in nature.  
The discovery theory framework had indicated that evolution was important, suggesting 
that a dynamic approach is appropriate.  Through the longer-term focus a new 
contingency variable was put forward: dynamic interaction.  This variable reflects the 
dynamic learning and interaction process that occurs as a result of the passage of time.  
The longitudinal application and explicit consideration of dynamic interaction meant 
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that the variables driving the process of evolution could be explored in detail, as the 
firms moved through the life cycle of EVA.  The model developed from this study 
suggested that as well as including the dynamic interaction variable, it is important to 
focus on a range of variables, their collective action and their interdependencies, as well 
as how they change over time.  It was suggested that results from studies focussing on 
only a limited number of variables may be questioned as there could be omitted 
variables and the collective impact of variables may be missed.  Furthermore, changes 
in interactions between contingency variables would not be detected in a cross-sectional 
study.   
  
6.4.2 Insights from the Holistic Approach  
 
In this study, the research method was designed to provide a holistic approach to our 
understanding of EVA, through the testing of empirical findings and hypotheses from 
the literature and the interpretation of case study evidence, using three different 
theoretical frameworks drawn from three academic disciplines.  Thus, this study goes 
beyond the simple description of EVA and addresses some of the criticisms of 
management accounting research raised by Zimmerman (2001).  It also provides an 
opportunity to reflect on insights and synergies gained through the use of the three 
frameworks.     
 
The discovery theory framework was appropriate for emphasising the nature of EVA as 
a process of discovery within the firms (even though EVA was not able to discover the 
source of value).  Thinking of EVA in this way highlighted the dynamic nature of the 
process and the path dependent nature of the system.  It also emphasised the role of 
managers as leaders (or change agents) who influence the MCS.  The use of this 
framework tended to focus on internal forces as drivers of the process.  However, it 
needed extending to include the role of incentives.   
 
The management model framework was suitable for analysing the evidence on the 
actual use of EVA within the organisation.  As with the discovery process framework, it 
provided a good theoretical basis for an understanding of EVA.  This framework 
complemented the previous framework by concentrating on the use of EVA within the 
firms.  It reinforced the importance of incentives that had been highlighted in the 
discovery process framework.  However, a disadvantage of this framework is that it 
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implies a static approach to the analysis, suggesting that without adaption it would not 
be satisfactory for a longitudinal analysis or an analysis of management change.   
 
Whilst the frameworks were designed to be separate (but nested), in many ways the 
contingency theory framework benefitted from the previous application of the other two 
frameworks.  Traditionally, contingency studies were static and focussed on perhaps a 
limited number of variables.  Generally, researchers in these studies have been testing 
only a limited number of factors, or looking to draw up a ‘check list’ of factors that 
were relevant, without any notion of relative importance or interactions, or for how long 
the phenomenon being studied actually persisted in the firms.  In this study, contingency 
theory was extended to a longitudinal application, with no restrictions on factors, with a 
focus on linkages between the variables and with the inclusion of the dynamic 
interaction variable to emphasise the importance of managers in the process.  As such, 
key aspects of the previous two frameworks were introduced (emphasis on the process 
and the importance of management), meaning that this application was able to address 
many of the issues raised with earlier contingency theory studies.  Overall, this 
framework was well suited to the study of the entire life cycle of EVA within the 
organisations.  On its own contingency theory would not have satisfied the criticisms of 
Zimmerman (2001), as it is largely positive, based on empirical observations.  Of course 
and in common with the management model, systematic or regular observations over 
time and across companies can lead to normative predictions for the impact of 
contingencies on management control systems. 
 
A summary of the key features of the frameworks is presented in table 6.1.   
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Table 6.1 Summary of the key features of the three theoretical frameworks 
 
 Discovery  
Theory 
Management 
Model 
Contingency 
Theory 
Positive/Normative approach Normative Both Both 
Dynamic or static  Dynamic Static Extended to 
dynamic 
Examination of underlying 
motivations for change  
x 
(other than value 
discovery) 
x  
Internal or external focus for 
change 
Internal N/A Internal and 
external 
 
 
To summarise, individually the frameworks each had their own strengths and 
weaknesses.  However, used together, they complemented each other, providing 
synergistic gains for the researcher and meeting the suggestion of Luft and Shields 
(2002) to use a variety of theories.  The frameworks facilitated the exploration of 
different aspects of the EVA system whilst also serving to strengthen the conclusions 
when important aspects of EVA were highlighted in one or more frameworks.  
Furthermore, the earlier frameworks improved the design of the final framework.  
Taken together, the three frameworks provided insights into a management accounting 
technique; how it was implemented, how it persisted and changed in the organisations 
over time, emphasising the dynamic nature of the system, the importance of managers 
in the change process and the role of internal and external forces in the process.   
 
6.4.3 Contributions to our Understanding of EVA 
 
The evidence demonstrated that EVA was a real innovation for the firms, leading to a 
major change in their rules and routines.  Whilst the firms had the same starting point, 
employing Stern Stewart to advise on the full implementation, the path dependent 
nature of evolution in the firms (through dynamic interaction and localised knowledge) 
meant that each of the companies ended up with different EVA systems.  The 
application of EVA was not uniform or standard, demonstrating that different 
applications can be successful.  There is more than one way of working with the EVA 
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MCS and achieving the desired information from the system.  Despite these differences, 
the reasons for evolution within the firms were the same.  A contribution of this study is 
the analysis of the reasons for evolution of the measure, through the study of EVA as a 
process.   
 
The first reason for evolution arose because the EVA measure suffered from a lack of 
internal and external validity.  Both insiders to the firm (the people working with EVA) 
and outsiders (the media, interested stakeholders and analysts) misunderstood the 
measure.  The main problems were the complexity and subjectivity that EVA entailed 
and the lack of standards for EVA.  If the approach to the measure of EVA is too pure 
and theoretical, this leads to too many adjustments which are all contestable and 
possibly difficult to accept.   For many managers working with EVA and board 
members seeing the EVA results, the calculation may be viewed as a ‘black box’.  
Overall, these problems meant that it was easier to focus on revenue and expenses (and 
hence EBIT).  External parties misunderstood EVA as they confused it with profit.  
Furthermore, the individual nature of the EVA calculation meant that the measure of 
EVA was specific to each firm.  This feature was cited by Stern Stewart as an advantage 
of EVA (Ehrbar, 1998, p165).  However, it was in fact a disadvantage.  It meant that, 
coupled with the lack of standards, the EVA system suffered from a genuine lack of 
credibility.   
 
The second motivation for evolution concerned the incentives created.  Here the issue 
was the clash of cultures between the perceived American style ‘cut-throat’ nature of 
incentives and the more collegiate one-company view that the companies wanted to 
foster.  This dichotomy presented a challenge both within the firms (managers resisted 
the highly levered bonuses) and with the firms’ relationships with external parties 
(where there was a fear of repercussion or ‘media disaster’ if the high level of bonuses 
paid was made public).  Whilst this may have been a direct result of the way the 
incentive schemes were applied, the lesson is that the views of insiders and outsiders 
must be heeded to ensure a cultural fit.  Furthermore, in some cultures and in some 
organisations (such as firms in or originating in the public sector), intrinsic incentives 
may form an important dimension.  An attempt to layer extrinsic incentives onto 
intrinsic incentives may fail if there is a clash between the two, such that intrinsic 
incentives (which may be regarded as vital for the organisation) are driven out by 
extrinsic incentives. 
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Overall, the process of evolution meant that the EVA system failed to be employed in 
the way that Stern Stewart would recommend; it just couldn’t work.  For decentralised 
firms where communication and coordination is important, the evidence shows that the 
EVA system can create, rather than solve, problems both internally and with external 
parties. 
 
A further key contribution of this study is the evidence that is presented on the demise 
of the measure.  In management accounting, there are very few studies that look at the 
abandonment of systems, particularly after they have been in use for such a long period 
of time.  Studies tend to focus on implementation of new measures (often at a very early 
stage), without examining longer term reasons for persistence, change and demise 
within the organisation.  One of the reasons is that it can be difficult to find evidence on 
reduction.  For example diffusion studies often portray the introduction and use of a 
technique as an ‘S’ shaped curve, with no actual reduction, just a flattening out in the 
numbers employing the technique.  Studies on abandonment often concern techniques 
that may have been adopted but not formally implemented.  As a consequence, there is 
very little evidence available from which to study the reasons for failure. 
 
The gradual demise of EVA in the listed company demonstrates that a necessary 
condition for success is the on-going commitment of an EVA ‘champion.’  Without the 
executive drive and continued renewal, refinement and development, the motivation for 
the system dies.  Even with this commitment, external forces can act on the firm 
spelling the demise of the system.  The significant factors driving the decline of EVA in 
the two SOEs were the introduction of IFRS and the recession, which acted collectively 
to mean that the EVA system was no longer appropriate.  The introduction of IFRS 
meant that both human and monetary capital resources had to be devoted to compliance 
with the new regulations.  This may have created no problems in a more buoyant 
economic climate but the recession meant that the management accounting function 
suffered as a result of the staff demands made by the financial accounting system.  
Because EVA was non-mandatory and it was costly, it was seen as a ‘luxury’ that had to 
go.  In other words, new management accounting techniques such as EVA may be fine 
when resources are available but when this is not the case, their benefits do not 
outweigh the costs.  Whilst formal cost-benefit analysis of accounting techniques may 
not be possible on the basis of exact numbers, there comes a time when it is well 
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understood in the organisation that the EVA system is both costly to sustain and it no 
longer provides sufficient benefits.   
 
In addition to its costliness, EVA did not provide the right information in the recession.  
One aspect concerned external stakeholders.  When firms are under pressure, 
particularly from fund providers that are looking for reassurance that their covenants 
will not be breached, it is the financial accounting information that forms the basis of 
the requirements.  Since the firms must ensure that they meet these restrictions the focus 
turns to financial accounting.  There is no interest in the subjective measure of EVA. 
 
The recessionary cycle altered the firms’ investment decisions.  When normal activities 
are depressed in this sort of environment, the quest for growth opportunities becomes 
important.  However, the evaluation of projects on an annual EVA basis can reduce the 
incentive to invest in such projects if short-term EVA is negative.  Furthermore, the use 
of ex post EVA didn’t provide the right information regarding whether the firms were 
on track with their investments.  Managers couldn’t assess whether the projects were 
going well or not.  This may not have been a problem in times when there was no limit 
to the availability of funds.   
 
The limited availability of funds also meant that the EVA system did not work.  
Recession caused a change in strategy so that a key focus was cash burn and payback 
from investment.  One aspect of EVA that was perhaps not apparent when it first came 
to prominence is that the system works when the capital markets work.  With EVA, 
there is a fundamental implicit assumption that firms can go to the capital market 
whenever they need to borrow and they will pay the market rate for that capital (Young 
and O’Byrne, 2001, p8).  However, in a recession, capital markets don’t work like this, 
there is a squeeze or ‘credit crunch’ so that it is costly or even impossible to raise funds.  
This means that firms need to hold liquid resources, to fund possible future projects.  
Consequently there is a clash with the incentives created under the EVA system, where 
holding capital depresses the EVA result through the increased capital charge.   
 
Overall, it can be concluded that EVA was a system that could be evolved to ensure that 
its use was sustained in the organisation over a lengthy period of time.  However, 
problems with information and incentives meant that the application could not work in 
the way that Stern Stewart originally intended.  Although in theory EVA can be 
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employed to create value in the organisation, the evidence has demonstrated that in 
practice it did not fulfil this role.  As a management accounting technique it was 
vulnerable to pressures that arose from a lack of internal support (which can be 
interpreted as inertia), the inappropriate information and incentives that it created, the 
over-riding importance of financial accounting and its unsuitability in the recessionary 
environment.  Taken together these features meant that EVA is no longer a successful 
tool for creating value.   
 
However, EVA has not disappeared without a trace.  There is some residual legacy in 
the two SOEs; one continues to calculate EVA ‘at a high level’ for pricing decisions and 
the other uses EVA for some business cases, alongside other measures.  The listed 
company, the firm that made very significant investment in the EVA system, has no 
legacy whatsoever. 
 
 
6.5 Implications of the Research 
 
6.5.1 Implications for Practitioners 
 
As well as the overall conclusions on EVA highlighted in the previous section, it is 
interesting to consider the implications that the theoretical frameworks may have for 
managers designing the MCS in their firm.   
 
The overall conclusions for practitioners from the discovery theory framework is that 
when a new management accounting technique is being considered, it is important to 
understand that the implementation and use of that technique will involve a process of 
discovery.  This means that it cannot be predicted ex ante what the benefits will be and 
where the firm will end up.  The process is dynamic, with managers playing a key role.  
It is also path dependent, meaning that it would be difficult for one firm to learn from 
the experiences of another firm that is further along the discovery process.  Therefore, 
an element of faith and trust is required, with the understanding that the effect of the 
system will be discovered over time.  This highlights the importance of, managerial 
experience and leadership.   
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The management model provided a good theoretical framework for thinking about what 
managers do and how a management accounting technique can form the model.  The 
framework could be usefully adopted by practitioners, to frame the management role.  
However, it is a static model and it needs to be remembered that, over time, dimensions 
change in response to external factors.  It must be recognised that managers must adapt 
(for example to changing objectives in a recessionary environment) so that flexibility 
must be incorporated. 
 
Finally, the contingency theory framework highlighted the various factors that are 
important at the various stages of the evolutionary process.  The conclusions from this 
study have highlighted the importance of a good cultural and strategic fit.  Of vital 
importance is the external environment which can mean that the management control 
system is no longer appropriate due to problems over information and incentives.  Over 
time, environmental changes can drive out management accounting measures, so that 
the firm converges to a sole reliance on financial accounting techniques.  However, 
whilst highlighting these issues ex post, the very nature of contingency theory (the 
management control system is contingent on the firm and its environment) means that it 
is difficult to imagine how this theory can really help managers in the ex ante design of 
the management control system.     
 
6.5.2 Implications for Policy Makers 
 
It has been suggested that regulators or shareholding ministers for SOEs have been and 
continue to be interested in the measure of EVA as it provides an opportunity to 
benchmark the companies in the absence of a share price.  These people are trying to 
assess the discovery of value within these firms, particularly in the monopoly elements 
of the businesses.  It is a natural area of interest for them as they wish to protect the 
interests of consumers.  Whilst this may be an acceptable reason for requiring SOEs to 
provide EVA results, it cannot be expected that firms would spend time on EVA, 
particularly in a recessionary environment.  In addition, a requirement to produce EVA 
numbers does not mean that behaviour within the firms would change.  This would 
require the specification of standards for EVA and a link to incentives.  At this stage 
there is no indication that The Treasury in New Zealand would take these steps. 
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Secondly, there are difficulties with the EVA measure.  It is complex and subjective, 
meaning that it is difficult to calculate and can be subject to manipulation.  This means 
that there is a distrust of the results.  Furthermore, its use as a means of comparing 
different businesses would be problematic.  The EVA for one firm cannot be contrasted 
with the EVA of another firm, due to a host of measurement issues.  There are also 
difficulties comparing EVA results for one firm over time, since assets and company 
structure can be subject to fluctuation.  It is not clear how the EVA measure would cope 
with the revaluation of assets. 
 
6.6 Further Developments of the Research Methodology 
 
The study is limited by the fact that only three firms have been studied.  Although they 
were large and important EVA users, it is known that other companies were using EVA 
in New Zealand at that time.  One such company is Transpower, who also published 
EVA results in the annual report and accounts up to 2004.  The study could be extended 
to include such companies.  Furthermore, richer conclusions could be drawn by 
examining companies in different countries.  For example, it would be useful to 
investigate organisations in developing countries, to see if EVA is present and to 
examine whether they are going through a similar process of evolution.  The influence 
of regulators that require EVA results (for example for SOEs in China) could also be 
examined.   
 
Every attempt was made to interview respondents from a variety of positions within the 
firms, to ensure triangulation of results.  However, respondents were providing their 
own opinions sometimes these may not have been the view of other respondents.  For 
example, when EVA was abandoned in one firm, some individuals remained loyal to 
the system and regretted the move away from it.  These differences could be explored in 
more detail and with more respondents.   
 
Finally, although this study is longitudinal in nature, it did require an end point.  
Different conclusions may be drawn if the study is extended (with the same firms), 
particularly if the extension went beyond the recession to a more buoyant economic 
climate. 
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Appendix A. Pilot questionnaire issued in 1999 
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Appendix B. Extract from Post’s annual report 1999, illustrating the 
use of EVA 
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Appendix C. Airways’ EVA statements published in the annual report 
and accounts, 1999 
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Appendix D. Extract from a presentation to employees regarding the 
EVA performance incentive scheme at Company X, 2000/2001 
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Appendix E. Extracts from Company Z Annual Incentive Plan 
Guidebook, 2000/2001
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